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Abstract 
This disssertation investigates spillover effects in the South African SA banking 
sector using a number of different perspectives and methods. First, I used an adapted 
model developed by Claessens et al., (2001) and extended by Uiboupin (2005) to 
identify the effect of the foreign banks’ re-entry on the domestic banks’ performance 
after the apartheid regime change. The results show that the foreign banks’ entry has 
an effect on the before-tax profit of domestic banks and increases the competition in 
SA banking market.  
 
Then I further the investigation from an efficiency perspective using a cost efficiency 
model for the same bank panel. The results show that on average foreign banks are 
28% more efficient that domestic banks. But the results show that over the period 
2000-10 both categories of banks increased their efficiency level by around  10% and 
that the origin of the banks as well as their size were the main factors responsible for 
the efficiency gap. Then results from the implemention of a survey I designed, using 
an adapted version of Kraft (2002) for the foreign banks and branches, confirm that 
the entry of foreign banks contributed to the modernisation of the SA banking sector 
and to the introduction of new products and best practices, leading to the conclusion 
that spillover effects were localised in the limited segment of the SA wholesale 
banking.  
 
I analyse the impact of recent FDIs in SA banking sector, in terms of knowledge 
transfer and spillovers. The results show that the acquisition of ABSA (an SA big 
four) by Barclays (a British bank) generated increased efficiency. That was not the 
case for the Standard Bank (another of the SA big four), of which a 20% share was 
acquired by ICBC. The results show that these recent FDIs have no significant 
impact on  competitiors’ behaviour and strategy.   
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General introduction  
The primary subject matter of this thesis is spillover effects (also called foreign direct 
investment knowledge spillovers) in the South African (SA) banking sector during 
the post-apartheid regime and in particular the impacts of the presence of foreign 
banks on SA domestic banks performance. The dissertation explores the benefits in 
terms of strategy and knowledge transfer from both foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and “greenfield” investment (minority participation in domestic bank shareholding) 
made respectively by British and Chinese banks. In order to achieve this, the study 
uses a set of quantitative and qualitative models and methodologies such as general 
regressions (see model 3.1) to identify spillover and competition effects, efficiency 
regression (see model 3.5) to calculate efficiency scores of foreign and domestic 
banks, a survey of the foreign banks to determine channels of spillover diffusion 
(questionnaire in annex 3.10), and an interview guide (annex 5.1) that helps to 
analyse knowledge transfer.  
 
Knowledge spillovers, are defined as knowledge created by one firm, which is used 
by a second firm, where the user does not fully compensate the creator for this use 
(Javorcik, 2004). In addition, it is defined as improved technology, financial returns, 
labour productivity or some other measure of productivity (Bosco, 2001). 
Furthermore, inward FDIs can act as catalyst to facilitate the creation of other 
benefits such as job increases and knowledge transfer. Although it can be considered 
as a form of knowledge spillover, knowledge transfer is distinct from knowledge 
spillover and is defined, as purposeful or intended diffusion of knowledge from one 
firm to the other and as such represents no externality (Smeets, 2008).  
 
This study adopts a specific way to identify the existence of spillover effects in the 
SA banking sector, its key research question. To achieve this, the study explores the 
existing literature and sets an appropriate approach of analysis. This approach 
consists of, i) Analysing in-depth the SA banking sector and identifying segments 
where knowledge spillovers are likely to occur and provide the reason why, ii) 
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defining theoretically the relationship between aspects of competition and FDI and 
establishing the hypotheses for competition and spillovers effects, iii) defining 
theoretically the relationship between efficiency and FDI and establishing the 
hypotheses for efficiency as a vector of spillover effects, iv) and testing both 
hypotheses specifically in SA banking sector using survey and case study techniques 
and then generalising the findings using empirical models such as linear regressions 
and x-efficiency models.  
 
In an attempt to answer the key research questions and formalise the above proprosed 
approach, this dissertation is decomposed into seven chapters, excluding the 
introduction and conclusion. Chapter 1 provides an extensive theoretical review of 
the aspects and shapes of knowledge spillovers in both the manufacturing and 
banking sectors. I semantically distinguish between FDI knowledge spillovers used 
in the manufacturing sector and spillover effects in the banking sector. In addition, I 
explain the economics of multinational banking from a theoretical perspective, which 
summarises the theory of Multinational Banks (MNBs).  
 
Chapter 2 defines the context of knowledge spillovers in the SA banking sector.  This 
chapter is inspired by the theoretical framework mentioned in chapter 1 and provides 
more theoretical aspects on direct, indirect effects as well as on the technological 
gap, demonstration effects, and addresses the growing importance of information 
communication technology (ICT) during these last years. It establishes how 
competition, which is an indirect effect, is a condition for spillover effects to occur. It 
also highlights the importance of the market segmentation when studying spillover 
effects. The main issue is that ignoring the segments in which foreign banks operate 
could minimise the relative effect of FDI spillovers. If the foreign banks are only 
interested in limited market segments then the effect on overall competition will be 
small, but inversely, it can be assumed that if they are interested in the broader 
market, their effect on competition may be large (Kraft, 2002). In addition to 
competition, the relationship beween efficiency and FDI is theoretically exposed and 
the implication of efficiency on competition and spillovers is examined. Further 
analysis is provided in chapter 5. Consequently, two sets of hypotheses are 
established. The first set is concerned with the effect of foreign banks’ presence on 
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SA banks’ performance and competition. Claessens et al (2001) find that in 
developing countries, foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks and an 
increase in the number of foreign banks reduces the level of profitability and margins 
of domestic banks in a specific market. The second set is concerned with the 
efficiency level and FDI spillovers. For instance, Micco et al (2004) find that in 
developing countries, foreign ownership is positively correlated with banks’ 
efficiency and performance, but this finding is not true in developed countries. The 
two sets of hypotheses are tested and results are presented respectively in chapters 4, 
5, 6 and 7.  
 
Chapter 3 presents data and methods used, the results of which are in chapters 4, 6 
and 7. It presents and describes the two empirical models corresponding to the two 
set of hypotheses. The first model tests the effects of foreign banks’ presence on SA 
banks performance and uses linear regression, and I ran thirty-six regressions 
equations. The second model uses x-efficiency estimates to calculate the score 
efficiency of both the foreign and the domestic banks. For both estimates I used Stata 
software version 11 for Mac.  These two models use the same sources of data. These 
sources are identified and the definition of these data is provided. The timescale is 
identical for both models as the period of study spans from 2000 to 2010. Chapter 3 
also presents the methods and procedures for the survey. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a full analysis of the presence of foreign banks in SA from a 
survey methodoloy. It addresses directly the reasons for the foreign banks re-entry in 
1994, the reasons why they are still operating in SA and their intentions beyond 
2011-12, which could be a prelude to a new configuration of the SA banking sector. 
This section helps to identify specifically both the segment in which foreign banks 
operate and compete with SA banks, and the channels of spillovers. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses specifically from a case study perspective the relationship 
between efficiency and FDI in the SA banking market. It defines aspects of voluntary 
and involuntary spillovers, highlights the importance of the country of origin in the 
process of technology transfer and evaluates whether knowledge transfer depends on 
the degree of ownership by analysing the efficiency before and after the British and 
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the Chinese FDIs of both ABSA, a SA-based British-owned institution and the 
Standard Bank, where ICBC has a minority but significant ownership. This chapter 
evaluates the impacts on the industrial structure in the SA banking market after 
entries by analysing the degree of efficiency of the competitors of these two banks to 
determine the presence of any knowledge spillovers. This chapter is important 
because it analyses directly the existence of knowledge and spillovers from foreign 
banks’ presence, which operate in all segments (wholesale and retail) of banking.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the findings from the first set of hypotheses about spillover and 
competition effects. The impacts of variables, measuring the presence of foreign 
banks including number of foreign banks (ForNum) and the foreign banks’ share 
(ForShr) in the SA market, on five performance indicators including net interest 
income (NIIN) also called net interest margin, non interest income (NOINTIN), 
before tax profits (BTXP) and total expenses (TOEX) also called overhead costs, are 
analysed. The results confirm empirically the existence of a competition effect. The 
results also potentially show the existence of spillovers effects, but this depends on 
the segments in which foreign banks operate, as it is an important parameter 
necessary to capture any possible spillover effects.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings from the second set of hypotheses on efficiency. The 
efficiency scores of both categories of banks (foreign and domestic) are calculated. 
The difference between the two is presented and explained, as well as the trend over 
the 10 year period (2000-10). These results confirm and magnify findings from 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. This chapter also deals with the factors that explain the 
efficiency gap between the two categories of banks. These factors include the level 
of equity (risks), and the size and the management of the banks.  
 
This dissertation provides a unique and distinctive approach to the issue of the 
knowledge spillover theory. First, the literature on effects of FDI in the 
manufacturing sector is fairly well developed but this is not the case for the banking 
sector. And in banking, most empirical investigations of FDI have focused either on 
multinational banks (MNBs) operating in the US market or on US MNBs operating 
abroad, and a few studies have been carried out in Canada, Europe, Japan or 
 xvi 
Australia. However there are no studies that examine fully the issue of FDI spillovers 
in the SA banking sector.  
 
In addition, the previous empirical research in the banking sector concentrates 
essentially on the MNBs’ performance (or profitability) in foreign markets. This 
dissertation tries to reconcile many aspects of empirical analysis available in both 
manufacturing and banking sectors. In order to achieve this, it starts by presenting a 
literature review that provides detailed aspects of the many shapes of the theory of 
FDI knowledge spillovers and their empirical evidence in the manufacturing sector. 
Then it presents the MNBs theory to analyse the internationalisation of foreign banks 
and links them to FDI spillovers. This creates a base that underpins the theory of FDI 
in the banking sector. This dissertation is the first document that examines 
theoretically and extensively a multisectoral review of FDI knowledge spillovers that 
combines a review of both banking and manufacturing.  
 
It also goes further by identifying the relevant empirical models from both sectors 
and puts them together to create a specific empirical framework necessary to analyse 
the effects of the foreign banks and knowledge spillovers in the SA banking sector, a 
geographic location where studies are rather limited. Furthermore, while the 
literature in general uses either empirical models or case studies to address the issues 
of FDI, this dissertation innovates by using both methodologies. For this reason 
chapter 4 uses a survey to describe and evaluate the multiple strategies of foreign 
banks and branches into the SA banking and their influence in terms of inputs for 
new knowledge, competition and spillover effects, based on the idea that the 
presence of the foreign banks may demonstrate the availability of products and 
knowledge that the domestic banks may adopt. In return this may increase 
competition.  
 
Equally, the case study in chapter 5 plays an important part in term of methodology 
and outcomes. While the existing literature hightlights the importance of two recent 
FDI in the SA banking sector, this study goes further by analysing specifically 
whether these two major FDI contributed to increase competition from an efficiency 
perspective.  
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Then, this aspect of competition and spillovers effects is tested and generalised 
though an empirical model, whose results are presented in chapter 6. The other 
stream of ideas, from an efficiency perspective, according to which foreign banks are 
more efficient than domestic banks, is tested through both the case study (from 
recent acquisition and foreign participation, as mentioned earlier) and empirical 
angles (from data of 14 banks operating in SA). By combining empirical analyses, a 
survey and a case study from a multisector approach, this dissertation provides a 
unique but nevertheless solid justification to examine FDI knowledge spillovers in 
the SA banking sector. 
 
The outputs of this dissertation contribute to and participate in the ongoing debate 
about the theoretical aspects of knowledge spillovers FDI for different reasons. First, 
the former definition of knowledge spillovers is directly taken from the literature on 
FDI knowledge spillovers in the manufacturing sector, as the literature on FDI 
knowledge spillovers focuses primarily on the manufacturing sector and mainly in 
geographical areas such as the US, Europe and more recently Asia, Japan and 
Australia. The literature on banking is at a relatively embryonic stage (Herrero and 
Simon 2003) and more studies are needed in this sector at firm-level, especially as 
we are currently entering a new generation of internationalisation in the banking 
sector (Haddad and Harrison 1993; Barrios et al 2006; Okeahalam, 2008).   
 
Second, the reason for limited empirical studies in the banking sector lies in the 
scarcity of available data that is even more acute in the case of Sub-Saharan African 
countries (SSA). Most of the foreign banks in Africa were established during the 
colonial period, and since have enjoyed monopoly-type behaviour. But the last 
decade has seen many African countries liberalising their financial systems, opening 
up their banking markets and have allowed competitors to establish operations. 
Despite efforts made in terms of efficiency and market stability, many African 
countries’ banking sectors are still underdeveloped, lagging behind when compared 
with other developing countries. Therefore, by studying the spillover effects in the 
SA banking sector, this thesis contributes to fill this gap, given the importance of 
financial sector development for economic growth.  
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And finally, the literature on spillovers provides key elements of the impacts of 
internationalisation on the performance of firms, where the performance is measured 
in terms of efficiency. To explore spillovers and competition effects theoretically, 
and measure the effect of the presence of the foreign banks in SA, one established 
framework that is described takes its origin from the manufacturing sector. The 
internalisation theory provides a theoretical framework to explore the 
multinationalisation of banks (Williams, 1997). Given that the question addressed by 
the theory of MNBs is central to the theory of FDI in the manufacturing sector 
(Grubel, 1977), I assume that analysing the effects of the presence of foreign banks 
in developing countries, in particular in SA, is equivalent to looking at the effects of 
FDI in the manufacturing sector. This assumption explains why I base most of my 
empirical analysis on this theory, which when combined with aspects of 
technological gap and demonstration effects, establishes the effects of foreign banks’ 
presence in developing countries. I describe and apply the technological gap theory 
as well as the demonstration effects concepts to the banking sector. The findings are 
in line with the existing literature. But although confirmed, the resulting spillover 
effects are more limited to the wholesale banking segment, while it seems more 
difficult for the retail sector to take full advantage of these benefits. With the 
dominance of the big four banks (ABSA, Standard Bank, FirstRand and Nedbank), in 
the retail banking sector, competition due to the presence of foreign banks does not 
seem to play an important role. Falkena et al. (2004) and Okeahalam (2001) have 
concluded that the SA banking sector is highly concentrated and this high level of 
concentration is the result of a few large banks dominating the market, which shows 
that the SA banking sector is suffering from a low level of competition (Greenberg 
and Simbanegavi, 2009). Does it mean that these big four behave as a cartel? The 
Enquiry Panel conclusion of the SA competition commission was negative (Jali et 
al., 2008).  
 
This dissertation brings an original contribution at different levels and in different 
areas.  
It contributes to the theoretical debate on the way FDI spillovers occur, which have 
previously focused on spillovers through manufacturing processes. This thesis 
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extends the nature of FDI spillovers to those related to the banking sector, an IT 
(information technology)-dominated service industry. Spillovers are shown to occur 
in a different way, through copying managerial practices and organizational 
processes, through tacit knowledge transfer more than through transfer of more 
physically capital intensive processes related to manufacturing. This introduces 
subtle distinctions into the consideration of the nature of those spillovers, making 
them more dependent on the integration of management practices by the acquiring 
bank into the company organizational structure. The thesis argues that these 
spillovers are not likely to occur automatically and depend on the segment of the 
banking sector that is being integrated. 
Although focusing on economics and strategy aspects of FDI, the implications of its 
findings go beyond and stretch to the areas of globalisation and political economy. 
Reasons to study FDI in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are both the Chinese involvement 
in the region, as a recent new economic player, which started back in 2000, and the 
emergence of South-South economic relationships amongst countries that includes 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The example of minority 
shareholding (20%) of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), a 
Chinese bank, into the Standard Bank, one of the SA big four, provides an 
illustration of the importance of both the SA banking market and the interest of 
China in Africa. And Chinese ownership in a South African bank is compared with 
British ownership into a similarly sized South African bank.  
 
Another original contribution resides in the SA itself as a recipient of FDI. SA is a 
paradox. It is the largest SSA economy in terms of GDP (World Bank, 2012) and yet 
a developing country (World Bank Data, 2013; IMF, 2012). However, the SA 
banking sector is somehow unique in its kind. While many Sub-Saharan African 
countries are still lagging behind with respect to their financial sector development 
when compared with those in developed countries, the SA for a developing country 
has a well-developed and sophisticated financial sector (Schoombee, 2000). The SA 
commercial banks’ assets represent about 87% of GDP compared to the 68% of GDP 
for 22 other middle-income countries in 1990 (Demirguc-Kunt and Ross, 1996; 
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, 1995) and 93% of SA total deposits to GDP in 2007 (Greenberg and 
Simbanegavi, 2009). I checked the validity of this argument that SA for a developing 
country has a well-developed and sophisticated financial sector (Schoombee, 2000), 
by looking at private credit (defined by the IMF as claims on the private sector by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions) to GDP (PCGDP) of SA 
compared to other 10 different countries of different sizes over the period 1993-2010. 
It appears that SA PCGDP is the third highest, larger than those of developed 
countries such as France, Greece and Italy (Figure 3.2).  
 
Another attractive aspect of the SA banking sector for more FDI, that contributes to 
the originality of this thesis, is that it highlights the internationalisation strategies that 
these big four banks have chosen to sustain asset growth (see annex 4.1: Interview 
guide). This has been the case for Nedbank, ABSA and FirstRand back in mid-
1990s, whose objective was to maintain the market-sustaining approach of the 1980s 
in order to support the trade and investment activities of South African corporate 
customers. Nedbank and ABSA, for instance, had offices in China to help trade 
between the two countries as well as the rest of Africa (we mentioned earlier the 
importance of the South African mining industry to China). As of 2010, Nedbank has 
four subsidiaries in Southern Africa, branches in London, Singapore and Hong Kong 
and representatives in China and Taiwan. It has a commercial partnership with 
Ecobank and some minority participation in 2013. In 2010 the HongKong Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (HSBC), a British bank, launched a bid for 70% of Nedbank 
but then withdrew from the bid. ABSA too is present in six countries and some parts 
of Southern Africa. Barclays took a 51% stake in ABSA in 2005 with a specific 
strategy of transferring Barclays’ African operations to the bank, which allows 
Barclays to increase its shareholding in ABSA. This strategy in fact took place 
recently in 2013. So the international presence of ABSA currently covers eight 
countries in 2010 plus all African countries covered by Barclays activities. FirstRand 
Bank has been more modest in its strategy of internationalisation and has a strong 
regional presence, in particular in Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland, Nigeria, 
Angola and other African countries. FirstRand has branches in London, India and 
                                                        
1 SARB: South African Reserve Bank 
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representation in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The strategy of Standard Bank 
(SBSA) consists of both market-seeking, focusing on emerging markets, and a 
broader internationalisation. SBSA is not interested in Western markets like the US, 
which are overbanked and too competitive to buy into; instead they bought ANX 
Grindlays Bank in 1992 that had presence in eight African countries. SBSA has 
representative offices in Shanghai, in more than 15 Eastern European and Latin 
America countries, in 18 African countries and in 8 industrialised countries. In China 
they have activities in commodity trading and M&A advisory services and Latin 
America where it reduced its participation. As outlined earlier, ICBC, a Chinese 
bank, took a minority participation in the SBSA in 2007 and recently SBSA reduced 
its participation in some banking activities located in South America and East Europe 
to re-focus on African markets. Some believe that this new direction of strategy was 
dictated by ICBC and this issue was addressed with the SBSA representative in the 
case study in chapter 4.  
 
In addition to its well-developed financial sector, and its relatively internationalised 
four big banks, SA has a favourable FDI policy that the post-apartheid government 
has implemented from 1995 by progressively liberalising the financial market. As a 
consequence, the SA economy experienced an increase in terms of capital inflows 
(Mohamed, 2010). The several bilateral agreements signed with countries from 
Europe, Asia / Middle East and Latin America, and its involvement in multinational 
agreements such as WTO and GATT (Tralac, 2004) and regional integration 
agreements such as SACU or SADEC, make SA a good location for FDI.  
 
And finally, the last factor that makes SA banking sector so attractive and of interest 
is its banking infrastructure. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was created in 
1887 to channel capital into the mining industry. The enormous amount of capital to 
finance the gold mining industry contributed to the emergence of the corporate sector 
after 1945, and in the 1990s JSE was in the top 20 stock exchanges globally by 
market capitalisation (Gelb, 2010). This is why FDI became so important in 
manufacturing development and in the 1970s South Africa was considered an 
important borrower. Even at that time after most of the foreign banks left South 
Africa because of the political regime, the skills and the capability accumulated 
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earlier were maintained, as well as its presence in international centres via 
participation in international banking supervision and monetary policy networks 
(Gelb, 2010). Domestic banking re-opened in 1995 to branches of foreign banks. As 
a consequence the presence of foreign banks in the market more than doubled 
(Figure 3.1), and this increased competition in the domestic wholesale banking 
market as the findings show in chapter 6. The benefit from this competition was the 
modernisation of capabilities in credit and risk management, and in investment and 
merchant banking and the domestic market was able to offer new products (currency 
derivatives, interest rate warrants) as the foreign banks survey shows in chapter 4.     
 
Given this favourable political and economic context, it was not surprising to see 
many foreign banks returning soon after 1995 in SA to establish branches and 
representations, as just mentioned, although it is important to remember that some of 
the foreign banks never really left SA during the Apartheid period. But it was only in 
2005, that Barclays, a British bank, returned to SA in the form of FDI (prior to 2005 
it was already operating as a branch) by taking a majority share of Amalgamated 
Bank of South Africa (ABSA), one of the SA four big banks. The deal cost Barclays 
about $20 billion (compared to the $50 billion Merrill Lynch acquisition deal made 
by Bank of America in 2008) and that was the first major direct investment (FDI) 
since foreign banks’ re-entry. Two years later, in 2007, it was ICBC that took a 
minority but significant 20% share in the Standard Bank shareholding for an amount 
of $20 billon. These examples illustrate both how important the SA banking sector is 
and its attractiveness as a financial and banking location. In 2010, the SA banking 
market comprised 15 locally controlled banks, 6 foreign controlled banks and 
branches of 13 foreign banks. With such a number of more than 30 banks, a number 
much higher than in any other African countries, a variety of ownership structures 
and an ability of the domestic banks to be internationalised, picking up the SA 
banking sector was an obvious choice of study. Therefore, after more than 15 years 
of presence, with a number of foreign banks that surpasses the number of domestic 
ones, it could legitimately be asked what type of benefits have been generated from 
the presence of foreign banks in SA and how should we measure them.  
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During these years of research the main challenge I had to overcome was that of data 
collection and analysis. I have mentioned the scarcity of studies in the area of 
banking of sub-Saharan African countries and argued that the main reason for this is 
the limited availability of data. In SA, the domestic banks, which are under private 
ownership, have the obligation to publish their annual reports in compliance with SA 
regulation, and the keenness of these banks to provide archived documents back from 
2000 is to be noted. The study has collected data from balance sheet profit and loss 
accounts from the SA domestic banks in order to compare some key indicators on 
performance and costs. And by putting together bank-specific data (firm-level) with 
data on foreign bank presence as well as data on SA macro-economics for the years 
2000-10, this study to my knowledge, is the first to analyse empirically the extent of 
spillovers and competition effects of the foreign banks in SA. Many studies highlight 
the importance of the deals between ABSA and Barclays and between the Standard 
Bank and ICBC. But this study is the first that compares the direct transfer of 
knowledge of both foreign banks to the domestic ones and the presence of spillover 
effects that may be generated to the entire SA banking system.  
 
Logistically, collecting information about the domestic and the foreign banks that are 
operating in SA was a very important task of this PhD programme. This task of data 
collection required travelling several times to SA for the following reasons. Realising 
that it was not possible to gather most of banks information needed from the SARB, 
and in particular the data from the foreign branches, I approached all banks of the 
study panel (Annex 3.1) and asked them to provide me with their archive annual 
reports for the period 1993 to 2010. After explaining carefully the purpose of this 
study, the domestic banks as well as the foreign-owned banks that are listed in JSE, 
enthusiastically sent me back copies they possessed. Unfortunately, many annual 
reports were missing for the sub-period 1994-2000. This is the reason why I decided 
to consider only the period 2000-10 for the study. This period and these data were 
used to feed the empirical models investigating the effects of the foreign banks on 
SA domestic banks as well as the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic banks 
and its determinants. Furthermore, it was not possible to get the same kind of bank-
specific data from the foreign bank branches for legal reasons. The foreign banks 
directed me to their global annual report made by their mother banks that are located 
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in home countries. After consulting these annual reports, it became clear that 
information was aggregated and there was no possible way to extract results specific 
to the SA market. To overcome this situation, I broadened the study by designing a 
survey that was implemented for the foreign banks and branches that are operating in 
SA. The survey contributed to identify not only the spillover effects but also helped 
to capture key elements needed in the formulation of the banks’ strategy in the SA 
market (design and implementation processes are described in chapter 3). My 
presence in SA helped me to have direct contacts (including organising meetings, 
conference calls and email exchanges) not only with representatives of ABSA and 
the Standard Banks but also with the representatives of banks’ competitors and other 
actors of the banking sector such as the SARB, the Competition Commission, the SA 
Treasury, strategy consultants, lawyers and representatives of banking consumers. 
This helped deepen the understanding of the SA market especially when specific 
mechanisms of spillover and factors that trigger competition were identified. For 
instance, I found that the currency crisis in 2001 had an impact on the domestic 
banks performance from the results of the first empirical model (3.1). Furthermore, I 
discovered that one of the main factors responsible for competitive pressure was not 
so much the presence of the foreign banks but in fact the emergence of a new 
domestic competitor in the retail banks that created serious challenges for the big 
four in terms of strategy.  
 
During my staying in SA I was based at the Tralac (Centre for trade and law for the 
Southern Africa) as a visiting researcher, where and I could benefit from the Tralac 
expertise and logistics. I partnered with the Graduate Business School of the 
University of Cape Town (GSB-UCT) for the preparation and the implementation of 
the survey.  
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Chapter 1 
1.  A multi-sector review of the theory of FDI 
There are relatively few studies on multinationals in Africa. The history of 
multinational operations in Africa has to be found in the strong relationships 
inherited from the late colonial period. However, since the mid 1990s, and 
particularly at the beginning of the 2000s, a wave of new entries has been observed 
in the African continent. This phenomenon has not yet been fully scrutinised and the 
banking sector in Sub-Saharan Africa remains particularly understudied.  
 
In the 1990s many studies focused their attention on FDI in the manufacturing sector 
and real production activity, called general FDI. These studies have analysed the 
impacts of FDI on technological transfers, productivity and wages. The implications 
and effects of FDI are important, as for many developing countries in the 1990s, FDI 
remained the main source of external finance. Goldberg (2004), who studied FDIs in 
both manufacturing and financial sectors, argues that financial FDIs (FFDIs) share 
many of the features of general FDIs. For instance, before setting up an operation in 
a host country, the manufacturer would assess first whether it is important to service 
this specific market and second, whether the market should be serviced via export or 
the establishment of a local production. By analogy, the bank would decide whether 
it is important to provide lending, deposit-taking and other services to this market 
when assessing the market. Then if the bank decides to service this market, it would 
assess whether it is via cross-border activities or FDI. FDI inevitably would take the 
form of either opening branches or subsidiaries. The reasons for entry into a new 
market may lie in the opportunity to acquire local market share and take advantage of 
sales or production networks. And both manufacturing and financial sectors share 
these different features.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the early theoretical contributions that have been 
developed. I first review the literature on FDI in manufacturing, based on the FDI 
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knowledge spillover framework as illustrated in figure 1.1. Then I present a review 
of the literature on spillover effects in the banking sector. 
1.1  The theory of FDI in the manufacturing sector 
In the discussion on FDI in the manufacturing sector I assume the following 
definition of knowledge spillover, which consists of the creation of knowledge by a 
multinational enterprise (MNE), used by a local host country firm and where the 
local firm does not fully compensate for the use of this knowledge (Javorcik, 2004b). 
This definition has to be distinguished from knowledge transfer, which is purposeful 
or intended diffusion of knowledge from one firm to the other (Smeet, 2008). The 
process of knowledge spillover is illustrated in Figure 1.1. This process identifies 
three areas where it is necessary to allow for the existence of spillovers or as 
preconditions for spillovers: aspects of MNEs, channels of FDI knowledge spillovers 
and aspects of local firms.  
Figure 1.1: General FDI knowledge spillover process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Smeet (2008) figure adapted by the author 
 
1.1.1 Channels of FDI knowledge spillovers  
It is important to note that in the sector of financial (banking) and services this term 
can be called channels of spillover effects. In the manufacturing sector (figure 1.1) 
there are three main channels, from which knowledge can spill over (Saggi, 2006). 
The first is vertical linkages, when the MNE spills over knowledge to its suppliers 
and customers. The second channel, workers mobility from MNE to local firms, 
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allows employees who received training from the MNE to apply their knowledge in 
the local firm. Finally the demonstration effect is when the local firms imitate or 
reverse engineer MNEs’ products and/or practices. 
1.1.1.1  Vertical linkages 
Studies of FDI have examined the vertical linkages of spillovers (Hoekman and 
Javorcik, 2006; Lin and Saggi, 2005; and Saggi, 2006). Knowledge spillovers 
through backward linkages consist of both knowledge transfer from the MNE to its 
suppliers or customers, and knowledge spillover. The knowledge spillover is 
therefore a consequence of the knowledge transfer because the domestic supplier or 
customer firm exploits the knowledge received from the MNE in its (vertical) 
relationship with other firms.  
 
Early contributions in this field were made by Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen 
and Venables (1999). Rodriguez-Clare studies the input demand-effects of MNEs. 
Rodriguez-Clare builds a model with monopolistic competition in the intermediate 
sector, which national firms and MNEs use as inputs in their final goods production. 
Later he realises that final goods of MNEs are more complex and all firms have love-
of-variety for inputs. When a MNE enters a market, it generates an increased demand 
for intermediate inputs. This constitutes the backward linkage. The monopolistic 
competition in this sector means that the variety of available inputs produced 
increases and then producers of final goods benefit due to the love-of-variety for 
inputs. This constitutes the forward linkage effect. Although similar in many aspects, 
the difference with the Markusen and Venables model resides in the fact that 
Markusen and Venables explicitly considers the intra-industry competition effect that 
a MNE induces upon entry. Finally, the Markusen and Venables studies as well as 
Rodriguez-Clare studies do not fully address the knowledge spillover effect but focus 
rather on early spillovers and competition effects.  
 
Lin and Saggi (2007) study vertical technology transfer (VTT) through backward 
linkages from an MNE to their local suppliers. Lin and Saggi’s idea is that only after 
an MNE has negotiated an exclusivity contract with some local suppliers – assuming 
that the local suppliers are not allowed to supply to any other local firms – the VTT 
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takes place. But this definition of knowledge spillovers has not yet reached a 
complete consensus. 
 
Some authors find vertical linkages in their studies. Javorcik (2004a) finds evidence 
of positive backward linkage spillovers but not forward linkage spillovers. Javorcik 
and Spatareanu (2008) too find similar results by identifying positive backward 
linkage spillovers only for MNEs that share ownership with local firms. Similarly to 
Javorcik and Spatareanu, Kugler (2006) finds evidence of backward linkages but 
none for forward linkages when he analyses FDI for eight Colombian sectors. 
Bwalya (2006) as well as Schoors and van der Tol (2002) find similar evidence when 
assessing FDI for a sample of, respectively, Zambian manufacturing firms and 
Hungarian firms.  
 
1.1.1.2  Worker Mobility 
Another way knowledge can spill over from MNEs to domestic host country firms is 
from labour turnover (also referred to as labour turnover in banking and services 
sector). The idea is that the MNE provides its workforce with a higher degree of 
training, education and valuable working experience than the domestic firm can 
provide. Consequently, whether the workforce decides to work in the domestic firm 
or set up their own local company, they can use knowledge acquired in the MNE’s 
subsidiary. Since the MNE does not receive any compensation, this therefore 
constitutes a knowledge spillover.   
 
Motta and Ronde (2001) pioneered this channel for knowledge spillovers. In their 
model, a firm has to make a choice between FDI and exports to service the foreign 
market with the workers to be trained if exports are selected. When training is 
completed, both the local firm and the MNE make a bid to acquire the trained 
worker. Knowledge spills over in the case that the local firm makes a higher bid. It is 
likely that such a spillover would happen if market competition were low and 
knowledge easy to transfer.  
 
 5 
Another way to measure knowledge spillovers from worker mobility is to consider 
the wages that are paid by firms that employ experts from MNEs. This is exactly 
what Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) provide in a model where spillovers are in a 
general equilibrium setting. The Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) study supports 
this hypothesis showing that hiring foreign experts increases the real wages of the 
hiring plant. Their model shows that the effect is instantaneous and persistent. This 
means that it lasts not only during the period of hiring but also after the foreign 
expert has left the plant.  
 
Gorg and Strobl (2005) find that an owner of a local firm who has previously worked 
in a MNE increases the productivity of his local firm on condition that the worker 
operates in the same sector. However, the fact that an owner has received specific 
training does not guarantee significant productivity to the firm. But a question is to 
what extent this result reflects the more general situation in which any foreign 
employee, not just the owner hired by the local firm, can create knowledge 
spillovers. The answer can be found in Poole (2008) who finds that increase in 
foreign workers’ presence increases wages. This result indicates that knowledge 
spills over from former MNE employees to domestic firms. Similar findings were 
suggested in Hale and Long’s work (2006).  
 
1.1.1.3  Demonstration effects 
The literature provides some definition of demonstration effects (Cheung and Lin, 
2004; Moran, Graham and Blomstrom, 2005), and according to Saggi (2002), 
demonstration effects occur though the imitation and reverse engineering of MNEs’ 
products and practices by local firms. Other studies (Gorg and Strobl, 2001; Holger, 
G. and Greenaway, 2004) look essentially for horizontal (intra industry) spillovers 
but implicitly deal with demonstration effects because they occur mainly though 
these horizontal spillovers (Saggi, 2002). But studies of empirical demonstration 
effects can lead to mixed and conflicting results. Unfortunately not much can be said 
about demonstration effects because studies in this field are less developed.   
 6 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of study on FDI knowledge spillovers 
Channels of spillovers Study Results 
Vertical linkage Javorcik (2004a) Positive backward linkage effect and no forward linkage effect 
 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) Positive backward linkage effect 
 Kugler (2006) Positive backward linkage effect 
 Bwalya (2006) Positive backward linkage effect 
 School and Van der Tol (2001) Positive backward linkage effect and negative forward linkage effect 
Worker mobility  Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) Positive 
 Gorg and Strob (2005) Positive 
 Poole (2006) Positive 
 Hale and Long (2006) Positive 
 Cheung and Lin (2004)  Positive 
 Hale and Long (2006) Positive 
Demonstration effects Cheung and Lin (2004)  
 Hale and Long (2006)  
Source: Smeets (2008) table simplified by the author 
 
 7 
 
1.1.2 Transmission factors of spillovers  
The literature has identified some factors that are necessary for an effective 
transmission of knowledge spillovers. This is a result of conclusions from 
observations in which countries and firms within countries differ in their ability to 
benefit from the presence of foreign-owned firms and their superior technology 
(Lipseyand Sjoholm, 2005). In the financial and service sectors, this transmission 
factor is referred to as a determinant of spillover effects. The transmission factors are 
the concepts of absorptive capacity and geographic proximity (also called spatial 
proximity or geographic localisation). Other factors are discussed such as intellectual 
property rights and competition. 
 
1.1.2.1  Absorptive capacity (AC) and backwardness 
The literature presents some relationship that links AC and backwardness: Findlay 
(1978) and Wang and Blomstrom (1992) argue enhancing spillovers depends on 
increased technological backwardness. At the same time, other authors such as 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Glass and Saggi (1998) would claim that firms need 
some minimum amount of absorptive capacity to allow them to capture spillovers. 
AC therefore is created by (or defined as a consequence of) investments in R&D or 
human capital that provide a favourable platform of fundamental knowledge and 
technology essential in the assimilation and the exploitation of external knowledge 
(Smeet, 2008).  
 
1.1.2.2  Geographic localisation 
Some components of FDI mentioned earlier such as mobility of workers and vertical 
linkage can intuitively suggest how being close to the MNE can become an important 
condition in capturing knowledge (Girma and Wakelin, 2007). But other authors 
made early contributions in the location and FDI field, such as Martin and Ottaviano 
(1999), Baldwin and Martin (1999) and Martin and Ottaviano (2001). Using and 
combining their models, to investigate the influence of special bounded knowledge 
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spillovers on growth rates in two regions, Krugman (1981) and Romer (1990) find 
that firm location is important for growth only if spillovers are spatially bounded. It 
was added that the two regions could grow at similar rates in the long-run 
equilibrium when spillovers are global. Others like Jaffe et al. (1993) and Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2002) contributed by investigating how innovation activities could be 
localised. For this purpose they used evidence from patent citations and show that 
spillovers are localised at different geographic levels (country, states and 
metropolitan statistical areas). However, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) 
demonstrated how innovation activities are more pronounced in knowledge-intensive 
industries.  
 
By analysing spillovers in R&D from nine European countries, Keller (2002) finds 
that the distance it takes for half of total spillovers to be eroded, in other terms called 
the half-life of spillovers, was 1,200 km. In the case of Bottazi and Peri (2003) who 
analyze spillover across 15 countries of the EU, the effect of regional R&D (inputs) 
on the number of patents (outputs) vanishes beyond 300km. Barrios, Bertinelli and 
Strobl (2006) find that in countries having a strong degree of co-agglomeration, 
productivity effects of FDI are positive and significant. Studies carried out by Girma 
and Wakelin (2007) also suggest productivity of domestic plans is positively affected 
by FDI.  
 
1.1.2.3  Intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
IPR is another component that can play a role in FDI spillovers. Where there is a 
strong IPR policy in the host country, MNEs will transfer more and higher quality 
knowledge to their subsidiaries. This will contribute to enhancing potential 
knowledge spillovers. However, the relationship between IPR and the extent of 
spillovers from FDI can be offsetting and effects are still unclear. Markusen (2001) 
analyses the impacts of changes in intellectual property rights protection in a host 
developing country and concludes that increased IPR protection makes spillovers 
less likely if the multinational can not write an enforceable contract with a local 
agent. Glass and Saggi (2002) reach a similar conclusion for their study in 
developing countries and find that FDI does not become relatively more attractive. 
 9 
Most research studies analyse only the effects of IPR on the volume or composition 
of FDI or on the incentives for intra-firm technology transfer. For instance, Javorcik 
(2004a) looks at the effect of IPR on the composition of inward FDI in the Russian 
Federation and five other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Branstetter, 
Fishman and Foley (2006) analyse the impacts of IPR protection on technology 
transfer. The results from their studies on spillovers are inconclusive. Feinberg and 
Majumdar (2001) investigate the spillover implications of FDI in India in a period 
where IPR were reportedly considered to be not strong (1980s – 1990s). Their 
findings conclude that there is no evidence of spillovers. However, Allred and Park 
(2007) conclude that there exists an optimal and positive degree of intellectual 
property rights protection that triggers diffusion of knowledge from MNEs.  
 
1.1.2.4  Competition  
Competition in the host country can be considered as a favourable factor for 
spillovers and knowledge diffusion. Blomstrom, Globerman and Kokko (2001) argue 
greater competition may encourage MNEs to transfer more high quality technology 
to their subsidiaries, increasing the potential for knowledge spillovers. Glass and 
Saggi (1998), Wang and Blomstrom (1992) confirm Blomstrom, Globerman and 
Kokko’s conclusion. Kathuria (2002), who studies the impacts of liberalization of 
Indian industry on spillovers from FDI, finds that the effects on spillovers occur 
mainly through higher FDI.  
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Table 1.2: Summary of study on transmission factors of spillovers  
Transmission factors Study Results 
Absorptive capacity (AC) / Backwardness Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2002) Positive backwardness 
 Castellani and Zanfei (2003)  Positive backwardness and no AC effect 
 Girma (2005) Positive AC (U-shape effect) 
 Peri and Urban Positive backwardness 
 Girma and Gorg (2007) Positive AC (U-shaped effect) 
Geographic proximity Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2006) Positive 
 Girma and Wakelin (2007) Positive 
 Nicolini and Resmini (2007) Positive 
Source: Smeets (2008) table simplified by the author 
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1.1.3 Effects of the multinational enterprises foreign activities 
The theory of multinational enterprises and more specifically multinational banks 
will be discussed further in section 1.2. Here, will be examined how aspects of 
MNEs ownership and nationality of parent affect FDI knowledge spillovers and the 
relationship between motives of FDI and knowledge spillover.  
1.1.3.1  Ownership 
Another important aspect of FDI is the ownership of the MNE, where empirical 
research distinguishes between minority FDI, which indicates that the MNE holds a 
minority share in the foreign affiliate, and majority FDI where the MNE holds a 
majority share in the foreign affiliate. The empirical studies discriminate between 
wholly owned subsidiaries and shared subsidiaries. In examining the relationship 
between spillovers and MNE ownership, Muller and Schnitzer (2006) find a trade-off 
in which a larger ownership share induces the MNE to transfer more technology to 
its subsidiary. Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) were pioneers in investigating the 
relationship between FDI and ownership and their study shows both minority and 
majority FDI lead to spillovers, with no statistical differences between the estimated 
effects. In their findings, Demelis and Louri (2002) show that only majority-owned 
foreign affiliates experience labour productivity improvements as a result of 
knowledge transfer, and minority FDI is more likely than majority FDI to produce 
knowledge spillovers, confirming the Muller and Schnitzer (2006) prediction. And 
more recently, a study from Javorcik and Spartareaunu (2008) shows that shared 
foreign and domestic ownership produces positive vertical spillovers and negative 
horizontal spillovers. Adverse competition effects explain the negative spillover 
effect. Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2010) find that that minority FDI has a 
negative (competition) effect on locally-owned firms’ productivity but majority FDI 
has no effect. They notice that the effect of minority FDI on foreign-owned firms is 
positive and larger than that of majority FDI. And finally, Liu et al. (2000) find that 
the presence of FDI has a positive spillover effect on productivity.  
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1.1.3.2   Nationality of parents 
The nationality of the parent company seems to play a significant role in FDI 
spillovers in the light of some recent studies, many of which compare the Chinese 
FDI from Hong-Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT_FDI) with Western countries 
(WEST_FDI). Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2007b) find that HMT_FDI is less 
technologically advanced than FDI from outside China, and the negative competition 
effect takes over beyond some threshold level. One of the consequences of this, as 
they predicted, is a non-linear spillover effect of increased FDI from these countries. 
However, they acknowledge that the increase of this FDI produces positive 
spillovers. On the other hand WEST_FDI generates a positive linear effect and the 
spillover effect dominates because it carries more advanced technology.  
 
Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2007a) investigate the relationship among HMT_FDI, 
WEST_FDI and productivity in an analysis of 158 Chinese industries. The results 
show that HMT_FDI provides more spillovers in labour-intensive industries and 
WEST_FDI generates more spillovers in technology-intensive industries. 
 
Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2010) find in their study of locally owned 
firms in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan that spillover effects of both minority and 
majority FDI are larger than those in Western countries. Their results confirm the 
opposite was true for spillovers to foreign-owned firms.  
 
Girma and Wakelin (2007) compare three different sources of inward FDI into the 
UK. These inward FDI flows are from Japan with a majority of R&D-intensive 
international companies that operate essentially in the electronics industry; the 
United States, which has a long history of investing in British manufacturing 
industry; and the rest of the world. They find that Japanese and other international 
firms generate significant and positive spillover effects whereas US companies have 
no significant spillover effects. They infer that the high R&D-intensity of Japanese 
FDI explains their finding.   
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Javorcik, Saggi and Spatareanu (2004) study upstream spillover effects of FDI from 
Asian, European and American firms in a panel of Romanian companies. They find 
that Asian and American FDI has positive vertical spillover effects on Romanian 
enterprises whereas European FDI has a negative spillover effect. They interpret 
their results by increased competition in the downstream sector, in which the 
multinational enterprises are operating. There are three major reasons that explain 
why European FDI is weaker: first, Romania is closer to the European Union (EU); 
second, at the time of the study Romania had a preferential trade agreement with the 
EU; and third, inputs sourced from home-country suppliers by EU subsidiaries 
comply with Romania’s rules of origin, which is not the case for Asian or American 
subsidiaries. These authors conclude that all these mechanisms make spillovers 
through vertical linkages less likely for EU subsidiaries due to increased imports of 
intermediate inputs from the EU.  
 
1.1.3.2   Motives for FDI: Technology or market seeking 
The literature relating to the impact of FDI on firm performance in the manufacturing 
sector is abundant, and as reviewed earlier, most of the firms favour FDI as a way of 
exploiting ownership advantages or to take full advantage of technological advance. 
This type of FDI is usually called technology-exploiting FDI (Kuemmerle, 1999; Le 
Bas and Sierra, 2002) and many authors refer to it (Hymer, 1960; Dunning, 1977; 
Markusen, 2002). But there is the reverse of the technology-exploiting FDI called 
technology-seeking which consists of sourcing or seeking external foreign 
knowledge (Dunning and Narula, 1995; Kuemmerle, 1999; Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; 
Siotis, 1999; Le Bas and Sierra, 2002) where enterprises would try to capture 
spillovers from the firms in the host countries they are investing in. In this case, the 
spillovers will flow from the domestic firms to the MNE. Studies that investigate 
these two types of FDI spillovers use variables Min_FDI and Max_FDI to identify 
technology-exploiting and technology-seeking FDI. Driffield and Love (2007) use a 
similar approach to analyse a panel of 11 manufacturing sectors in the UK and find 
that technology-seeking (or sourcing) FDI did not produce spillovers; but 
technology-exploiting did generate spillovers; Girma’s (2005) studies produced 
similar evidence.   
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Other types of FDI include horizontal FDI (Markusen, 1984) motivated by market-
seeking incentives, vertical FDI (Helpman, 1985) that looks for efficiency- or 
resource-seeking FDI; and export platforms for FDI (Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, 
2007), which searches for more efficient locations where exports can be more 
profitable. The degree of positive spillovers from these types of FDI can vary 
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Driffield and Love, 2007). As Protsenko (2003) 
analyses the spillover effects of horizontal and vertical German FDI in the Czech 
Republic, his results show that vertical FDI produces positive spillovers but 
horizontal FDI has effects largely through increased competition. This example is 
given to highlight the importance of these three different types of FDI in examining 
the degree or extent of spillovers.  
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Table 1.3: Summary of study on FDI and knowledge spillovers   
Factor Study Results 
MNE ownership Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) Minority and majority FDI shares have equal spillover effects 
 Dimelis and Louri (2002) Minority FDI shares have greater spillover effect than majority FDI shares 
 Jarvorcik (2004b) Shared foreign and domestic ownership has positive spillover effect 
 Jarvorcik and Spatareanu (2008) Shared foreign and domestic ownership has positive vertical spillover effect and negative 
horizontal spillover effect 
 Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2010) Minority FDI shares have greater spillover effect than majority FDI shareholders 
Nationality of parent company Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2007b) No effect for FDI from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan but positive effect for FDI from 
other countries in high-technology sectors 
 Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2007a) Positive effect for FDI from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in labour intensive 
industries, and positive effect from FDI from other countries in technology-intensive 
industries 
 Abraham, Konings and Slootmaekers (2010) Larger effect for FDI from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan on locally owned enterprises 
and the opposite for foreign-owned enterprises 
 Javorcik, Saggi and Spartareanu (2004) FDI from Asia and America has positive upstream spillover effects and FDI from the EU 
has negative spillover effects 
 Girma and Wakelin (2007) FDI from Japan and other countries has positive spillover effects and FDI from the US has 
no spillover effects 
Motive for FDI Girma  Exploiting FDI has positive spillovers effects but sourcing FDI has no spillover effects 
 Driffield and Love (2007)  Exploiting FDI has positive spillovers effects but sourcing FDI has no spillover effects 
 Protsenko (2003) Vertical FDI has positive effects but Horizontal FDI has no spillover effects 
Source: Smeets (2008) table simplified by the author 
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1.1.4 ICT a General Purpose Technology and a source of spillovers 
Informationa and communication technology (ICT) is classified as General Purpose 
Technology, similar to electrification and other great inventions of the past 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005). ICT brings important technological progress and it 
has the ability to complement innovation and helps genetates spillover effects 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995 Lipsey et al., 2005). ICT has produced positive 
productivity effects (Javanovic and Rousseau, 2005; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2005; 
Venturini, 2009) and is recognised as a determinant of productivity growth 
specifically when combined with investments in R&D, organisatioanl and human 
capital (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000 and 2003).  
 
Although direct impact of ICT on productivity is clearly established it not clear 
however, that ICT generates positive spillovers as empirical evidence is conflicting. 
For instance, some studies show signinficant effects (van Leeuwen and van der Wiel, 
2003; Severgnini, 2010; Venturini, 2011) others simply refute such spillovers 
existence (Stiroh, 2002; Acharya and Basu, 2010; Haskel and Wallis 2010; Van 
Reenen et al., 2010; Moshiri and Simpson, 2011). How can this contradiction possibly 
be explained?  
 
Similar analytical frameworks used in the dicipline of knowledge spillovers (Jaffre, 
1986; Griffith et al, 2004; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009) have been recently used to 
analyse spillovers effects from ICT (Stiroh, 2002; Mun and Nadiri, 2002; Acharya 
and Basu 2010) and it has been found that ICT helps reconcile many explanations of 
knowledge spillovers (Rinco, Vecchi, Venturini, 2012). ICT is a source of pecuniary 
spillover (Griliches, 1979) because combining competition and innovation in the ICT-
producing sector allows computerised industries to benefit from lower costs 
(Jorgenson, 2001). This is identified as source of spillover from upstream to 
downstream sector, also called vertical externality (Bresnahan, 1986). Horizontal 
externality in other hands referes to the used of GPT amongst a large number of 
sectors. Another source of spillovers is the increased efficiency of transactions among 
firms that use ICT. Rowlatt (2001) and Criscuolo and Waldron suggest that using 
systems such as electronic data interchange, internet based-procurement and other 
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inter-organisational information systems generate administrative and search costs 
reduction and improved supply chain management. Similarly, translfer of payment 
and invoices, automatic inventory replenishment, on-line markets for placing and 
receiving orders have all contributed to improved efficiency.  
 
Other studies reject the spillover effect from ICT. Stiroh (2002) finds no evidence of 
ICT capital spillovers when regressing TFP growth on ICT capital and other controls 
variables for the US manufacturing sector. Neither Haskel and Wallis (2010) nor 
Acharya and Basu (2010) find positive spillovers in their syudies. It is suggested that 
the lack of spillover may reside in the type of data used in their empirical analysis, 
with data at mico level being more supportive of spillover hypothesis than data at 
macro level. And this idea was supported by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000). Another 
possibility in identifying spillovers from ICT could be a consequence of the lagged 
impact of ICT on productivity. In addition, adoption of ICT imposes a relatively long 
periods of experimentation, during which firms put in place changes in their 
organisational structure, business practices and customer relation (Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt, 2003). Therefore, this implies a significant delay between initital investment and 
exploitations of performance improvements that could explain a lagged ICT spillover 
effect, as suggested in works of Morrison (2000), van Ark and Inkaar (2006).  
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1.2  FDI in the banking sector and theories of multinational banks 
While the literature on effects of FDI in the manufacturing sector is extensive, as seen 
previously, this is not the case for the banking sector. Most empirical investigations of 
FDI in banking have focused either on multinational banks (MNBs) operating in the 
US market or on US MNBs operating abroad, and only a few studies have been 
carried out in Canada, Europe, Japan or Australia. The reason for this shortage of 
studies lies essentially in the lack of data. However, the available studies investigate 
general determinants of MNB performance. Among them, one part of the literature 
examines the determinants of MNB growth or presence; the other side focuses more 
on the profitability of MNBs in foreign markets. These key studies on MNB growth 
or presence, which usually support geographic factors in FDI theory, include works 
by Fieleke (1977), Terrell (1993), Golberg and Saunders (1980), Ball and Tschoegl 
(1982), Cho (1985), Sabi (1988), Nigh et al. (1986), Hultman and McGee (1989), 
William (1996) Yamori (1998) and William (1998). They support the argument that 
banks expand abroad for defensive reasons, and highlight the importance of local 
market opportunities (market seeking), the regulation and the ownership advantages, 
which comprise the MNBs’ expertise in international operations and their knowledge 
in the host country.  
The second side of the empirical research concentrates essentially on the MNBs’ 
performance (or profitability) in foreign markets. Some studies, which include De 
Young and Nolle (1996), suggest that foreign-owned banks have a distinct 
disadvantage in terms of input efficiency. William (1996, 1998) shows that profits of 
Australian banks are positively correlated with Australian net interest margins and 
fees and Peek et al. (1999) suggest that the reason why foreign subsidiaries in the US 
performed poorly was provided by the change in business strategy or the pre-existing 
characteristics of the banks acquired by the foreign banks.  
 
1.2.1  Internalisation theory  
The origin of internalisation theory is the theory of the firm pioneered by Coase 
(1937). The internalisation theory highlights and analyses how important transaction 
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costs are when firms are created (Jones and Wren, 2006). Firms are expected to select 
an entry mode with the lowest transaction costs, given a particular degree of asset 
specificity, and considering the combined effect of asset specificity and external 
uncertainty, internal uncertainty, and the potential for free riding by partners 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). The transaction-cost-based perspective on 
internationalisation, also called internationalisation theory was developed in the work 
of Buckley and Casson (1976; 1998). It suggests that MNE involvement in foreign 
markets is caused by market imperfections, and that MNEs organise internal markets 
to overcome failure in product and factor markets (Rugman, 1981) and to avoid 
transaction costs generated by external markets (Jones and Wen, 2006). In this way, 
the MNE is regarded as a set of resources and activities that can either be internalised 
and exploited or externalised. These two possibilities will depend on costs and 
benefits that the external markets generate. The issue here is how to define the borders 
of the MNE that depend on the costs and benefits of the choice between exploiting 
proprietary knowledge and controlling the firm’s activities through firm-based 
activities, or exporting or licensing the firm’s knowledge and activities to local 
partners.  
 
Information or knowledge transfer therefore becomes a critical issue in internalisation 
theory (Rugman, 1981). The MNE is viewed as the superior vehicle to transfer tacit 
knowledge across borders (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Tallman, 2003). Foreign 
expansion can be explained by the competitive capability of a firm to successfully 
create, replicate and transfer knowledge abroad (Kogut and Zander, 1993). The 
development of new knowledge through research and development activities is time- 
consuming and risky that makes it difficult to license. This is why firms with a strong 
technological base and rich knowledge structure are more likely to expand through 
start-ups rather than through acquisition (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). And at the 
same time knowledge can more easily be distributed within a corporation and across 
borders. Therefore, the internalisation of the knowledge markets leads to a high 
degree of multinationalisation (Buckley and Casson, 1976) as it best preserves the 
management structure of the MNEs (or MNCs) (Rugman, 1981).  
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Communication costs lead to the internalisation of markets. The reason why is the 
need to control the high volume of information across fragmented markets. 
Consequently, this type of costs can be reduced to its lowest if countries are similar in 
terms of economic conditions and language (Buckley and Casson, 1976).  
 
By applying internalisation theory to multinational banking, Rugman (1981) 
concludes that as MNEs overcome failed markets for products and factors through 
internalisation, MNBs overcome imperfections in the market for financial 
information. A bank-customer relationship is very information-intensive, and so the 
information is internalised (Rugman 1981; Cho, 1985). Keeping and protecting 
special customer information is one of the keys of internalisation-specific advantages 
of banks (Miller and Parkhe, 1998) and this provides incentives encouraging MNBs to 
invest in foreign markets (Sabi, 1988). A typical example of this is the banks 
following their clients abroad from the same country of origin to protect their bank-
customer relationships against the competition of local banks, meaning that the banks 
adopt a defensive expansion strategy in foreign markets (Williams, 1997; Aliber 
1984). This denotes the specific advantage of the MNBs in information that in turn 
allows them to offer new credits to their customers at lower marginal costs from the 
same home country (Williams, 1997). And to preserve their long-term customer 
relationships, MNBs use technologies to process information more efficiently. This 
ability gives them an information advantage and special knowledge in risk 
management (Claessens and Van Horen, 2008). But embarking on an FDI involves 
additional costs through doing business in unfamiliar economic and political 
environments and thus internal advantages may not be sufficient to compensate for 
these extra costs. As internalisation-specific advantages depend on institutional 
conditions such as the information and business environment of the host country, 
banks usually will invest in countries whose institutional conditions are similar to 
those in their home country (Claessens and Van Horen, 2008).   
 
However, internalisation theory was seen first as unable to identify the sources of the 
ownership-specific advantages internalized by a bank and second, as not able to 
explain the selection of particular entry markets for MNBs (Cho, 1985). The presence 
of imperfection alone in financial markets may not provide incentives for banks to 
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become multinational; instead and in addition to their defensive expansion MNBs 
may follow market-oriented motives in foreign markets.   
 
1.2.4  Spillover effects in the banking sector  
While in manufacturing I concentrate the analysis on FDI knowledge spillovers, for 
the banking sector, the literature identifies the spillover effects and uses a similar 
framework to that of manufacturing as illustrated in figure 1.1, with just a few 
specific adaptations. The literature establishes that foreign banks may have some 
effects on the domestic banking sector of the host country: while foreign banks may 
have some effects on the domestic banking sector of developing countries they may 
have no effects on banking sectors in developed countries (Claessen, 2001). I will just 
mention here some effects that could be generated by the entry of foreign banks in a 
developing country banking sector, given that chapter two analyses fully theoretically 
and empirically the aspect of foreign banks’ entry in SA banking sector. A brief 
definition of these effects will be stated here, considering the channels and the 
determinants of spillover effects similar to those in manufacturing.  
1.2.4.1  Direct and indirect effects 
The direct effects may consist of domestic banks being more efficient and operating at 
lower costs than domestic ones (Uiboupin, 2005) and may have higher profits in 
foreign markets (Berger et al, 2000). Foreign banks may operate with variable prices 
such as interest rates and fees, may have more experience at pricing the risks of 
projects. Foreign banks may be more capable at identifying profitable investment 
activities (Jansen and Vennes, 2006) and may directly increase quality and pricing of 
financial services (Levine, 1996; Hermes and Lensink, 2004).  
 
Foreign banks may indirectly force the domestic banks to adopt modern practices and 
technologies used by foreign competitors. These can in turn help domestic banks to 
become more efficient. These two aspects contribute to the increase in efficiency of 
domestic banks (Lensink and Hermes, 2004).  
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Foreign banks may be more interested in larger and less risky customers, leaving the 
riskier customers and smaller borrowers for the domestic banks. Consequently, this 
may lead to more bankruptcies and credit constraints on the private sector (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2004; World Bank, 2002).  
1.2.4.2  Channels of spillover effect 
Channels of spillover effects are not significantly different from FDI knowledge 
spillovers channels seen in the manufacturing sector. In the banking sector, the two 
most important channels of spillover effects from ownership-advantages are 
demonstration and labour turnover (worker mobility in manufacturing sector). In the 
banking sector, unlike manufacturing, there are no vertical linkages due to the nature 
of banking activities, as banks rarely deal with suppliers.  
 
When entering in a foreign developing country that is usually characterised by 
outdated management skills and poor processes and procedures, services and products 
(Bascom, 1997), the new foreign banks demonstrate the availability of new services 
and products, profitability and efficiency, new technology, modern skills, 
management practices and marketing. Consequently, the domestic bank may both 
imitate and adopt these new and modern skills (Lensink and Hermes, 2004).  
 
As competition is closely linked to demonstration effects (Blomstrom and Kokko, 
1997), it could be considered in the case of the banking sector as a channel of 
spillover effects. Competition may work as a catalyst, forcing domestic banks to 
adopt new practices and information technology faster. 
 
Labour turnover, especially from foreign to domestic banks is the other most 
important channel, because it allows the transmission of management and technical 
skills (McKendrick, 1994). And from the training that MNBs invest in (Lehner and 
Schnitzer, 2008) and that is provided to the local force, local employees may get 
better access to international know-how (Hemmer, 2002). In return the MNBs will 
benefit as the local employees may have better knowledge about the local market.  
 
 23 
1.2.4.3  Determinants of spillover effects   
Similarly to the manufacturing sector, absorptive capacity (AC) is important and 
constitutes a condition to determine spillover effects in the banking sector. It is 
defined as the ability to use available knowledge, to adopt it according to specific 
applications, processes and routines, and to apply it to develop new knowledge and 
new competencies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). AC is a condition for spillover 
effects, as a difference between the level of economic development of home and host 
countries exists. This difference of economic development is called the technological 
gap, and is defined as disparities between the technologies and the human capital 
resources of home and host countries firms respectively (Jacob and Groizard, 2007). 
The relationship between the two concepts is somewhat complex, as there are 
different views about the interplay of the two. For Findlay (1978), a larger economic 
distance between home and host countries may provide more opportunities for 
spillover effects. On the other hand, spillover effects are negatively correlated to the 
size of the technology gap between home and host countries (Lapan and Bardhan, 
1973). Finally, Dimelis (2005) and Kokko (1994) conclude that a larger technology 
gap reflects a lower AC of domestic companies and reduces the chance (likelihood) of 
spillover effects.  
 
When applied in the banking sector, the technological gap will be called the 
knowledge gap (Hau and Evangelista, 2007) as the banking sector, unlike the 
manufacturing that uses machinery, equipment etc, uses soft technologies that refers 
to know-how or management competencies (UNCTC, 1989). Using a similar 
argument as above, a large knowledge gap may reduce the efficiency (as efficiency 
represents a measurement of spillover effects, see chapter 2) of domestic banks 
(Uiboupin, 2005).  
 
We have identified intellectual property rights (IPR) as a transmission factor of 
spillovers in the manufacturing sector. I have just defined above the concept of soft 
technologies (UNCTC, 1989) used in the banking sector as equivalent to the concepts 
of technology used in the manufacturing sector. One of the major differences with 
manufacturing is that patents cannot protect soft technologies, which refer to know-
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how and competencies in the banking sector, because they are embodied in 
individuals. And only internalisation can commit them to a bank (Grosse, 1996). 
Therefore, training and labour turnover, seen earlier, work as a transmission factor for 
soft technologies and produce spillover effects. Similarly to competition, training 
could be classified as either a determinant of spillover effects or a channel of spillover 
effects.  
 
Competition too can be considered a determinant for spillover effects, as the extent of 
spillover effects may depend on the competitive pressure made by foreign banks’ 
entry. If the domestic firms (or banks) are familiar with competition from foreign 
firms’ presence, this may result in a positive reaction from domestic firms (Dunning, 
1993). On the other hand, no spillover effects may occur if the foreign firms operate 
in isolated segments and if technologies and products are very different (Kokko, 
1994), meaning that it is unlikely for competition to take place despite the presence of 
foreign banks.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2. Theoretical framework for the analysis of 
spillovers into the SA banking sector 
The aim of this chapter is to present the different theoretical models that are being 
used to anayse how knowledge spillovers occurred through the presence of foreign 
banks after the apartheid regime in SA. SA is the strongest African economy in terms 
of GDP (World Bank, 2012) but still it is a developing economy. Many authors such 
as Lensink and Hermes (2004), King and Levine (1993) conclude that foreign bank 
entry effects depend on how well-developed the host country economy and financial 
sector are, arguing that countries with well-developed financial institutions tend to 
experience more rapid rates of real GDP per capita growth (Levine, 1997; Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
 
There are two main streams of analysis. The first one follows the hypothesis 
developed by Claessens et al. (1998), Micco et al. (2004), who find that in developing 
countries, foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks and that an increase 
in the number of foreign banks reduces the level of profitability and margins of 
domestic banks. For Micco et al. (2004) however this finding does not hold in 
developed countries.  
 
Furthermore, the effect on domestic banks depends on the scale of the segment of 
foreign banks operations. Assuming that most foreign banks operate in the small 
segment of investment and corporate banking, as is the case in SA, the effect will 
certainly be smaller. Therefore, in light of these findings and given the atypical nature 
of the SA economy, it makes the case of SA an interesting one in terms of outcome of 
the foreign banks’ effect.  
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Therefore this chapter will provide a set of different hypotheses to identify the effects 
the foreign banks have had on domestic banks since the end of the apartheid regime 
in SA.  
 
The second stream of analysis is based purely on efficiency measures of foreign and 
domestic banks. According to Eller et al. (2006), efficiency is a transmission channel 
for benefits from FDI in the financial sector to the whole economy. It follows a 
procees in which the change in ownership due to consolidation will increase efficency 
at the macroeconomic level due to improved managerial efficiency and the use of 
technology and know-how, resulting in significant economies of scale. Bonin et al. 
(2005) also share this argument and state that international investors are the source 
for better services and cost efficiency. Then efficiency may spill over onto the whole 
financial sector because of superiority in terms of efficency of foreign banks from 
developed economies. The reasons for that are that foreign banks use cheaper funding 
and have more diversified portfolios that generate lower risk premia on their interest 
income. Consequently competition may occur and banks may provide cheaper loans, 
which in turn facilitates investments (Eller et al., 2006). But there is also a 
relationship between the financial sector efficiency and economic growth that 
translates into an increase of GDP (Levine, 1993; Koivu, 2004; Rossi and Volpin, 
2004; Cottarelli et al., 2005; and Eller et al, 2005). 
 
Therefore the main hypothesis that this dissertation will test is whether or not the 
foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks in SA and why. 
 
This chapter first reviews the different mechanisms of spillovers from the two 
streams of analysis presented above that form the theoretical framework of this study. 
Section 2.1 presents the theory on competition and spillover effects, followed by a set 
of different hypotheses based on the existing literature, while section 2.2 presents the 
theory and its hypothesis on Efficiency as a measure of knowledge spillovers.  
2.1 Competition and FDI spillovers: theory and hypotheses 
This section presents the first part of the two-stage theoretical framework that is 
being developed to study spillovers in the SA banking sector. The effect, subsequent 
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to foreign banks’ entry, can be direct, indirect or both and will depend on many 
different factors in the host country (size of FDI, market segment, and host country 
economic conditions). Direct effects will consist of providing improved quality and 
better pricing of financial products, better portfolio diversification and risk 
management or simply new products and services for businesses and individuals in 
the domestic market. Indirect effects may be on domestic banks’ performance in 
terms of costs, profit margins and loan loss provision. It may be characterised by 
domestic banks becoming more efficient. New regulations can be regarded as an 
indirect effect. Alongside the indirect effects are spillovers created by the competition 
that increases the pressure on domestic banks to adopt new banking practices and 
procedures. Another spillover effect may be through higher turnover of personnel of 
foreign and domestic banks. The technological gap between foreign banks and 
domestic banks can create favourable conditions and allow knowledge to spill over 
but taken alone it may not be sufficient to achieve any knowledge spillover. Figure 
2.1 summarises the different aspects of the effect of foreign banks entry that are 
discussed below.  
 
2.1.1 Effects of foreign banks entry on domestic banks performance  
When entering a new country and especially a developing one, foreign banks may 
have to overcome difficulties such as language and cultural barriers, currency and 
regulation differences. They will have to understand and adapt quickly to changing 
market characteristics, as the business relations require local information and local 
strategies (Berger et al., 2000). Consequently, foreign banks may experience 
difficulties in building relationships not only within the retail sector but also with 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). But on the other hand foreign banks that are 
used to operating in competitive markets may find it easier to adjust some component 
of prices such as interest rates and fees and identify profitable investment activities 
(Jansen and Vennes, 2006). 
 
Better investment skills in providing products and services and superior management 
skills that create new opportunities to diversify risks, and better quality and pricing of 
financial products, or simply new products and services for businesses and 
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individuals in the domestic market (Levine, 1996) represent together characteristics 
of the presence of foreign banks and help the foreign banks’ branches or subsidiaries 
to achieve higher profits in foreign markets (Berger et al., 2000). In addition, mother 
banks provide direct transfer of management skills and practices that ensure 
competitiveness of their subsidiaries (Uiboupin, 2005) as seen in figure 2.1. Foreign 
banks may have a stronger and less volatile lending growth than domestic banks 
(Dages et al., 2000). Studies from Claessens et al. (1998) conclude that foreign banks 
in developing countries have higher profits than domestic banks. 
Figure 2.1: Effects of the foreign banks entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Uiboupin (2005) figure adapted by the author 
 
Micco et al (2004), show that state-owned banks in developing countries are less 
profitable and have higher costs than private banks. Berger et al. (2005) find that 
Chinese state banks were less efficient than foreign banks. Consequently, according 
to the arguments provided above about foreign banks’ presence and depending on 
their ownership-specific advantages (as seen in the previous chapter), foreign banks 
may have direct effects on the domestic country banking market and contribute to 
directly increase quality, pricing and availability of financial services for both 
domestic banks and individuals. (Levine, 1996; Hermes and Lensink, 2004). 
Furthermore, foreign banks may directly contribute to the improvement of 
institutional aspects of host developing countries such as banking regulation and 
supervision (Claessens, 2006; Goldberg, 2007; Lensink and Hermes, 2004).  
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The entry of foreign banks may have indirect effects not only on domestic banks’ 
performance but also on the entire domestic banking system and the domestic 
economy. Claessens et al. (1998) was mentioned earlier suggesting better 
performance that foreign banks show when entered developing economies, but the 
authors also find that an increase in foreign banks reduces the level of profitability 
and margin of domestic banks. Furthermore, as illustrated in figure 2.1, foreign banks 
may contribute to the changing behaviour of domestic banks, first by benefitting from 
spillover effects in adopting better managerial practices and technologies from 
competitors. Second, foreign competitors may force domestic banks to become more 
efficient in the way they operate. As a consequence, both types of externalities can 
contribute to improve the level of efficiency of domestic banks through lower costs or 
lower interest margins (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). In analysing the relationship 
between financial liberalisation and banking efficiency, Levine (2001) finds that 
significant presence of foreign banks increases the efficiency of the domestic banking 
system by decreasing banks’ overhead costs and profits. Other studies show a 
positive correlation between foreign bank ownership and stability of the banking 
system (Caprio and Honahan, 2000; Goldberg et al., 2000). In their study Dages et al. 
(2000) find that the variety of ownership contributes to greater credit stability during 
times of economic downturn or weakness of the financial system. Demirgue-Kunt et 
al. (1998) provide evidence that foreign entry was usually associated with a lower 
incidence of local banking crises. 
 
2.1.2 The complex relationship between bank entry and the technological gap  
As seen in the definitions offered in chapter 1 about the role of a firm’s, a region’s, an 
industry’s or a country’s own technology or productivity in capturing knowledge 
spillovers, the general literature provides two alternative views. First, some argue that 
increased technological backwardness should enhance knowledge spillovers as the 
potential for knowledge spillovers is sufficiently large in that case (Findlay, 1978; 
Wang and Blomstrom, 1992). Secondly, others claim that firms need a minimum 
amount of absorptive capacity to be able to capture knowledge spillovers (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Glass and Saggi, 1998). Such absorptive capacity is created from 
investments in research and development (R&D) or human capital and provides 
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elementary knowledge or technology that are necessary to assimilate and exploit 
external knowledge. Providing that the extent of spillovers depends on difference in 
economic development between home and host countries, this difference will 
determine the size of both the technological gap between each country’s companies 
and the absorptive capacity of domestic firms. Thus, a technological gap can be 
defined as the disparities between the technologies and human capital resources of 
home and host countries’ firms (Jacob and Groizard, 2007). Absorptive capacity, 
according to the definition above, will provide the ability to adopt available 
knowledge and to apply it in order to create new knowledge and new competencies 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Narula and Marin, 2003).  
 
These definitions implicitly suggest a complementary relationship between 
backwardness and absorptive capacity. Findlay (1978) notes that the greater the 
backlog of available opportunities the greater the pressure for change within the 
backward region. In other words a larger economic distance between home and host 
countries will increase the chance for spillover effects. However, to increase the 
chance of spillover effects, a minimum level of absorptive capacity will be required. 
In other words, the technological distance between the two countries should not 
exceed a critical level. To conclude, the critical level of technological gap is 
essentially determined by the complexity of foreign technologies, as well as the 
extent of and the increase in market penetration by foreign companies (Perez, 1997).      
 
In the banking sector this relationship is valid on condition that the terminology 
“technology” is adapted. In heavy industry, the term technology refers to machinery’s 
hard technology that includes equipment and industrial processes. Soft technology 
largely available in the banking sector would refer to know-how and management 
competencies, technical, professional and other qualifications (UNCTC, 1989). This 
definition is confirmed by Romer (1993), who defines the idea of a gap that includes 
a technology gap as value-generating activities such as marketing, distribution, 
payment and information systems, business processes, quality controls and staff 
motivation. From this broader definition and by analogy it can be established that 
hard technology in the banking sector can be matched to information and 
communication technologies whereas soft technologies would include business 
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experience, management, financial and marketing competencies, and technical skills. 
Patents or intellectual property rights do not protect these competencies because they 
are mostly embodied in individuals (Grosse, 1996). Similarly, a technological gap in 
the banking sector will refer to the differences regarding applications of bank-specific 
information and communication technologies as well as a knowledge gap (Hau and 
Evangelista, 2007) that refers to gaps with regard to soft technologies (for example 
managerial gaps and skills gaps). Applying the above technological gap theory would 
mean that the condition to reduce the knowledge and technological gap between 
domestic and foreign banks resides in the diffusion of management methods, skills 
and technologies (information and communication technologies). And similar to the 
industry case, the extent to which spillovers take place will depend on the size of 
knowledge and technological gap. Furthermore, a smaller gap would indicate a higher 
absorptive capacity of domestic banks; however a bigger gap would reduce the ability 
to learn. In other words more absorptive capacity helps the domestic banks to catch 
up with foreign competitors, but too big a difference not only in terms of 
management practices and skills of staff but also in terms of ability to implement 
technologies could weaken absorptive capacity and reduce spillovers to the advantage 
of the foreign banks. A large knowledge gap may reduce the efficiency of domestic 
banks and would result in a crowding-out (Uiboupin, 2005). In addition (and this may 
apply directly in the case of this SA study) if foreign banks operate in segments that 
domestic banks are not present or specialised in, such as for instance export financing 
or export-oriented domestic companies, then the presence of the foreign banks will 
have a very limited effect.  
 
In SA, the re-entry increased competition in the domestic banking market and 
contributed to the modernisation of banking capabilities. In 2010, the number of 
foreign bank branches and foreign owned-banks, which represent 63% of the total 
banks in SA, surpassed the number of domestic SA banks. The growing number of 
foreign bank branches and foreign ownership in the banking sector raises the question 
of the effective role played by foreign banks in the most important African economy. 
Therefore it is reasonable to analyse the effect of the foreign banks on the domestic 
banks in SA.  
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2.1.3 FDI Spillovers and competition due to foreign banks entry and domestic 
market segmentation  
Blomstrom, Globerman and Kokko (2001) state that more competition may make 
MNEs transfer more high-quality technology to their subsidiaries, increasing the 
potential of spillovers. The theoretical models of Glass and Saggi (1998), Wang and 
Blomstrom (1992) tend to validate the findings on potential spillovers. In developing 
countries’ banking sectors, domestic banks, which are less advanced and usually use 
obsolete banking practices, may be forced to adopt new practices under pressure from 
foreign banks. This competitive pressure in the short term may have negative impacts 
on domestic banks’ costs, as new investments are required, but in the long run these 
new investments may help them become more efficient. As Lehner and Schnitzer 
(2008) argue in their theoretical model, they assume that spillover effects from 
foreign banks’ entry arise if domestic banks get access to the imperfect screening 
technology of foreign banks. Domestic banks have to invest in order to adopt the 
foreign bank’s technology. The incentives of domestic banks for investing decrease 
with spillover effects because of smaller returns on investment.  
But the effect on competition could depend not only on the extent of FDI but also on 
the objectives of the foreign banks. For instance, if the objective of the foreign banks 
is to be involved in limited market segments, then the effect on competition could be 
limited. This means that spillovers are unlikely to occur because the foreign banks 
operate in isolated market segments and the technologies and products might be very 
different from those of domestic banks (Kokko, 1994). On the other hand, if the 
objective is to be involved in a larger share of the market then the effect on 
competition could be larger (see banking market segments in figure 2.2). Another 
effect on competition is the failure of some domestic banks or the consolidation of the 
domestic banking sector. Domestic banks may not be able to compete with foreign 
banks and consequently they may leave the market whether through acquisition or 
bankruptcy. But from an economic perspective this effect would mean that less 
efficient banks are replaced by more efficient banks; however, this would generate 
major disruptions in areas such as employment, with major political repercussions.  
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Competition is closely linked to demonstration effects (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997) 
as defined by Saggi (2002); occurring through the imitation and reverse engineering 
of MNE’s products and practices by the local (host country) firms. This definition fits 
the understanding of knowledge spillovers. In entering into a domestic market of 
developing countries, foreign banks demonstrate that new financial services and 
products exist; they also demonstrate the profitability and efficiency of information 
and communication technologies, and modern skills as well as marketing and 
management practices (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). 
Figure 2.2: Market segments in the banking sector 
 
Source: (IFC, 2008) 
 
Thus, domestic banks may imitate and adopt these modern skills and competencies 
(Lensink and Hermes, 2004). However, the demonstration effect is hard to determine 
and studies yield very conflicting empirical results and none of them specifies in what 
way demonstration effects take place.  
 
2.1.4 Hypotheses on competition and FDI spillovers 
According to the theoretical framework established earlier, the presence of foreign 
banks in SA should increase competitive pressure on domestic banks. Claessens et al 
(2001) find that in developing countries, foreign banks have higher profits than 
domestic banks and an increase in the number of foreign banks reduces the level of 
profitability and margins of domestic banks. SA is a developing country (World Bank 
Data, 2013; IMF, 2012) and Claessens’ findings should hold. Although Micco et al 
(2004) confirm Claessens’ findings, they show that this finding does not hold in 
developed countries. However, given the scale of SA banking market development, 
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and the fact that the share of foreign banks is just below 30%, suggesting a 
concentration of SA total assets in the domestic banks (see figure 2.3), it would be 
fair to assume that foreign banks’ entry has no effect on the SA domestic banks or if 
any effect, it should be either small, or localised to a particular market or segment, or 
unclear. To test this I establish the following hypotheses derived from Claessens 
(2001) and Uiboupin (2005) studies.  
 
Studies about foreign banks entry and net interest margins establish that foreign 
banks entry is associated with higher interest margins in the short run (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2004). On the other hand, other studies find no statistical significance 
between net interest margin and foreign banks’ share (Zajc, 2003). This could mean 
that the net interest margin is possibly related to other factors such as money market 
interest rates. In addition, the re-entry of foreign banks in SA started six years before 
the time period of this study. If there were a short-term rise in competition in the 
market when the foreign banks’ share increases, it would be more difficult to capture 
this effect. Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, according to the theory above, 
foreign banks possess net superiority in terms of technologies and banking practices. 
And pressure from foreign banks should encourage domestic banks to operate more 
in other segments of the market where the presence of the foreign banks is relatively 
limited. Consequently, domestic banks should be able to increase their net interest 
margins.  
 
Ch2/H1: The net interest margin of SA banks is either ambiguous or positively 
correlated with foreign banks’ share in SA.  
 
Increased competition can decrease incomes from lending activities and usually an 
increase in foreign banks’ share in the market is associated with higher competition 
effects. Therefore, domestic banks could try to increase their non-interest incomes to 
offset their diminishing incomes from lending activities (interest income). However, 
increasing competition due to foreign banks’ entry could decrease the non-interest 
incomes of the domestic banks that try to offer better loan conditions and prices to 
their customers. So the foreign banks’ entry can have either positive or negative 
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effects on non-interest incomes of domestic banks in SA, which helps to set the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Ch2/H2: The non-interest income of a domestic bank in SA is either positively or 
negatively correlated with the foreign banks’ share in SA.  
 
Claessens et al (2001) find that in the market a higher foreign banks’ share is 
associated with lower overhead costs (all operating expenses except interest 
expenses) of banks. This means greater efficiency. However in developing economies 
this relationship could be opposite in the short run, as the domestic banks react to 
foreign banks entry by having higher overhead costs. The reason is that domestic 
banks want to keep their image and their technological base in order to remain 
competitive in the market. That reason too illustrates directly the demonstration and 
spillover effects. By entering into the market, foreign subsidiaries demonstrate new 
technologies and practices, new products and services they obtain through the 
ownership-specific advantages from their parent banks. The domestic banks may 
therefore learn and benefit from new training and investment programmes that can 
impact (increase) directly their overhead costs. This increase in overhead costs can be 
explained in the case when a foreign bank acquires a domestic bank as some 
adjustment costs are involved. Nevertheless, foreign banks tend to have a more highly 
developed technology base, which helps lower overhead costs in the long run, while 
in the short-run their overhead costs may well be higher (for example due to higher 
salaries paid to expatriates). This allows the following hypothesis:  
 
Ch2/H3: The overheads of a domestic bank in SA are positively correlated to the 
foreign banks’ share in SA.  
 
The overall profitability of a bank is given by the ratio of the bank profit over its total 
assets. As the banks’ entry usually increases market competition then a negative 
effect can be expected on domestic banks’ profitability. Many studies find that 
foreign banks’ entry decreases the profit of domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2001; 
Hermes and Lensik, 2003; Zajc, 2002; Unite and Sullivan 2003). I can therefore set 
the following hypothesis:  
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Ch2/H4: The ratio of pre-tax profit to the total assets of a domestic bank in SA is 
negatively correlated to the foreign banks’ share in SA.  
 
The financial development of a market influences the effect of foreign bank entry 
(Hermes and Lensink, 2004). The entry of foreign banks in a developed market 
would have little or no effect at all. This is because the potential for domestic banks 
to learn from foreign banks may not be high. This is especially interesting in the case 
of the SA market. As SA is a developing country (World Bank Data, 2013; IMF, 
2012), it is assumed that in this case, the foreign banks are more developed than 
domestic ones. However as stated earlier, the SA financial sector is well developed 
and integrated. The literature shows that banking FDI from a developed country to 
another developed country has no effect. It could be suggested then that the way 
foreign banks’ share in the market influences the performance of the domestic banks 
depends on the financial development of that market. It is likely that the development 
of the banking market is important, specifically, for overhead costs and non-interest 
activities. In more advanced markets, it is assumed that investment in banking 
technology has already been made. Consequently, overhead costs increase more in 
less developed markets than in more developed markets. The same argument can be 
used for non-interest income in developed markets where competition is already high, 
meaning that domestic banks have already moved to non-interest activities; therefore, 
foreign banks’ entry may decrease non-interest incomes because the competition 
effect is stronger than the adjustment effect. This is strongly related to the technology 
gap hypothesis that was explained earlier in the theoretical framework. 
 
Ch2/H5: The effect of foreign banks entry depends on banking market development 
in SA. 
 
To test some or all aspects of these hypotheses this dissertation proposes and uses 
two different models. The first one, presented in chapter 3, uses survey methodology 
to analyse the different impacts of the re-entry of foreign banks in SA after the SA 
regime change, and the results of the survey are discussed in chapter 4. A second 
model, also explained in chapter 3 and whose results are presented in chapter 6, tests 
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empirically the four hypotheses and generalises the findings of the existence of 
competition effect on SA domestic banks due to the foreign banks re-entry. 
 
The primary reasons why this dissertation uses two different models, is that it was 
impossible to obtain any data from the foreign branches that are operating in SA. 
Annual reports of foreign branches on SA activities only are not available. Therefore 
using survey methodology allows us to address the issues of spillovers and 
competition directly to the foreign banks and branches and increases the size of the 
panel for greater accuracy of the role of the foreign banks in SA. But providing that 
the majority of the foreign banks and branches in SA operate essentially in the 
lucrative segment of wholesale banking, any spillover and competion effects if they 
exist would signal that these effects are localised in that particular segment and may 
not necessarily imply a generalisation of these effects into the entire SA banking 
sector. However, the domestic banks, under the pressure that foreign banks may exert 
on investment banking activities, would want to make use of technology, know-how 
and management practices by adapting them to the retail banking activities and 
become more efficient and and profitable. But the outcome of this straightforward 
assumption is not guaranteed. And this is why using these two methodologies 
becomes very pertinent.  
 
2.2.  Efficiency as a measure of knowledge spillovers: theory and 
hypothesis 
This section presents the second part of the two-stage theoretical framework that is 
being developed to study spillovers in the SA banking sector. It focuses on efficiency.  
Productivity and efficiency are used as measures of knowledge spillovers and 
spillover effects. The literature tends to use different measures of productivity such as 
total factor productivity or labour productivity, to identify the existence of knowledge 
spillovers in the manufacturing sector. This can make comparisons rather 
challenging. Holger, G. and Greenaway (2004) conducted the most recent 
comprehensive survey of empirical research on FDI spillovers and surveyed at least 
40 econometric studies (as some studies contain more than one case) at the 
microeconomic level from which 20 cases find evidence of positive spillovers, 17 
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cases find no significant evidence of spillovers and 8 find evidence of negative 
spillovers. Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that foreign equity participation is 
positively correlated to productivity. Barrel and Pain (1999) find evidence of 
significant spillovers from inward investment on technical progress. Markusen and 
Venables (1999) find positive spillover effects on the development of domestic firms 
through linkages with domestic suppliers.  
 
The literature indicates that efficiency is often used as a measure of the impact of FDI 
on the performance of firms. It would therefore not be surprising, as suggested by 
Meade (1968) that inefficient firms would be taken over. Such an argument would 
imply that firms with a low level of efficiency would change ownership more often 
than other firms. Unfortunately, this argument is not strong enough in the light of a 
significant number of empirical studies, such as Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989), 
which find no evidence of acquisitions improving efficiency. 
 
However McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) support the argument in which acquisition 
and change of ownership are determined by the desire to acquire efficiency rather 
than to obtain efficiency through managerial discipline. According to this theory, 
firms with higher efficiency could experience change in ownership more frequently 
than other firms leading to an improvement in their overall efficiency. Unfortunately, 
as Okeahalam (2008) pointed out, very few studies have been carried out on the 
preference of foreign firms when they buy domestic firms, and even less research has 
been done on the impact which the industrial structure in the domestic market of the 
foreign (acquiring) firm might have on the efficiency level after foreign entry has 
taken place. This is interesting because the foreign firm coming from a competitive 
market may adopt different behaviours. Depending on its size and the structure of the 
market, it can be assumed that the firm may behave in a monopolistic way in order to 
accrue rent that it may not be able to accrue in its own market under similar 
conditions, where the level of efficiency is likely to be lower. Alternatively, the firm 
may decide to compete and then see the level of efficiency rising. Therefore, in the 
banking sector, a foreign bank, which is inefficient or used to operating in an 
oligopolistic environment, and which decides to enter a market, is unlikely to lead to 
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an improvement in the performance of firms in the domestic market. In this case the 
benefits of FDI (or internationalisation) are likely to be small.  
 
2.2.1 Theory of efficiency to measure knowledge spillover 
Eller et al. (2006), provides a three-step framework as seen in figure 2.3 that 
describes how efficiency is a transmission channel for benefits from FDIs in the 
financial sector to the whole economy. 
 
The first element of the model is the transmission via the efficiency channel. For 
instance Kosak and Zack (2005) find that consolidation resulting from the change of 
control in ownership in banks in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
increases banks efficiency. Banks realise efficiency gains at micro and 
macroeconomic levels. At microeconomic level, a bank efficiency gain will be 
obtained from improvement in managerial efficiency usually measured by x-
efficiency (and called cost efficiency) and illustrated by input allocation and use of 
technology (defined in the methodology - chapter 3). As a result the bank will 
achieve some economies of scale and scope. But the presence of foreign ownership 
could increase managerial cost (also called profit efficiency) by transferring superior 
management skills, management systems and technology to the newly owned banks 
(Amel et al., 2004). This process was described in figure 2.1 when discussing 
technology and knowledge transfer in the previous section of this chapter.  
 
At the macroeconomic level, a bank will need to diversify risks and lower transaction 
costs. This will improve pooling and allocation of available financial resources to 
high-productivity projects (Fink et al., 2004). This will enhance investment activities 
and stimulate economic growth (Hollo and Nagy, 2006).  
 
All components of the transmission via efficiency channels such as strategic 
reorientation, implementation of internal group standards and clearing of risky credit 
portfolios support the hypothesis in which foreign-owned banks provide efficiency 
gains. Bonin et al. (2005) share this argument as they conclude that international 
investors provide better services and are more cost-efficient. 
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Figure 2.3: Efficiency effects triggered by FDIs 
Source: Eller et al., (2006) adapted by the author 
 
But many others do not find similar results, as cost efficiency does not necessarily 
depend on ownership (Green et al., 2005) and especially in the short term after the 
operation of acquisition that necessitates expenses from the deal and the 
implementation of management techniques and technology to the acquired banks. To 
provide an explanation for these conflicting arguments, Papi and Revoltella (2003) 
argue that a threshold for foreign ownership is needed to change the efficiency level 
of the acquired bank.  
 
In the case of efficiency spillovers onto the whole financial sector, the second 
component of the theoretical model figure 2.3, foreign banks from developed market 
economies that are usually more efficient and use cheaper funding as well as having 
more diversified portfolios, will aggregate lower risk premiums in their interest 
income. From this, competition may emerge and the foreign banks may contribute to 
the decrease in banks’ interest rate margins, which in turn may contribute to a 
reduction of companies’ cost of borrowing and facilitate investment (Eller et al., 
2006).  
 
Drakos (2003) finds that the new foreign entrants, via privatisation programmes that 
took place in many CEECs, exacerbated local and regional competition. This can be 
explained by the fact that when acquisition takes place, the new foreign owner 
introduces new market policies that trigger competition (Eller et al., 2006). However 
minority participation or greenfield investment might add new competitors with 
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perhaps no direct impact on competition. The fact that the domestic banks might be 
able to compete with the foreign-owned ones will contribute to improve the 
efficiency of the domestic banking system (Claessen et al., 2001). However, the 
domestic banks may develop other services that are more tailored to the needs of 
local customers thus avoiding competition on price with the foreign banks (as shown 
in previous section). As a consequence, the domestic banks may see their profit 
margin increase or at least not be affected as the revenues generated by these new and 
tailored activities services to local customers may offset some losses caused by 
competitors.  
 
Efficiency spillovers may not occur and the impact of the foreign banks in fact may 
be negative. Assuming that competition increases, waves of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions may take place, contributing to increasing concentration in the financial 
systems of emerging market economies (Bis, 2004). This can accentuate the 
formation of monopolistic competition
2
 thus leading to negative aspects of market 
power from banks that negatively affect the possibility of more efficiency gains. 
 
In short, these different aspects show that the establishment of foreign ownership in 
developing economies can have a direct impact on domestic banks’ performance (as 
already mentioned in previous sections) but more precisely on efficiency gains. 
Consequently, greater efficiency gains can create conditions that put pressure on the 
entire financial system to become more efficient forcing in some cases lending rates 
and interest margins to decrease. But as observed, evidence is conflicting and is not 
always conclusive.  
 
Finally, the last component (which is not part of the scope of this study), spillovers 
onto economic growth, consists of the relationship between the financial sector 
efficiency and economic development that translates to an increase in GDP. King and 
Levine (1993) find that efficiency, overall costs of financial services and depth and 
breadth of intermediations have an impact on economic growth. Eller et al (2005) 
show evidence of how privatisation and foreign ownership contribute to greater 
                                                        
2 Mamatzakis et al. (2005) study the South Eastern Europe over the period 1998-2002 and find 
evidence of monopolistic competition. 
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efficiency in capital allocation. Levine (1997) shows that higher financial sector 
efficiency induced by higher financial sector competition should result in an overall 
reduction of transaction costs, which in turn allows the cost of capital to decrease as 
the interest margin declines. Koivu (2004) shows that increasing financial sector 
efficiency impacts on growth increases, because as available capital becomes 
cheaper, it encourages corporations to invest more and consequently increases 
economic development and growth (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). However, according to 
Cottarelli et al. (2005) an increase of competition may involve systemic risk, such as 
credit bubbles.  
 
2.2.2 Hypothesis on efficiency as measure of knowledge spillover 
The first question is whether or not foreign-owned banks in South Africa are more 
efficient than domestic-owned banks. The results could validate chapter 6’s results 
based on hypothesis 4 stipulating that an increase in foreign banks’ share decreases 
domestic banks’ performance, in particular domestic banks’ pre-tax profit. This may 
or may not translate into higher efficiency for foreign-owned banks. However, as 
already explained, better performance does not automatically mean greater efficiency 
and vice versa. Moreover higher efficiency of foreign banks could be the result of 
greater competition, which in turn could reveal the existence of possible knowledge 
spillovers as explained in the theoretical framework fig 2.1. It is important to note 
that it is the bank business model that determines the level of efficiency. For instance 
a bank that puts more effort and resources into customer services may see its 
efficiency deteriorate but may report better performance measures. I can therefore set 
the following main hypothesis:  
 
Ch2/H6 on efficiency: foreign-owned banks in South Africa are more efficient than 
domestic-owned banks. 
 
To test this hypothesis on efficiency this study designs and uses a two-step approach, 
which is described in chapter 3 and whose results are presented and discussed in 
chapter 7.  This two-step approach provides:  
  43 
1. a measurement of an efficiency score  for both categories of banks SA 
domestic and foreign-owned banks using x-efficiency;  
2.   an assessment of the main factors that explain any efficiency gap using the 
efficiency scores as the independent variable in a Tobit regression;  
  
From this efficiency measure that will be provided from (1), foreign-owned banks 
should be expected to perform better for the following reasons: 
 First, a strong link between foreign and private ownership is usually observed, 
especially in the context of developing economies. Foreign-owned banks may 
benefit from better control from private shareholders who provide better 
incentives for managers. In the case of the SA banking sector this argument 
could be refuted. Contrary to many developing economies where most banks 
are state-owned, all SA banks have been privately owned. However, this 
argument should not be entirely rejected, as for the last ten years four big 
banks have been dominating the market. They might have adopted a 
monopolistic behaviour similar to state-owned banks.  
 Secondly, foreign shareholders, in general foreign-banks, may contribute to 
spread their know-how and risk analysis methods to other organisations (as 
already discussed earlier). The literature produces two types of empirical 
studies supporting the view that foreign-owned banks perform better. First, 
and as already described, foreign-owned banks have a performance 
advantage in developing countries (Berger et al., 2000). Second, many 
studies have compared performance of public and private companies 
(Konnings, 1997; Estrin and Rosevear, 1999) and produced no conclusive 
evidence that privately-owned companies in developing economies perform 
better. In summary the empirical literature seems to provide conflicting 
evidence for the general assumption that foreign-owned banks perform better 
than domestic-owned banks in developing economies.  
Ownership is not the only factor identified as responsible for differences in 
efficiency. Other factors such as banks managers’ behaviour and the characteristics of 
banks account also explain differences in efficiency scores, and this will be evaluated 
in (2). First, as Mester (1996) pointed out, differences in risk preferences might 
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explain discrepancies in efficiency and such differences between foreign-owned and 
domestic banks may find their origin from discrepancies in size or structure. 
However, adjusting size and structure of activities takes time due to the significant 
adjustment costs involved, that in turn influences the level of capital invested. In the 
case of SA, the argument of time adjustments is very limited, as the foreign bank 
branches have been operating since their re-entry in the SA market around 1994-95 
and many foreign branches such as the Athens Bank have been operating even longer 
as they never left SA. It can be argued that they have had time to adjust their size and 
structure. But the same argument of time adjustment is valid in the case of ABSA, 
whose new owner became Barclays in 2005 and ABSA accounts for around 20% of 
the total SA market. This is the reason why ABSA, in this chapter is treated as a 
domestic bank, but is subject to a specific case study in the next chapter.  
 
Finally, some changes have occurred in the SA banking market in the last 10 years. It 
may be legitimate to assume that recent waves of FDI may have increased 
competition. Interest rates have fallen on average from 8.73% in 1995 to 4.09% in 
2010. And equally important, the range of financial products has significantly 
increased during this period, with derivative products (futures, options and forwards) 
or other financial products such as forfeiting, revolving credit cards and asset 
management. Banks, especially the four big ones have formed financial groups to 
provide these and other services bringing a new level of services and sophisticated 
operations to the SA market.  
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2.3. Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter defines the theoretical framework in which this dissertation analyses 
knowledge spillovers into the SA banking sector. It establishes the fundamental 
hypothesis on how the presence of foreign banks in a developed country induces 
knowledge spillovers and presents the case of SA through a survey, which is to my 
knowledge the first that has been undertaken.  
 
The framework states that the entry of foreign banks into a developing country has 
direct and indirect effects on the performance of the domestic banks. Direct effects 
will consist of providing improved quality and better pricing of financial products, 
better portfolio diversification and risk management and new products and services in 
the domestic market. Indirect effects may be on the domestic banks performance in 
terms of cost, profit margin and loan loss provision and efficiency.   
 
In addition to direct and indirect effects, the entry of foreign banks into a developing 
country banking market induced knowledge spillovers by creating competition. The 
competition increases pressure on the domestic banks to adopt new banking practices 
and procedures. But in order to adopt these new practices and procedures a minimum 
technological gap between foreign and domestic banks is needed. This constitutes 
some favorables conditions to create knowledge to spill over.   
 
However, it was identified that taken alone, the technological gap is not sufficient to 
create conditions for competition and therefore knowledge spillover. This depends 
very much on the market segment in which the foreign and domestic banks operate. 
As stated earlier, the effect of competition could depend not only on the extent of FDI 
but also on the objectives of foreign banks. If the objective of the foreign banks is to 
be involved in a limited market such as the wholesale market, as is the case in SA and 
confirmed by the survey, then the effect on compettion could be limited. 
Consequently spillovers are unlikely to occur because foreign banks operate in 
isolated market segments and the technologies and products might be very different 
from those of domestic banks (Kokko, 1994). On the other hand if the objective is to 
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be involved in a larger share of the market then the effect on competition might be 
larger. Another factor that can also influence knowledge to spill over is labour 
turnover of domestic and foreign banks and this theoretical aspect is developed 
further and tested in chapter 4.  
 
This chapter sets the hypotheses for an empirical model testing the impacts of the re-
entry of foreign banks in SA on the performance of SA domestic banks. The 
empirical model is explained in chapter 3, the results of which are analysed in chapter 
6, which also picks up on the existence of some aspects of competition effects already 
suggested from the survey.  
 
This chapter also identifies a model from Eller et al., (2006) which establishes a 
direct relationship between efficiency and FDI spillovers and describes how 
efficiency is in fact a transmission channel for benefits from FDI in the financial 
sector to the whole economy. The model’s first component, the transmission via the 
efficiency channel, provides an explanation of how a threshold for foreign owership 
is needed to change the efficiency level of an acquired bank. The second component, 
efficiency spillovers to the whole financial sector, shows how competition created by 
the presence of more efficient banks (using cheaper funding and having more 
diversified portfolios and lower risks premium in their interest income) in a less 
developed economy, may force domestic banks to decrease their interest margin and 
reduce cost of borrowing and facilitate investments. Therefore, this dissertation uses 
an x-efficieny model to calculate the efficiency of both categories of banks, foreign 
and domestic, that operate in SA. The x-efficiency model is described in chapter 3 
and the results are presented and discussed in chapter 7. The results generalise the 
existence of FDI spillovers into the entire SA banking system.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Data and methodology of all empirical 
models 
This chapter presents the methodologies for the empirical work whose results are 
analysed in chapters 4, 6 and 7. Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey, chapter 6 
of a model of competition and chapter 7 of a model of efficiency. This chapter 
therefore presents the data and methods issues for each of these subsequent chapters, 
starting with the survey. 
 
It then goes on to present both the methodologies and the data of two empirical 
models, that show the existence of both competition and spillover effects in the entire 
SA banking sector. They help generalise the results from the findings from the survey 
in chapter 4 and the case study in chapter 5.  
 
The first model is derived from Claessens (2001) and Uiboupin (2005) and 
established the four hypotheses (developed in chapter 2) from which the re-entry of 
foreign banks in SA has direct and indirect impacts on the performance of SA 
domestic banks. Direct impacts could be an increase or decresase of the SA banks net 
interest margin, an increase or decrease of the non-interest income, a increase of total 
costs and a decrease of pre-tax profits. All these direct impacts are a consequence of 
competition due to the re-entry of foreign banks in SA. Chapter 2 postulated the 
existence of knowledge spillovers into the higher segment of SA corporate banking, 
and these impacts, if they are statistically significant, could lead to a general 
conclusion of competition and spillover effects into the entire SA banking sector.  
 
The second model helps address the direct relationship between efficiency and FDI as 
explained in chapter 2 and tests the hypothesis on whether or not foreign-owned 
banks in SA are more efficient than domestic-owned banks. The reason for this is that 
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better performance does not automatically mean higher efficiency and vice versa. 
Because it is the bank business model that determines the level of efficiency, 
therefore, if a bank puts more effort and resources into customer services, it may see 
its efficency deteriorate but may report better performance measures. This implies 
that if the first model concludes that there has been better performance by the foreign 
banks this does not automatically signify better efficiency. However, greater 
efficiency of the foreign banks could be the results of greater competition. 
Consequently, showing a competition effect from model one, confirmed by a greater 
efficiency of foreign banks from this second model, leads us to argue for the 
generalisation of competition effects and knowledge spillovers into the entire SA 
banking system.  
3.1. Survey Methodology for Analysis on foreign banks and 
branches operating in SA 
This section is dealing with the survey methods used to analyse various aspects of the 
strategy of foreign banks.  
3.1.1 Survey methodology 
The choice of survey as a methodology to search for the existence of knowledge 
spillovers was guided by the fact that the results from the empirical models used in 
chapter 6 do not show precisely the way the foreign banks contributed to diffuse their 
knowledge and subsequently how spillover effect occured. Surveys are usually used 
not only to gather information from a group of people (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 
1993) but also to evaluate demand and to examine impacts (Salant and Dillman, 
1994). Survey methodology can elicit information about attitudes that would be 
difficult to evaluate using observational techniques (McIntyre, 1999). There are 
different types of survey but the one used here is a written survey based on a 
questionnaire. A survey process includes the survey design that involves two steps 
(Levy and Lemeshow, 1999): 
1. The first step consists of developing a sampling that describes the procedure. 
The procedure is used to select the sample and its size, and the choice of 
channel through which the survey will be administrated: telephone, interview, 
postal mail, email, etc (Salant and Dillman, 1994),  
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2. The second step consists of the model for obtaining the population estimate 
from the sample data.  
 
This survey uses only two types of question: questions that describe and evaluate 
people, place and events (QPPE) and questions that measure knowledge (QK). QPPE 
asks the respondents to make self-assessments and each question should be carefully 
examined to ensure that it is not subject to different interpretations (Fowler, 1995). 
QPPE can be divided into three categories: evaluative continua, agreement continua 
and rating scale. This survey uses numerical evaluative continua, which consists of 
multiple-choice questions with four response options. I was aware that numerical 
scales could be misinterpreted. Manipulation may occur for instance when a 
respondent begins at one end of the numerical scale and works up or down from there 
to end up with their response. The same manipulation can occur when the respondent 
starts at midpoint of the numerical scale and formulates their response from that 
point. However, in this case each choice was independent from one another, reducing 
consequently the risk for manipulation. QK is used to assess respondents’ familiarity 
with a subject or their ability to provide informed responses. The rating scales used 
for this particular question are usually the true-false or yes-no. In this survey yes-no 
is used. One particular risk resides in the ability of the respondent to provide accurate 
answers. To reduce this risk some plausible but incorrect answers can be included 
intentionally in order to distinguish those who know from those who do not (Fowler, 
1995). In this survey, the respondents were carefully chosen. They are usually top 
managers who have been working long enough in the organisation or in many cases 
who were the architect of the banks’ strategy and helped in implementing it. In 
selecting this particular population, the risk of an unknowledgeable population that 
might provide wrong answers is reduced.   
 
In a survey there are multiple sources of measurement error. In this case the most 
common are that respondents’ responses may not reflect the true beliefs, attitudes or 
behaviours of the respondents; they may provide intentionally false responses to 
invalidate the survey’s results or choose not to reveal their true insight for personal 
reasons, reasons that may not be rational or even understood by the respondent 
(Browne and Keeley, 1998). This is the reason why other guarantees to the 
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respondents were given: the questionnaire results are completely confidential (no 
disclosure of name or identification), the respondents were given the choice not to 
take part in the survey and they were given the choice to answer all or part of the 
questions. Finally a consent form was sign by the respondents and the research 
investigator to seal the guarantee of confidentiality.  
 
In terms of the execution of a survey there are many aspects to take into 
consideration. Salant and Dillman (1994) stress the importance of maintaining the 
confidentiality of individual responses and reporting survey results only in the 
aggregate. This is exactly what this study has produced. The survey was completely 
confidential as explained above and average weight (see later in survey process) was 
used to aggregate and report the respondents’ answers. There are some ethical issues 
that were addressed (see below in survey process). Levy and Lemeshow (1999) 
suggest that a pilot survey must be confirmed first in order to test the survey 
procedures before the actual survey is conducted, and Fowler (1995) provides a way 
to evaluate survey questions by using a focus group discussion to determine how well 
respondents understand the questions and how they formulate their responses. This is 
what happened with a panel of several researchers from Tralac (Trade Law Centre for 
Southern Africa). Each question was tested: formulation, wording, understanding and 
expected answers. And finally, Isaac and Michael (1997) suggest the use of 
automated data collection tools to facilitate data tabulation and manipulation. Lucas 
and Henry (1991) insist on the use of nonparametric statistics where small samples 
sizes are involved. This aspect of computing the data of the survey is explained and 
described in the process below.  
 
3.1.2 Survey process 
Kraft (2002) assesses the presence of the foreign banks in Croatia using a survey 
methodology and this study has used an adapted version of his work. This survey was 
designed and conducted from 2011 to early 2012 in the SA banking sector in order to 
understand the channel of spillovers and the foreign banks’ strategy. This survey 
received full clearance from the QMUL Ethical committee (Ref: QMREC 2011/58, a 
copy is in annex 3.9). The survey was totally confidential and the participants were 
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given the choice to take part or not in the survey and to answer all or part of the 
questionnaire.  
 
The method described below provides the different phases of the survey: 
1. Design 
a) The questionnaire comprised eight questions (See questionnaire template in 
Annex 3.10). Question 1 (Ch3/H1) identifies the reasons for entry. It helps to 
clarify whether or not these motives are valid today. Questions 2 and 3 
(Ch3/H2) provide answers on foreign banks’ strategy in the SA market and 
help understand their comparative advantage at the time of entry. Questions 4 
to 6 (Ch3/H3 and Ch4/H4) relate to products, innovation and technology 
transfer identifying the presence of potential spillovers in the SA banking 
sector. Questions 7 and 8 (Ch3/H5 and Ch3/H6) contribute to the 
understanding of the future shape of the SA banking sector.  
b) An information letter (Annex 3.11) was designed. It provides all necessary 
instructions on how to complete and return the questionnaire,  
c) A consent form (Annex 3.12) was designed and required for this study. Both 
the bank participants and the research investigator must sign it. The consent 
form reminded the participants of the confidentiality aspects and the voluntary 
status of the survey.   
d) I was advised that the lack of familiarity with Queen Mary University of 
London (QMUL) in Africa wouldn’t help increase the number of participants.  
The participants needed an academic name or brand that they could recognise 
as local. Therefore, I decided to create a collaborative partnership between the 
two Schools of Business: QMUL – School of Business and Management 
(SBM) and University of Cape Town – Graduate School of Business (UCT - 
GSB). One direct advantage was that I was able to use and incorporate the 
logo of the UCT-GSB into all survey documents. TRALAC (Trade Law 
Centre for Southern Africa), an NGO, whose objective is to promote regional 
integration amongst Southern African countries, sponsored this survey and 
provided assistance in terms of methodology, review and logistics.  
2. Sample 
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The 16 foreign-owned banks and branches that are currently operating in SA 
(100% of the population) were targeted, and 8 of them returned the 
questionnaire: in fact 50% of the foreign banks population returned the 
questionnaire and therefore constituted the sample of study. I did not include 
in the panel foreign bank representations whose activities are very limited in 
the SA market. I decided to exclude ABSA and Barclays banks from the study 
for the following reasons: first Barclays recently acquired (2005) ABSA and 
the two banks are still in the process of integration. Second, most of the 
foreign banks have had a presence in SA since 1995. And finally, ABSA is 
one of the two case studies presented in the next chapter.   
3. Procedure 
The questionnaire was addressed to the participants through the following 
procedure:  
I. Firstly, contacts were made with each bank to identify the relevant person to 
complete the questionnaire. The relevant interlocutor could be the Secretary of 
the Company, the head of the Quality Control Department or a team member 
or the head of the Marketing Department. The purpose and the conditions in 
which the survey operates were explained to the relevant interlocutor and the 
bank was asked if it could take part.  
II. The pack that includes the questionnaire, the information letter and the 
consent form was sent to the banks’ contact, 
III. Sometime it was necessary to re-contact the bank interlocutors to remind them 
to send on time the completed questionnaire and consent form back, 
IV. Once collected, the consent form was signed by the research investigator and 
sent back to the interlocutor. Then both completed documents were saved on a 
file accessible only by the research investigator and his supervisors. 50% of 
the foreign banks returned the completed questionnaire and the consent form,  
V. The software Stata was used to compute the data from the questionnaire,   
4. Scale and model of estimation 
Seven questions were multi-choice with four different scales: 0 - not 
important, 1 - less important, 2 - important and 3 - very important and one 
question required a yes or no answer. The model estimates the average score 
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of each response of the questionnaire, weighted by bank assets. Assets, as a 
weight, were chosen to reflect the importance of the banks. 
 
The results for this survey are presented in the chapter 4.  
 
3.2 The main source of bank data for models on competition and 
efficiency  
To study the relationship between foreign banks entry and domestic banks on one 
hand, and the level of efficiency between foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks 
on the other, data at bank-level and data at macro-level are used. At bank-level, data 
for 15 SA banks were compiled and used (Annex 3.1), and amongst these banks five 
are foreign-owned. In the panel of foreign banks are included the banks that are 
operating in SA and that are at least 50% foreign owned. The foreign banks’ branches 
as defined by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) are not included. The study 
covers the period from 2000 to 2010. Annual data are used for all groups of data: 
bank-level accounting data, foreign banks’ entry data, banking market development 
data and SA macro-economic variables.  
 
As many studies do, the first option was to investigate the possibility of using 
Bankscope, but it was not possible to exploit this source as only data from 2006 were 
available and not for all banks. It would have been possible to collect banks data from 
annual reports further back from 1994 from the SARB as they are kept in their 
archive. But the SARB denied access even when the domestic banks directed me to 
get access to their own data. Fortunately, some balance sheets for many banks are 
available on their website. With the unreserved cooperation of the main domestic 
banks I succeeded in collecting most of their annual reports for the period 2000-10, 
and for those that were not available on websites, hard copies were post-mailed to 
me. Therefore, all data are collected from each bank annual reports. However, to 
guarantee consistency, I used definitions of data contained in Bankscope (Annex 3.2) 
to construct the dataset. Software Stata 11 (for Mac) is used in this study.  
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3.3 Data and methodology for the effect of foreign bank entry on 
SA domestic banks 
3.3.1 Data  
The selected domestic banks (Annex 3.1) represent a share of more than 95% of the 
total domestic banking sector in terms of total assets. First, two variables to measure 
the income of banks are selected: net interest margin defined as net interest income 
over total assets (NIIN) in Claessens et al., (2000) and Uiboupin (2005) studies; and 
non-interest income to total assets (NOINTIN). Second, a bank’s profitability is 
characterised by the ratio of its before-tax profits to total assets (BTXP). Finally, a 
bank’s costs are measured by the overhead costs to total assets, which I also called 
total operation expense (TOEX) and loan loss provision to total assets (LLP) that will 
not be used in this study. It is important to remember that these variables are the 
results of calculations made from banks’ income statements and balance sheets that 
usually follow the international standard relationship (3.0), therefore some strong 
correlations amongst these variables could be present. 
 
BTXP = NIIN + NOINTIN – TOEX – LLP    (3.0) 
 
The banks-specific exogenous variables are determined by: the short-term and long-
term deposits and other funding over total assets (SLTDPA), equity ratio to total 
assets (EQTY) and non-earning assets over total assets (NINEA).  
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation (N<=126) 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Net Interest Income (NIIN) 1.00    
2. Before Tax Profit (BTXP) 0.66 1.00   
3. Non Interest Income (NOINTIN) -0.04 0.57 1.00  
4. Total Operating Expense (TOEX) 0.74 0.81 0.45 1.00 
Mean  0.097 0.045 0.048 0.093 
Standard deviation 0.165 0.047 0.055 0.133 
Source: Banks annual reports. Author calculation 
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Table 3.1 shows some summary statistics and pairwise correlations of dependent 
variables. There are some high correlations between NIIN and BTXP (0.66), between 
NIIN and TOEX (0.74) and finally between BTXP and TOEX (0.81). The high 
correlations are the direct results of the relationship (3.0) described earlier. However, 
the variables are not used all together at the same time in the empirical equation, 
which means that collinearity is not a concern. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the trend of bank-specific variables of both the domestic and the 
50% foreign-owned banks; some specific aspects of the SA banking market can be 
observed. For instance the before tax profits to total assets (BTXP) decreased slightly 
in 2001 and after 2008 for all banks. These decreases coincided with the currency 
crisis in 2001 and the global economy downturn in 2008.  
Table 3.2: Average value of variables of panel SA banks (%)  
Variables Ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BTXP D 3.7 2.8 3.7 3.3 5.4 5.7 6.2 5.9 4.6 4.3 3.2 
 F 1.1 0.8 14.4 1.5 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.7 2.9 2.2 1.6 
NIIN D 5.3 4.9 13.4 14.4 14.1 13.1 12.0 9.6 6.3 6.0 4.9 
 F 14.9 9.0 7.6 6.0 3.2 3.9 3.6 4.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 
TOEX D 4.4 3.6 8.1 10.5 15.2 13.9 11.5 9.5 7.9 7.3 6.2 
 F 5.0 3.3 10.6 6.8 5.6 4.6 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.6 
NOINTIN D 2.7 2.5 2.2 3.0 5.9 5.2 4.9 5.9 6.9 6.7 5.6 
 F 4.1 2.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.9 2.0 1.8 
EQTY D 12.5 11.6 21.7 20.2 22.8 21.1 21.3 21.3 17.0 15.9 16.5 
 F 7.8 6.9 8.6 7.2 13.1 11.8 10.7 11.3 12.1 11.1 10.7 
SLTDPA D 78.3 78.1 66.8 63.3 62.6 65.6 63.0 65.9 70.9 70.5 68.0 
 F 86.4 87.0 86.8 87.5 84.2 85.2 80.8 79.2 77.8 77.9 78.6 
Notes: D for domestic, F for foreign. 
Source: Banks’ annual reports and Author calculation 
 
The important increase in 2002 (from 0.8% to 14.4%) should not be considered, as 
this figure corresponds to the year when a new foreign-owned bank started to operate 
in SA. But when considering the trend of BTXP in the period it shows that foreign-
owned banks tend to be less profitable than the domestic ones. The Net interest 
margin (NIIN) increased significantly after 2001 until 2006 and slowed after 2006. 
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After the currency crisis in 2001, there was a reconfiguration of the banking market 
and many smaller banks disappeared. They either went bankrupt or were bought not 
by the foreign banks but by domestic ones, suggesting that the domestic banks took 
advantage of some lucrative assets. However, the decrease in 2006 coincided with the 
biggest FDI ever in the banking sector, when Barclays, a British bank, took over 
ABSA one of the three biggest domestic banks in 2005. This could suggest an 
increase in competition as the trend continued until 2010. For the foreign-owned 
banks, the impact of the currency crisis is confirmed, as NIIN started to decrease in 
2001 but picked up again after 2006 from 3.6% to 4.3%, coinciding with the 
Barclays’ direct investment in ABSA bank. The foreign-owned banks operated with a 
lower interest margin, enhancing the competition.  
 
TOEX, the total operating expense, is the indicator that could signal the presence of 
spillover effects as explained in hypothesis 3. From the period 2000-04, this indicator 
increased sharply for the domestic banks and it can be noted that the level of TOEX 
in 2004 is almost 4 times that of 2000. In that period, the SA banking sector took 
advantage to upgrade their systems and norms in compliance with the international 
standards. It was at that time that the currency crisis occurred, making any association 
between some of these expenses and the presence of foreign banks difficult to detect. 
What could re-enforce the difficulty to signal any spillovers is the constant decrease 
of TOEX after 2005 for domestic banks. On the other hand, TOEX for foreign banks 
was relatively stable except for the period 2002-04 that saw an increase of TOEX, 
suggesting that the foreign banks may have suffered from this currency crisis in terms 
of foreign currency exchange.  
 
Foreign-owned banks have a lower equity ratio (EQTY). This could indicate that 
foreign-owned banks can exploit the reputation of their mother banks and have higher 
risk and profitability than the domestic banks. But this statement could be misleading, 
as most of the foreign-owned banks of my panel cannot be classified as top 
worldwide financial institutions.  
 
Foreign participations have three different forms. They are present in the SA banking 
market either through their local representations, or branches or they have shares in 
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some domestic banks. For this study, the SA banks with majority (50% or more) 
foreign banks ownership only, were included in the panel. Fortunately, there are no 
missing banks for the foreign variables and for the period under consideration.   
 
Following Claessen (2001) and Uiboupin (2005), I use two variables for foreign 
banks’ entry: the share of foreign banks’ assets in the total banking market assets 
(FORSHR) and the ratio of number of foreign banks to total number of banks 
(FORNUM). The SARB, in reports available on their websites, provides an 
exhaustive list of banks and classifies them by category. There is no national bank in 
SA. All SA financial institutions are in private ownership but there is a pyramidal 
ownership system between some of the SA big four banks and other mutual 
institutions, which means that some of these banks have multiple private ownerships. 
Nevertheless, the domestic banks can be distinguished from mutual institutions, 
which have been discarded from the study panel.  
 
Figure 3.1 shows a significant increase in number of foreign banks in SA. In this case 
foreign banks include the foreign-owned banks as well as the foreign banks’ 
branches. This number has almost tripled from 1993 to 2010. The average share in 
total assets has increased with a big jump in 2006 after Barclays bought ABSA banks. 
However the share of foreign banks is just below 30%, suggesting a concentration of 
SA total assets into the domestic banks. This is important because such a percentage 
share may not be enough to show any significant effect of the presence of foreign 
banks in the SA banking sector. This result may suggest that foreign banks are 
present only in particular segments or niches of the market, which might limit foreign 
banks overall influence in the market by showing no significant effects on domestic 
banks. Foreign banks may operate in segments in which, domestic banks are not 
specialised (Clarke et al., 2000). 
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Figure 3.1: Average foreign banks’ share in SA (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: FORNUM for number of foreign bank, FORSHR for share of foreign bank  
Source: SARB and Author calculation 
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The ratio of domestic private credit (by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions) to GDP (PCGDP) is the variable chosen, and used by Claessens et al., 
(2000), Hermes and Lensink (2004) and Uiboupin (2005) as a proxy for the 
development of the banking sector.  
 
The PCGDP I use are from two different sources: Sana Hussain and IMF: 
 The PCGDP data used in figure 3.2 are aggregated and produced by Sana 
Hussain from the School of Business and Management of Queen Mary 
University of London. Their advantage is that they were collected for several 
countries over a long period of time (more than thirty years) and allows the 
comparison between SA PCGDP and the PCGDP of ten other countries’. 
 The PCGDP data used in the different regressions’ estimation presented in the 
chapter 5 originate from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see annex 
3.3). Other macro-economic data used in the regressions are also from the 
IMF (Chapter 6).  
Thus using PCGDP from the IMF allows having consistency amongst the different 
macro-economic data and their sources. The PCGDP data from the IMF (Annex 3.3) 
present the same trend as those of Hussain, with some minor differences between 
2008 and 2010 only. While the IMF shows an increase during that period, Hussain 
shows a quasi stagnation. The other difference is the amplitude, which is more 
important in the IMF data. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the PCGDP of ten countries compared to SA (SA line is bigger and 
coloured in red). These countries include Ghana, defined as a lower-middle-income 
economy, Brazil, China and Russia as upper-middle-income economies and Canada, 
France, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and UK, as High-income OECD countries. The 
first general observation is the increase of PCGDP for all countries during the period 
considered. This trend is the result of global deregulation and the liberalisation of the 
financial market of many countries worldwide. However, for the period of 1993-
2001, only Switzerland has a higher PCGDP than SA. For the period 2001-06, 
Canada, Switzerland and UK, three developed countries have a higher PCGDP. And 
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after 2006, only two developed countries out of six, Switzerland and UK have a 
higher PCGDP. And finally, for the whole period, SA, an upper-middle-income 
economy, has a higher PCGDP than high-income economies that include France, 
Greece and Italy.   
 
Taking SA alone, there is a constant increase of PCGDP over the last eighteen years 
with some brutal and small decreases that occurred in 2001 and 2008, which 
corresponds respectively to the SA currency crisis and the global slowdown. But the 
trend of constant increase in SA PCGDP is explained by the introduction of a policy 
of gradual liberalisation for the financial market, undergone by the post-apartheid 
government in 1995. The objective of the liberalisation policy is to attract a large 
share of foreign capital that allows more domestic investment, creation of jobs and 
development of the economy. It is important to remember that SA has a tradition of 
attracting FDI well before 1995 (before the end of the apartheid regime) as the 
economy is based on mining that always requires important financial investments. 
Figure 3.2 confirms this by showing that SA PCGDP is still higher than 9 countries in 
the panel between 1993 and 1995. But this surge of capital inflows really started to 
kick off from 1992 during the period of power change negotiation and took off after 
the democratic election in 1994.   
 
We can now conclude that the SA banking market is well developed and this 
development has been significant over the last eighteen years.  
 
Indicators of macro-economic development are represented by real GDP growth 
(GGDP), log of GDP per capita (INCOME) and inflation rates (CPI); Claessens et al 
(2001), Hermes and Lensink (2004) as well as Zajc (2002) and Uiboupin (2005) use 
these three country-specific variables in their studies. 
 
 
 
  61 
 
Figure 3.2: SA private credit to GDP compared to ten countries 
Notes: PCGDP for Private Credit to GDP  
Source: Hussain (2013) 
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3.3.2 Method 
To explore the impact of foreign banks’ presence on domestic banks’ performances 
and, following Claessens et al (2001) model, the following panel model is estimated:  
 

y i t 0  1FS i t 2Bi t 3X i t i t    (3.1) 
 
where 

y it  is a matrix of dependent variables for the bank i in SA, expressed in 
percentage, 

FSit  a measure of foreign bank penetration in the SA banking market at 
time t, 

Bit  is a set of bank-specific indicators and represents a set of control variables. 
Finally, 

X it  is a matrix containing SA macro-economic variables at time t.  
 
Then a set of dummy variables that captures the short time effects of the financial 
crisis in 2001 is added to this initial empirical model (4.1). The crisis triggered a 
reconfiguration of the banking market and several domestic banks disappeared or 
were absorbed by the domestic banks. The dummy variables should capture the short-
term effect on the performance of domestic banks, if any, after 2006 when Barclays 
bank decided to increase its shares in the market by buying the ABSA bank. 
Therefore the model (2.1) with the dummy variables becomes:  
 
  

yi t0 1FSi t3Bi t4Xi tDt i t  (3.2) 
 
Furthermore, the interaction between the foreign banks entry and the SA banking 
market development needs to be tested. PCGDP is a proxy for SA banking market 
development at time t. Thus the variable

FS *PCGDP that represents the interaction 
between the SA banking market development and the foreign banks entry as used in 
Uiboupin (2005) and Hermes and Lensink (2004) works is created. The model (3.2) 
now becomes:  
 

yi t01FSi t2(FSi t*PCGDP t)3Bi t4Xi tDt i t (3.3) 
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The introduction of this interaction variable used in Uiboupin (2005) study is very 
relevant as he tests whether foreign entry effects in a particular country depend on the 
level of development of that country’s banking market. This interaction can be 
considered as relevant to this particular study, because SA is both a developing 
country (World Bank Data, 2013; IMF, 2012) and a market with a very competitive 
and well-developed banking sector. Consequently, what can be expected is that the 
foreign banks’ entry would have a bigger impact in the early stage of entry for 
instance from 2000 to 2006, as the number of banks doubled as shown in Figure 3.1 
(data just after 1994 being not available). Then the impact reduces as the banking 
market becomes more developed. A banking market development variable should 
have a negative effect on banks’ costs and income.  
 
Finally, another interactive term for foreign banks’ entry and market is put into the 
equation (3.3) as banks having different market shares could react differently to 
foreign banks’ entry. So it might be that smaller domestic banks may react more 
rapidly than bigger ones because they are more agile to changes in market conditions 
and have to adjust quickly to remain competitive. However, the SA banking market is 
highly concentrated with the SA four biggest banks having about 80% of the market 
share. Adding this new variable gives the following model (3.4):  
 

yi t01FSi t2(FSi t*BKMKSHRi t)3Bi t4Xi tDt i t (3.4) 
 
The number of explanatory variables may seem limited or there may be other 
determinants of bank performance that cannot be controlled for, so the effects could 
be captured in the error term. If these were correlated with one or several of the other 
explanatory variables, then the estimated coefficient would be biased. One option is 
to assume that all such unobservable are time invariant. That means 

it  it  it  
where 

 represents the time invariant unobservable and 

  a standard independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d) error term. In other words, this means that there may 
be significant differences among the banks but the intercept in cross-section may not 
differ over time. Under this assumption, a panel data fixed effects estimator may be 
useful to purge these time invariant unobservable factors, where all variables are 
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transformed into deviations from their mean. This removes cross-bank variation, 
leaving only the variation of variables over time within banks. The variation to be 
explained will essentially come over time within rather than across banks. This is 
exactly the purpose of panel data with fixed effects that is used here in this study. 
Chapter 6 presents and discusses all results and findings from these regressions. To 
estimate the linear regression models mentioned above I use Stata general procedure 
and command given in annex 3.4 and command for robustness check regressions is 
given in annex 3.5. All results are reported and discussed in chapter 6. 
 
3.4. Efficiency analysis of foreign and domestic banks in SA 
The objective of this section is to present a model allowing the ranking of banks by 
attributing them a score in order to compare the domestic-owned banks with the 
foreign-owned ones. The expectation is that foreign-owned banks would be more 
efficient than the domestic-owned banks. Opiela (2000) for instance finds that 
foreign-owned banks perform better than domestic banks. 
 
The stochastic frontier is used here, as many scholars use a stochastic frontier 
approach to estimate cost and profit efficiency.  
 
The literature on bank efficiency is based on two main approaches that compute 
efficiency scores. One approach, measuring efficiency in terms of economies of scale 
and scope, uses non-parametric models applying linear programming techniques such 
as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull Analysis (FDHA). The 
second approach, or parametric approach, uses the frontier efficiency model, also 
called X-efficiency, using techniques such as the Stochastic Frontier Approach, Thick 
Frontier Approach and Distribution Free Approach. The differences that characterise 
the two approaches could contribute to producing different results in measuring 
efficiency scores, as concluded by Bauer et al. (1998).  
 
The non-parametric approach does not require assumptions about the functional form 
of the frontier that allows the frontier to envelop the data and the entire distance to the 
frontier is actually considered as inefficiency, meaning that exogenous variables are 
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considered to be part of the inefficiency term. The DEA may not be the most 
appropriate model when using a limited number of observations regarding inputs and 
outputs.  
 
On the other hand, the parametric approach that estimates the frontier efficiency uses 
econometric tools, which impose more structure on the features of the frontier. This 
consists of specifying functional form for the cost function but it allows for random 
errors, meaning better estimated efficiency scores. But to separate random error from 
inefficiency becomes a challenge. While the error model of the stochastic frontier 
naturally follows an asymmetric distribution, random errors usually follow a 
symmetric distribution. The reason for this is that inefficiency cannot reduce costs so 
it must be asymmetrically distributed whereas random errors can add or subtract costs 
so it must be symmetrically distributed. Jondrow et al (1982) suggests computing 
efficiency by conditional means of inefficiency terms with a residual being an 
estimate of the composite error. So computing the stochastic frontier efficiency model 
may involve arbitrary assumptions with regard to the distributions of the inefficiency 
term and random error. 
 
Some parametric models allow a separation of random error from inefficiency terms. 
This separation does not need assumptions on the distribution of the random error and 
inefficiency terms. The efficiency of foreign-owned banks needs to be compared with 
the efficiency of domestic-owned ones and as the thick frontier model provides 
average efficiency scores for the whole tested sample, this model therefore is not 
suitable for this study. A final advantage of a parametric approach over non-
parametric techniques is that it permits easier control or influence over variables on 
the structure of the cost frontier; therefore the inclusion of some environmental 
variables such as risk differences and in this case the variable that measures levels of 
equity, is easily done by adding terms in the estimated cost frontier (Mester, 1996). 
This is a major advantage in applying this method when studying aspects of 
developing countries where uncertainty and measurement problems can be 
significant.  
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3.4.1 Method of frontier efficiency costs  
Model (3.5) is based on a multiproduct translog cost function to calculate the scores 
of cost efficiency for the 14 banks in South Africa and is given by: 
 

TCi tf(Y,P)vi tui t    (3.5) 
 
where TC represents the total operating cost, Y is a vector of outputs and P the vector 
of input prices. 

v  corresponds to a random fluctuation (phenomenon beyond 
management control) and measurement error and is assumed to follow a symmetric 
normal distribution with mean of zero and variance 

 2. 

u  accounts for the bank cost 
inefficiency representing factors that could be controlled by management (bad 
management performance). 

u  follows a truncated normal distribution. It is assumed 
that in the stochastic frontier approach, the inefficiency component of the error term 
is positive, meaning that higher bank inefficiency is associated with higher cost. A 
translog specification rather than a Fourier-flexible functional form is also used, 
which requires additional truncations of data (Hasan and Marton, 2003). Thus the 
complete model is given by: 
 
  (3.6) 
 
where all variables are expressed in natural logs; Equity is the total equity, 

ymm
th  
bank output (m=1,2) and 

pnn
th input price (n=1,2). The general procedure to estimate 
cost inefficiency from Equation 3.1 consists of estimating equation coefficients and 
the error terms 

vit  uit  and of calculating efficiency for each observation in the 
sample. The cost frontier can be approximated by maximum likelihood so that 
efficiency levels are estimated using the regression errors. Jondrow et al (1982) show 
that variability 

  is used to measure a firm’s mean efficiency, with 

2 u
2 v
2. The 
bank-specific estimates of efficiency terms can be calculated by using the distribution 
of the inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the composite error term. A 
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formal definition of bank-specific relative cost efficiency is derived from the 
following equation: 
 

C  eff 
exp( f (P,Y))exp(ln umin )
exp( f (P,Y))exp(ln ui)

umin
ui
  (3.7) 
 
where 

ui represents the inefficiency of the 

i th bank and 

umin is the inefficiency 
associated with the best practice bank that means each bank, is benchmarked against 
the best bank in the sample.  
 
3.4.2. Data 
For the definition of the inputs and outputs the intermediation approach proposed by 
Sealey and Lindley (1977) is used here, which assumed that banks collect funds by 
using labour and physical capital to transform them into loans and other earning 
assets, therefore deposits are considered as an input.  
 
Similarly to the previous section for the first model general model (3.1) described in 
previous section, the data collected  originate from the same annual reports of the SA 
banks for the period of 2000 – 2010. The sample used here in this section is the same 
as the previous one and includes 14 SA banks composed of nine domestic-owned and 
five foreign-owned banks (Annex 3.1) and all together they represent more than 80% 
of total assets. The definition of a foreign-owned bank, remains the same as in the 
previous section, and is that the majority of shares (more than 50%) is owned by a 
foreign bank or firm. In the case of ABSA whose ownership changed in 2005, this 
study keeps it as a domestic-owned bank since the effects of change in an 
organisation take time to appear after an acquisition in the banking sector.  
 
Two outputs 

y1= loans and 

y2= investment assets are included. Investment assets are 
defined as all the earning assets other than loans according to the Bankscope 
definition, whose database is maintained by Fitch/IBCA. Annex 3.6 provides detail of 
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investment assets in the SA banks balances sheet. Both 

y1 and 

y2 are measured in SA 
Rand.  
 
There is an ongoing discussion, regarding the level of lending between foreign and 
domestic banks in developing countries, linked to underperforming or risky loans. 
Firstly, in periods of economic downturn some studies show that funding shocks to 
parent banks can be transmitted to their foreign subsidiaries with negative 
consequences for their lending (Peek et al., 1999; Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Chava 
and Purnandam, 2011; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). After the financial crisis in 
2008 many studies point out that foreign subsidiaries have reduced their lending more 
than the domestic banks (De Haas, Korniyenko, Loukoianova and Pivovarsk, 2011; 
Popov and Udell, 2010). And De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2011) comparing loan 
growth of foreign large banks that operate abroad find similar results. Second and 
more generally, Claessen and Van Horn (2011) show that in low-income countries 
foreign bank presence is associated with less credit extended, and although foreign 
banks generally have higher capital adequacy and better liquidity positions in terms 
of balance sheets, they tend to engage relatively less in the traditional lending 
business. Finally, one of the biggest reasons the foreign banks engage less in 
traditional lending when they operate in developing countries is because of 
underperforming loans, meaning that it would be more difficult for foreign banks to 
recover loans it may offer to some customers. Parker, Nellis and Figueira (2007) find 
that domestic-owned banks have a higher level of underperforming loans. This is 
highlighted by Kiyota (2011) showing that foreign banks in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
a less risky loan portfolio and domestic banks have a more serious problem with 
underperforming loans in their balance sheets compared to foreign banks. As a 
consequence and in light of this discussion, some may suggest that using  could be 
biased. However, I introduced in this study a new variable 

y0= net interest income 
and tested it with and without 

y1 and 

y2 but the results were not conclusive (I found 
the same coefficients for all observations). And for the sake of testing, when using 

y1 
and 

y2, homogeneity conditions were imposed by normalizing total costs and the 
price of labour by the price of borrowed funds. The results were almost identical to 
those with no normalisation. It is useful to remember that the aim of calculating 
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efficiency scores is to help clarify the findings of the previous chapter and then 
determine the reason why foreign banks may be more efficient, which in turn may 
help explain some of the aspects of knowledge spillovers. Therefore this chapter uses 
the simplest form of cost efficiency explained in the previous section using 

y1 and 

y2only as output variables.  
 
The inputs include labour, physical capital and borrowed funds and their prices (input 
prices) are used to estimate the cost frontier. Following Altunbas et al. (2000), the 
price of labour P1 is defined by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. P2 the 
price of physical capital is the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets. 
Finally, the price of borrowed funds P3, is defined as the ratio of interest paid 
(interest expenses) to all funding (sum of total equity and customer deposits). TC, the 
total cost is the sum of personnel expenses, interest paid and other non-interest 
expenses.  
 
Equation (3.6) includes the level of equity, which denotes the capitalisation risk, to 
control for differences in risk preferences following Mester (1996) and Altunbas et 
al., (2000). If managers from some banks are more risk-averse than other banks this 
will result in a higher level of equity than the cost-minimising level. Therefore if the 
level of equity is omitted, then a bank, even if it behaves optimally, may be regarded 
as inefficient given the risk preferences of its managers (Berger and Mester, 1997). In 
other words, assuming, for instance, that bank managers of foreign-owned banks are 
more risk-averse than managers from domestic-owned banks, their performance 
would be underestimated if equity is not controlled for in the cost efficiency model. 
 
Two other additional reasons to include the equity variable are provided by Berger 
and Mester (1997). First, bank insolvency risk depends on equity available to absorb 
losses. Therefore, insolvency risk could affect the bank’s costs via the risk premium, 
which has to be paid by the bank in order to borrow funds. This issue has particular 
resonance in emerging economies because of the level of non-performing loans in 
loan portfolios. SA is a stable but developing country (World Bank Data, 2013; IMF, 
2012), which may experience a similar situation. Secondly, it is assumed that equity 
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constitutes an alternative funding source to loans. Even, if deposits are considered as 
costs whereas equity is not, raising equity involves higher costs than raising deposits; 
therefore it is necessary to include it. Table 3.3 summarizes the statistics of the 
variables defined above.  
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics 2000-10 for banks’ inputs and outputs in SA 
Rand 
Variables Domestic –owned banks Foreign–owned banks 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Outputs     
Loans 145,776.3 169,942.5 1,172.16 952.83 
Investment Assets 51,699.58 66,810.09 658.60 686.80 
Inputs      
Personnel Expenses 3,246.50 3,536.84 44.19 38.08 
Other non-Interest Expenses 2,647.34 3,322.29 61.37 64.367 
Interest paid 11,962,20 13,735.25 89.07 74.70 
Input Prices     
Price of Labour (%) 3.93 5.19 2.56 1.41 
Price of Physical Capital (%) 256.73 186.34 244.06 250.67 
Price of Borrowed Funds (%) 7.35 3.56 5.14 1.41 
Other variables     
Total costs 18,231.95 20,060.81 194.64 161.2 
Total Assets 220,583.9 253,824.9 1,927.66 1,618.49 
Equity 13,962.16 14,924.41 277.37 399.05 
Customer Deposits (%) 60.00 25.57 84.92 5.02 
Loan to Investment Assets (%) 334.94 352.02 349.80 284.90 
Source: SA Banks’ annual reports 
Author calculation  
 
The first observation is the difference between the two types of banks; for instance 
the size of domestic-owned banks is far larger than foreign-owned ones. In terms of 
the activities’ structures, customer deposits and loans to investment assets show some 
differences. Foreign-owned banks rely more on deposits for their funding but the loan 
to investment assets shows that they focus their activities more on loans. It would be 
interesting to see how these observations influence their efficiency scores.  
 
There are significant differences between both types of banks in terms of input prices. 
The mean prices of labour and borrowed funds are about 1.5 times higher for 
domestic-owned banks whereas the price of physical capital is almost the same for 
both types of banks. These observations on input prices tend to confirm that 
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domestic-owned banks favour labour over physical capital in contrast to foreign-
owned banks.  
 
To estimate the x-efficiency model (3.6) I use Stata general procedure and command 
given in annex 3.7. All results are reported and discussed in chapter 7. 
 
3.4.3 Other factors that influence SA banks efficiency scores 
The aim of this step is to confirm the observed difference (if any) in performance by 
looking at the origin of ownership as a determinant. Thus whether or not ownership 
has a positive influence on efficiency, as well as the implication of other sources that 
explain differences between foreign-owned banks and domestic-owned ones, need to 
be assessed.  
 
One hypothesis that could explain the differences stems from discrepancies in size or 
in structure of activities (Weill, 2003) and not necessarily from management only, as 
mentioned in the section 2.4. There are possible adjustment costs associated with 
investments and the relatively short period of time in which banks have to adapt to a 
new environment by adjusting their size and activity. That was almost certainly the 
case in South Africa in the mid-1990s, when the Apartheid regime disappeared and 
where the banking sector experienced new investments and the return of major global 
banks. But the question is whether or not there is still a residual of this effect and how 
it influences the performance of domestic-owned banks.  
 
The objective of this section is to test for the factors that are influenced by the 
management by introducing two explanatory variables for size and structure of 
activity. A model derived from (3.1) is used, where variable (For) measures the 
presence of foreign banks as shown in the following model: 
 

Eff  0 1For2For*Assets3Assets4LINVA5CustomDep          (3.8) 
 
Eff, the dependent variable is the percentage cost efficiency score found earlier. A 
dummy variable (For) that identifies the type of ownership is added to the regression 
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and it takes value 1 if foreign-owned or 0 if domestic-owned. As highlighted above, 
differences in efficiencies can originate from differences in size and activities; thus 
two additional variables, the ratio of loans to investment assets (LINVA) and the 
share of deposits in the total balance sheet (CustomDep) are included. The difference 
in magnitude in terms of operations may explain differences in efficiency. Therefore 
the size of operations measured by the total assets (Assets) is added onto the 
regression. And finally, an interaction term (For*Assets) linking the variables Foreign 
and Assets is introduced that helps explain any relationship between the bank size 
and its origin. And an error term 

  is added.  
 
Table 3.4 reports the correlation amongst the efficiency scores and the four 
independent variables.  
Table 3.4: Pairwise correlation 
 For Assets CustomDep Linva 
Eff Score -0.6772 0.5234 -0.1217 0.0149 
For  -0.224 0.4139 -0.0431 
Assets   0.0480 -0.1483 
CustomDep    0.3282 
Source: SA Banks’ annual reports 
Author calculation 
 
No serious correlation issue is observed amongst the explanatory variables except 
between ownership (For) and efficiency score (Eff Score), which has a value of -
0.6772 confirming the earlier finding about the foreign-owned banks’ 
outperformance. There is a significant correlation (-0.5234) between variables For 
and Assets, indicating that the efficiency gap between domestic and foreign-owned 
banks is likely to be affected by bank size. This should be confirmed by the 
regression results.  
 
Most studies (Weill, 2003; Kiyota, 2011), which include efficiency scores, opt for the 
Tobit regression mainly because the cost efficiency score takes values in the interval 
between 0 and 1. This interval makes the independent variable very limited too, and 
using an OLS regression may provide biased results. Similarly to these studies, I use 
the Tobit model estimation and Stata general procedure and command for running 
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this model is given in annex 3.8. However, for robustness checks, panel data random-
effects GLS estimator is used and both results are reported and discussed in chapter 7.  
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Chapter 4 
4.  Results from the survey model 
The survey consists of a questionnaire that has eight questions sent to the foreign 
banks and branches that are operating in the SA market. (See questionnaire template 
in Annex 3.10). One question identifies the reasons for entry. Two more questions ask 
the banks to provide answers on both their strategy in the SA market and their 
comparative advantage at the time of entry. Two additional questions ask for 
products, innovation and technology the foreign banks contributed to bring into the 
SA market and help identify the presence of potential spillover effects in the SA 
banking sector. And finally, the last two questions help examine what shape the SA 
banking sector might take in the future. The results are presented in the following.  
4.1 What are the reasons for entry of the foreign banks in SA 
market?  
Although some banks never left SA such as Bank of Athens, after 1994 the number of 
foreign banks increased and in 2010 surpassed the number of domestic banks. But 
until 2005, the share of foreign banks in total assets was only about 10% of the share 
of total assets of the banking sector.  This situation changed once Barclays took 
control of ABSA, one of the four big SA banks. The results of the survey described in 
the previous section provide information about the foreign banks’ motivation for 
establishing operations in SA and other aspects of foreign banks’ behaviour and their 
impact on the SA market.  
 
When asked about their motivation (Table 4.1 below) for entering the SA market, 
“search for new clients” was the answer provided by the banks as their strongest 
reason for entry, followed by “geographical proximity”. Motivations for entry such as 
“SA regulation” and “high interest margins” came next. Following clients from home 
countries and competition in the home country did not receive a high score.  When 
asked the reason to stay in SA (now:2011) the results remained almost unchanged 
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with only one exception: “following clients from home countries” received the second 
highest score.  
 
To explain these reasons for entry, a number of factors, as defined and developed by 
Sagari, (1992); Konopielko, (1999); Buch, (2000); and Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001), 
need to be discussed. Banks operate in other countries because of the push factors 
relating to the home market meaning that if profits at home are low due to high levels 
of competition, macro-economic weakness or regulatory burdens then the banks may 
expand to foreign markets in order to increase their profits. Other factors defined as 
pull (factors) make foreign markets particularly attractive such as access to a new 
client base, which is very important in countries where GDP growth is not only fast 
but also is expected to be fast in the future, as is the case in developing countries such 
as SA. 
 
Table 4.1: Reasons for entry 
Activity 
At time of Entry Now In the future 
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Competition in the home Country 1.11 8 55.12% 1.15 8 55.12% 1.17 8 55.11% 
SA regulation 1.73 8 55.12% 1.75 8 55.12% 2.10 8 55.11% 
Search for new clients / new  
businesses 
2.43 8 55.12% 2.50 8 55.12% 2.30 8 55.11% 
Following clients from home  
countries 
1.00 7 51.35% 2.10 7 51.35% 2.10 7 51.35% 
Unused credit potential of the  
SA economy 
1.14 7 51.35% 1.60 7 51.35% 2.00 7 51.35% 
Unused credit potential of the  
SA households 
0.61 7 51.35% 0.63 7 51.35% 0.63 7 51.35% 
Geographical proximity 2.00 7 51.35% 2.00 7 51.35% 1.70 7 51.35% 
Similar mentality or way  
of working 
1.61 7 51.35% 1.60 7 51.35% 1.95 7 51.35% 
High interest margins 1.61 7 51.35% 1.77 7 51.35% 1.43 7 51.35% 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
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Low competition in the foreign market constitutes also a pull factor, as well as the 
presence of home country clients in the foreign market (also defined as following the 
client).  
 
In this SA case it seems that the push factors, especially “search for new clients and 
businesses”, were the main reasons for entry and they remained the case when the 
banks decided to stay in SA in 2011. Foreign banks, at the time of entry, wanted to 
exploit the huge SA economic potential that suddenly became available after the 
regime change. This is not surprising as some specific aspects of the SA economy 
such as the mining sector requiring important investments were already very strong 
and were maintained during the Apartheid regime. At the time of entry no pull factors 
seemed to be the reason for foreign banks to expand their operations in SA. However, 
the high jump of following clients from home countries in 2011-12 became a 
significant pull factor and it demonstrates the results of the SA government efforts to 
encourage more foreign trade and FDIs in the last decade. To a lesser extent other pull 
factors such as SA regulation and high interest margins started to attract interest. 
Furthermore, from 1994 to 2012 SA has enjoyed economic growth and business 
expansion and subsequently unused credit potential in the SA economy slowly 
increased trend scores from the time of entry to 2012.  
 
Looking at the future, “searching for new clients and businesses”, a push factor, 
remains strong followed equally by “SA regulation” and “following clients from 
home countries”, two pull factors and then “unused credit potential of the SA 
economy”.  
 
“Geographic proximity” requires specific attention as it got the second highest score 
at the time of entry and remains strong in the period 2011-12. Although pull and push 
factors may explain some aspects of the survey answers, it does not explain why 
geographic proximity received such a high score considering that geographically 
speaking SA in not that close to Europe, Asia or America. In addition to push and pull 
factors there are other factors that explain why banks decide to operate abroad. One 
pull factor, which is part of the ownership advantage theory (see chapter 1), is to 
“follow the clients from home countries”, as the banks may be able to compete with 
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host countries (Miller and Parkhe, 1998). But, as previously seen, this is not the case 
for the period 1994-2012. Another factor would perhaps be to “follow the 
competitors” (this was not asked to the banks). Indeed, ownership advantages may 
trigger different types of strategic behaviour amongst foreign banks that includes 
following the leader. Foreign banks then mimic each other’s investment behaviour 
that includes the location of their branches in host countries (Engwal and Wallenstal, 
1998). This perhaps may provide some clarification to this ambiguous response, as it 
was not possible to interview every single bank about the survey.  
 
4.2 In which type of clients foreign banks are interested, in SA 
market?  
As described in chapter 1, foreign banks have some ownership advantages that 
contribute to help them compete with domestic banks in host countries. Ownership 
advantages could be in the form of tangible and intangible assets and these types of 
assets may range from the foreign banks’ capabilities and capacity to offer superior 
banking products as well as unique banking services to their clients because they have 
better managerial skills or more advanced information technology (Aliber, 1984; Cho, 
1985; Yannopoulos, 1983; William, 1997). The foreign banks therefore may 
concentrate their activities in areas where they have comparative advantages. 
Furthermore, a bank from a more advanced economy might possess better risk 
management techniques, products and technologies (Berger et al., 2000; Claessens 
and Van Horen, 2008). Foreign banks may exploit their comparative advantage in the 
area of retail banking where they might have already developed products, services and 
expertise that can be cheaply implemented in the new market (Kraft, 2002). Some 
foreign banks may have a comparative advantage in products such as derivatives, or 
activities of private and investment banking that require specific knowledge (Clarke, 
Cull, D’Amato and Molinari 1999) and this particular aspect of comparative 
advantage is what most of the foreign banks that are operating in SA possess. On the 
other hand, in activities that require in-depth local knowledge, foreign banks may be 
disadvantaged. For instance, activities such as lending to small companies may be 
dominated by domestic banks (Kraft, 2002).  
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At the time of entry, in table 4.2 below the foreign banks report that their main targets 
were “large domestic companies” and “domestic blue chips” that received the highest 
score respectively 2.41 and 2.40. Clearly, they were not interested in small businesses 
as predicted from the earlier discussion above; “domestic, small and medium 
enterprises” as well as “micro-enterprises and sole trader” score respectively 0.90 and 
0.4. Foreign banks may find it more difficult to assess the creditworthiness of smaller 
businesses, which often have inadequate business plans and financial statements. The 
financing of small and medium enterprises involved higher administrative and 
transaction costs due to lending or investing smaller amounts (UNCTAD, 2005). In 
addition, when compared with larger corporations small and medium enterprises, in 
general, have smaller capitalisation and insufficient assets. They are more subject to 
market fluctuations that make them even more vulnerable. They may be regarded as 
high-risk borrowers as they may record higher rates of insolvency and as mentioned 
all these disadvantages may make their creditworthiness more complicated to assess 
by foreign banks. It may be assumed that foreign banks may have already developed 
products, services and expertise that could be cheaply implemented in the new SA 
market (Kraft, 2002) that possibly required standard but advanced skills for specific 
needs. It was mentioned in the previous section that foreign banks follow their clients 
abroad and this can be confirmed as “home country investors” received a high score 
of 2.29. This particular answer may well contradict the conclusion of the previous 
table 4.5, as “following client abroad” was not their main reason for entry. In fact, it 
seems that foreign banks were mostly interested first in the SA market potential but 
took full advantage of a situation in which foreign investors were gradually coming 
back to the SA market. This is clearly confirmed by the fact that “home country 
investors” is ranked third just after SA market: “large domestic companies” and 
“domestic blue chips”. In light of this new finding it can be concluded that the foreign 
banks that are operating in SA, at the time of entry, followed their clients that wished 
to invest in the SA economy.  
 
In 2011-12 the same three groups of activities: “home country investors”, “domestic 
blue chips” and “large domestic companies”, still dominate as they score respectively 
2.25, 2.40 and 2.43. However, two additional groups emerge: “foreign investors” and 
“other foreign or international companies”. These two groups represent any foreigners 
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(investors or companies) that do not originate from the same country as a foreign 
bank that operates in SA and that wish to invest in the SA economy.  This implicitly 
translates the influx of foreign investments in SA that reflects the effort made by the 
SA government since 2000 to implement trade and FDI policies.  
 
In their view of the future, foreign banks still focus on the five groups: “home country 
investors”, “domestic blue chips”, “large domestic companies”, “foreign investors” 
and “other foreign or international companies” with almost equal scores. “High net 
worth individual group” records a significant progression from virtually not important 
at time of entry to become close to important in the future. This suggests that due to 
the increase in SA economic development, a strong middle class society is currently 
emerging. This also suggests a shift in the foreign banks’ strategy to service this new 
type of customers in providing more private banking services.  
Table 4.2: Type of clients 
Activity 
At time of Entry Now In the future 
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Foreign investors 1.92 7 51.35% 2.01 7 51.35% 2.44 7 51.35% 
Home country investors 2.29 7 51.35% 2.25 7 51.35% 2.31 7 51.35% 
Other foreign or international  
companies 
1.80 8 55.12% 2.15 8 55.12% 2.21 8 55.12% 
Domestic blue chips 2.40 8 55.12% 2.40 8 55.12% 2.43 8 55.12% 
Large domestic companies 2.41 8 55.12% 2.43 8 55.12% 2.44 8 55.12% 
Domestic small and medium  
enterprises 
0.90 7 51.35% 0.89 7 51.35% 1.65 7 51.35% 
Micro-enterprises and sole traders 0.47 7 51.35% 0.55 7 51.35% 0.05 7 51.35% 
High net worth individuals 0.34 7 51.35% 1.50 7 51.35% 1.87 7 51.35% 
Households 0.08 7 51.35% 0.05 7 51.35% 0.04 7 51.35% 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 2.2). 
 
One conclusion that can be drawn here is that the foreign banks came to SA to enjoy 
the most profitable market niches. They did not seek to serve the whole spectrum of 
the market consisting of both retail (household) and corporate (business sector). 
Instead the focus was more on the SA business sector at the time of entry. 
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With household scores close to zero at the time of entry and even lower in the future, 
it seems that the foreign banks are not interested in this market.  
 
Table 4.3 provides another source of information on foreign banks’ strategies 
regarding the activities that are most important for them. At time of entry, foreign 
banks were mostly attracted to “portfolio investments” in SA. These activities cover 
exclusively production and investment. Foreign banks were less interested in foreign 
“direct investment” and “SA import/export activities”. The focus on these activities 
validates the findings in table 4.2, as the foreign banks were more interested in SA big 
businesses. 
Table 4.3: Type of activities 
Activity 
At time of Entry Now In the future 
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Foreign direct investment in SA 1.71 8 55.12% 2.50 8 55.12% 2.95 8 55.12% 
Portfolio investments in SA 2.34 8 55.12% 2.36 8 55.12% 2.37 8 55.12% 
SA exports 1.83 7 51.35% 1.86 7 51.35% 1.86 7 51.35% 
SA imports 1.85 7 51.35% 1.87 7 51.35% 1.87 7 51.35% 
Purchase of fixed  
capital/modernisation 
1.24 7 51.35% 1.40 7 51.35% 1.81 7 51.35% 
Purchase of working capital 1.38 7 51.35% 1.46 7 51.35% 1.46 7 51.35% 
Enterprise restructuring and 
 domestic M&A’s 
1.89 7 51.35% 2.38 7 51.35% 2.47 7 51.35% 
Expansion of domestic 
 companies abroad 
1.81 7 51.35% 1.95 7 51.35% 2.74 7 51.35% 
Household - consumption 0.78 7 51.35% 0.70 7 51.35% 0.70 7 51.35% 
Household - transportation 0.77 7 51.35% 0.82 7 51.35% 0.70 7 51.35% 
Household – real estate 0.65 7 51.35% 0.72 7 51.35% 0.57 7 51.35% 
Foreign direct investments  
by SA firms abroad 
1.95 7 51.35% 1.95 7 51.35% 2.31 7 51.35% 
Portfolio investments  
by SA firms abroad 
1.97 7 51.35% 1.97 7 51.35% 2.33 7 51.35% 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
In 2011-12, foreign banks focus their attention more on “FDI in SA” with the higher 
score, followed by activities such as “enterprises restructuring and domestic merger 
and acquisition” and “portfolio investments in SA.” that obtain almost similar scores, 
2.38 and 2.36 respectively. 
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In the future, “FDI in SA” dominates, closely followed by “expansion of domestic 
companies abroad” scoring respectively 2.95 and 2.47. These may be the result of 
FDI policy and economic partnerships that the SA government has implemented, 
which suggests that SA firms are taking advantage of economic partnerships and 
regional integration agreements to expand abroad. This is confirmed by a high score 
of “FDI by SA firms abroad” that scores 2.31.  
 
Table 4.3 confirms the fact that the foreign banks in SA are operating in the highly 
specialised segment of investment banking. At the time of entry their activities 
covered essentially “portfolio investments in SA” and extended gradually to 
investments in SA from foreign investors and activities of M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions). In the future they wish to consolidate their presence in this kind of 
segment. These types of activities are high value added and specialised activities that 
require specific skills and knowledge. This could partly contribute a limited and 
localised effects of spillovers and competition in SA banking sector, as the empirical 
results in chapter 7 may show. And that is explained by the fact that if foreign banks 
focus on segments where domestic banks are not present or specialised in then their 
presence will have few effects on domestic banks (Clarke et al, 2000). In the case of 
SA, domestic banks are still present in this segment but their main activities 
concentrate on retail banking.  
 
Table 4.3 confirmed another lesson learned from table 4.2, that foreign banks in SA 
are not interested in taking part in household activities or activities involving micro-
enterprises and sole traders. With the big four (excluding ABSA, which is now part of 
the Barclays group) that dominate the domestic market, they might think that it is 
worthier to concentrate their activities on corporate and investment banking where 
they possess significant comparative advantage. In fact, foreign banks’ entry is often 
limited to the wholesale segment (mortgage brokers, large corporate clients, mid-
sized companies, real estate developers and investors, international trade finance 
businesses and institutional customers such as pension funds and government 
entities/agencies and services offered to other banks or other financial institutions). In 
the SA case they are exclusively limited to the investment banking segment, as doing 
business in other segments is usually not ideal for them as they involve higher risks, 
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and higher information and transactions costs (Lensink and Hermes, 2004; Claessens 
et al., 2001; Clarke et al., 2003). This on the other hand reveals a lack of competition 
in retail banking that the competition authorities and regulators may need to pay 
attention to in term of policy implications. But in SA, as chapter 4 shows, this is 
slowly starting to change with ownership changes in the four big SA banks, in 
particular in ABSA and the Standard Bank.  
4.3 What products and service innovation do foreign banks 
contribute to bring into SA market?  
At the time of entry, foreign banks rated “money-market trading” as their primary 
activity. “Foreign currency dealing” and “lending to financial institutions” were rated 
with equal scores as their second main lines of business (table 4.4).  
 
In 2011-12, these three top activities: “money-market trading”, “Foreign currency 
dealing” and “lending to financial institutions” still remain important. However, 
foreign currency dealing and lending to financial institutions are outperformed by 
security trading, equity trading and derivative trading, which obtain scores higher than 
2.70. Activities such as “foreign payments” and “trading domestic riskless securities” 
are amongst the top activities. If “foreign payments” are a key activity for foreign 
banks in the SA market, activities such as “security trading”, “equity trading”, 
“derivative trading” and perhaps “trading domestic riskless security” represent major 
innovations.  
 
In the future, foreign banks seem to be particularly interested in “lending to 
government and public enterprises” and “domestic payments” (with scores above 2).  
“Money-market trading” and “foreign currency” remain strong in the banks’ 
intentions with the higher scores respectively 2.91 and 2.98. 
 
The outcomes of table 4.4 are in line with those of the previous table 2.3 that shows 
the types of activities that foreign banks are involved in. The products listed in table 
4.4 are in fact products provided by these activities. On the one hand, these results 
show the consistency of the respondents that validates the rigorousness of this survey. 
On the other hand, the consistency of results validates the strategy of the foreign 
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banks, which consists of concentrating their activities in the investment banking at the 
time of entry and gradually expanding their activities to the whole spectrum of the 
wholesale banking as defined previously.  
Table 4.4: Banking products and services 
Activity 
At time of Entry Now In the future 
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Deposit and lending business  
with private non-financial  
sector 
1.18 7 51.35% 1.60 7 51.35% 1.60 7 51.35% 
Lending to government  
and public enterprises 
0.88 7 51.35% 2.07 7 51.35% 2.43 7 51.35% 
Lending to financial  
Institutions 
2.00 7 51.35% 2.50 7 51.35% 2.56 7 51.35% 
Domestic payments 0.71 7 51.35% 1.86 7 51.35% 2.22 7 51.35% 
Foreign payments 1.60 8 55.12% 2.61 8 55.12% 2.61 8 55.12% 
Foreign currency dealing 2.00 8 55.12% 2.32 8 55.12% 2.98 8 55.12% 
Trading domestic riskless  
Securities 
1.64 7 51.35% 2.46 7 51.35% 2.46 7 51.35% 
Money market trading 2.50 8 55.12% 2.89 8 55.12% 2.91 8 55.12% 
Business leasing 0.73 7 51.35% 0.34 7 51.35% 0.34 7 51.35% 
Financial leasing 0.72 7 51.35% 0.38 7 51.35% 0.38 7 51.35% 
Securities trading 1.50 7 51.35% 2.74 7 51.35% 2.75 7 51.35% 
Equities trading 1.46 7 51.35% 2.70 7 51.35% 2.71 7 51.35% 
Derivatives trading 1.54 7 51.35% 2.72 7 51.35% 2.73 7 51.35% 
Asset Management 0.52 7 51.35% 0.60 7 51.35% 1.80 7 51.35% 
Commission business 0.48 7 51.35% 0.90 7 51.35% 0.92 7 51.35% 
Life and non-life insurance 0 7 51.35% 1.12 7 51.35% 0.21 7 51.35% 
Pension funds 0.40 7 51.35% 0.40 7 51.35% 0.40 7 51.35% 
Brokerage 0.40 7 51.35% 1.65 7 51.35% 1.67 7 51.35% 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
 
It seems that activities such as leasing or insurance have never been and will never be 
a priority for them. Indeed, this line of business is entirely covered by the domestic 
and insurance banks that are successfully operating in SA.  
 
Table 4.5 below summarises the most popular products used by the foreign banks. 
The number of banks that answered this question is more limited; they make up a 
maximum of 26% of total foreign banking assets and answers provided may suggest a 
trend. Futures, options and swaps are the most successful products, which obtain the 
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highest score 3 out of 3. These products are very specialised and bounded in the very 
specific area of investment banking. This result may suggest that currency risks in SA 
are actually very well managed, which is not a big surprise as these foreign banks 
have knowledge of how to support this line of business in SA.  
 
Table 4.5: Success of new products and services 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
 
Surprisingly domestic payments obtained a big score 2.77 out of 3 with a significant 
number of respondents. This is interesting because when analysing the answer in 
particular, the banks that use this product appear to be small in size. These 
respondents that use domestic payments account for only 8.35% of total foreign 
banking assets. This result suggests that only specific small foreign banks actually use 
this product.   
 
This survey shows that the derivatives products including “Futures”, “Options” and 
“Swaps” are more used than other products and for this reason this constitutes a 
success. Most of these products are traded on the JSE (Johannesburg Stock Exchange) 
that provides the infrastructure for trading. With the expertise and the knowledge and 
the fact that the foreign banks are used to dealing with these products, the success of 
these products is not a surprise. 
 
Product Average  
score 
Number of 
answers 
Share in total 
foreign banking 
assets 
Earliest introduced 
in SA market by any 
of the banks 
Futures 3 1 18.20% 2009 
Options 3 2 25.12% 2009 
Swaps 2.96 3 26.11% 2000 
Forfaiting 2 1 7% 2011 
Domestic payments 2.77 3 8.35% 1992 
Cash and asset management 2 1 18.20% Unknown 
Call deposit 1.70 2 1.43% 1992 
Call loan 1.70 2 1.43% 1992 
Open saving 1.70 2 1.43 % 1992 
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4.4 What knowledge diffusion do foreign banks contribute to bring 
into SA market?  
This section identifies directly from table 4.6 the types of knowledge that have spilled 
over in the SA banking sector from the foreign banks. As in previous sections, not all 
banks answered this question but they made up a maximum of 44.16% of total foreign 
banking assets, which is representative and significant. At the time of entry, foreign 
banks adopted “new products and services”, “management methods and skills” and 
“risks management processes”.  
Table 4.6: Skills and knowledge transfer 
Knowledge / skills / systems 
Before 2000 2000-10 2011 and + 
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Information technology 66.67 44.16% 66.67 26.56% 66.67 41.00% 
New products and services 83.33 44.76% 100 45.20% 66.67 41.00% 
Project assessment methods 33.33 22.20% 66.67 23.23% 50.00 22.80% 
Management methods and skills 83.33 44.76% 100 45.20% 66.67 41.00% 
Marketing knowledge and techniques 16.67 21.21 % 50 22.64% 33.33 22.20% 
Retail knowledge and techniques 16.67 0.60%% 50 2.03% 33.33 1.59% 
Wholesale knowledge and techniques 33.33 39.41% 66.6 41.00% 66.67 41.00% 
Risk management processes 83.33 44.76% 83.33 44.76% 83.33 44.76% 
Internal control processes and systems 66.67 41.00% 66.67 41.00% 66.67 41.00% 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
 
These three received the highest score (83%) and from the majority of the panel 
respondents (44.76%). “Information technology” and “internal control processes and 
systems” received an above-average score (66.6%).  
 
Moving to the period 2000-10, other areas seem to be affected by the transfer, such as 
“wholesale knowledge and techniques and project assessment method, which received 
a high score but only from a limited number of respondents.  
 
In the future, the banks would accentuate the transfer in almost all activities except in 
project assessment methods, marketing knowledge and techniques and retail 
knowledge and techniques, whose scores dropped below average.  
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In light of the answers provided by the foreign banks, it seems that foreign banks have 
been playing a significant role in the process of introducing new knowledge, skills 
and modern risk management systems and this is not surprising as domestic banks in 
developing countries are generally characterised by outmoded, inefficient 
management skills. This is reflected by the fact that a bureaucracy culture makes them 
consider first aspects of bureaucracy such as procedures and recording, as more 
important than profitability, customer service, training and innovative products 
(Bascom, 1997). This table 4.6 shows that the foreign banks have demonstrated the 
availability of new communication technologies, modern skills and management 
practices (Lensink/Hermes, 2004) in the SA market. As a result, it could be 
considered that the domestic banks may have imitated and adopted these modern 
skills and competencies (Lensink and Hermes, 2004) and therefore they may have 
improved the efficiency of their operations (Lehner and Schnitzer, 2008). Secondly, 
the availability of modern risk management systems that allows better portfolio 
diversification can in fact contribute directly to improve the efficiency of financial 
intermediation by reducing the cost of searching for processing information about 
potential borrowers (Hermes and Lensink, 2004; Levine1996; Agenor, 2003), and as 
mentioned above, foreign banks from more advanced economies may have better 
available risk management techniques (Berger et al., 2000; Claessens and Van Horen, 
2008). These aspects exemplify a straightforward possible direct spillover effect of 
foreign banks in the SA wholesale banking market.  
 
These results from table 4.6 that show the availability of new knowledge, skills and 
modern risk management systems in the SA market imply the existence of a 
technology gap before and after 2000. As domestic banks are operating in this 
segment of investment banking where the foreign banks are active, it is fair to say that 
some absorptive capacity existed or exists. Then, if absorptive capacity exists, it is 
likely that domestic banks enhanced their technological level by imitating foreign 
technologies as suggested earlier. This is complex because if the survey informs about 
the availability of new skills, knowledge and technology in the SA market, it does not 
tell what is the level of absorptive capacity of domestic banks. Unfortunately I cannot 
conclude on how and/or if any spillover effects occur in the light of this survey 
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because a large technological gap reflects a lower absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms and reduces the likelihood of spillover effects (Dimelis, 2005; Kokko 1994). 
The critical level of the technological gap is essentially determined by the complexity 
of foreign technologies as well as the extent of, and the increase in market penetration 
by, foreign corporations (Perez, 1997). In addition, if foreign technologies are 
developed for the specific market conditions in a particular country or for the specific 
needs of a certain firm, domestic firms may not have the required skills to adopt them 
(Moosa 2002; Blomstrom and Kokko 1998; Perez, 1997). And spillover effects are 
unlikely to occur if foreign firms operate in isolated market segments (Kokko, 1994) 
as is the case here. This aspect of absorptive capacity (AC) is a transmission factor for 
spillovers or determinant for spillovers effects as analysed in chapter 1. From this 
angle I cannot conclude that spillover effects have occurred.  
 
Furthermore, management know-how is mostly implicit and to be adopted, it requires 
sufficient personal contact between the sender and receiver of that know-how (Smeet 
and deVaal, 2005). One factor that can facilitate the diffusion of management know-
how and the transfer of skills and implicit knowledge is labour turnover (McKendrick, 
1994). This aspect of turnover is one of the components of spillover effects or 
channels of FDI knowledge spillovers. Unfortunately the survey does not provide 
information on that aspect of turnover.  
 
However, in light of the outcomes of table 4.6 as mentioned earlier, it can be 
confirmed that the foreign banks have demonstrated the availability of new 
information technology, new products and services, new management methods and 
skills, new risk management processes and new internal control processes and 
systems. The next question would be whether or not the domestic banks have imitated 
and adopted these new skills and techniques (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). If the 
answer is yes then it could be concluded that there is a case for some demonstration 
effects. Although table 4.6 does not provide with this answer, however, competition is 
the condition for demonstration effect to take place. The existence of such 
competition effect in the segment of wholesale banking would clearly imply that 
demonstration effects occurred. And as demonstration effects are channel of spillover 
effects (as seen in chapter 1) I could conclude that the SA wholesale banking sector 
  88 
has experienced some knowledge spillovers (or spillover effects). The next table may 
provide some more insight, as it deals with competition and as the survey assesses the 
banks over a relatively long period of time before 2000 and after 2011.  
 
4.5 What is the impact of foreign banks on competition, quality 
and efficiency in SA market?  
The results from table 4.7 below are complex but interesting and in many respects 
confirm the previous findings. It shows how the impact of the foreign banks has 
evolved over time. At the time of entry, it can be assumed that the foreign banks did 
not play any significant role in the SA market, as their total share in assets was very 
low (around 5% - see chapter 3).  
 
However, according table 4.7, it seems that their relative impact was made in the area 
of fees only with a score of almost 2. However, from the period 2000-11 their effect 
can be seen more clearly, with an increase of all impacts. But these impacts need to be 
read very carefully. For instance the second biggest impact is on “bank profitability” 
with a score of 2.41. But the analysis of the components of profitability shows a more 
contrasting picture. Indeed, profitability indicators as established in chapter 3 could 
include lending interest, fees and interest margin and each component tells a different 
story. 
 
 
 
Table 4.7: Importance of foreign banks entry for SA market 
Trend / process 
Before 2000 2000-10 2011-on 
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Lending interest rates 0.70 6 48.35% 1.11 6 48.35% 1.11 6 48.35% 
Fees 1.97 7 52.11 2.40 7 52.11 2.40 7 55.12% 
Interest margins 1.24 7 52.11 2.09 7 52.11 2.44 7 51.35% 
Products and services  0.95 7 52.11 2.14 7 52.11 2.56 7 51.35% 
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Assortment 
Market competition 1.21 7 52.11 2.39 7 52.11 2.37 7 51.35% 
Bank Profitability 1.58 7 52.11 2.41 7 52.11 2.41 7 51.35% 
Bank efficiency 1.77 7 52.11 1.81 7 52.11 2.17 7 51.35% 
Central bank regulation 1.74 7 52.11 2.10 7 52.11 2.09 7 51.35% 
Involvement of banks  
in managing non-financial  
corporations in which they 
 have equity holding 
1.84 6 48.35% 0.18 6 48.35% 0.20 6 48.35% 
Involvement of banks in 
managing non-financial  
companies that are major  
bank debtors 
1.21 6 48.35% 1.23 6 48.35% 1.23 6 48.35% 
Introduction of new banking  
products and services 
1.12 7 52.11 1.90 7 52.11 2.34 7 52.11 
Increasing the quality of  
existing products and services 
1.77 7 52.11 2.55 7 52.11 2.57 7 52.11 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
 
I stated earlier that as foreign banks generally have more experience in dealing in 
competitive environments than domestic banks, they may find it easier to operate with 
variable prices such as interest rates and fees (Jansen and Vennes, 2006). It was 
argued several times that those foreign banks in developing countries generate better 
profit margins than domestic banks. Here, table 4.7 shows that foreign banks had 
limited impact on “lending interest rates” (1.11), important impacts on “interest 
margins” with a score of 2.09 (although a much higher score could be expected) and a 
significantly higher score in “fees”. How can these contradictions be explained? First, 
the scope of foreign banks activity is smaller and limited to investment banking. 
Second, a majority of these banks’ revenue is generated through fees. Therefore, the 
results are not contradictory but rather reflect the complexity of foreign banks 
activity. It becomes clearer why foreign banks impact is limited in the area of 
“lending interest rates”; it seems that foreign banks in SA cannot compete with SA 
banks in offering much lower interest rates. As they perceived “fees” as their core 
activities, it is not surprising that impact on “bank profitability” is high.  
 
There is an impact on “product and services”, “introduction of new banking product 
and services” and “increasing the quality of existing products and services” for the 
period 2000-10 that received respectively a score of 2.09, 1.90 and 2.55. These results 
emphasise findings in the previous table 4.6 that show the biggest score for two 
activities that include “new products and services” and “Management method and 
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skills” and this allows to draw the same conclusion that all products, practices and 
know-how that are necessary for the process of knowledge spillovers to occur were 
present in SA market.  
 
In light of the results that score high: “products and services” in general and “bank 
profitability”, it is not surprising that “market competition” scores 2.40 out of 3. It 
shows that impact of the foreign banks in investment banking activity was important. 
But here, despite great competition, important impacts on products and services and 
profitability, the impact on “bank efficiency” is still limited as it scores 1.81 out 3, 
which means less than important. This finding will be further explained in chapter 4 
and 6 that provides empirical evidence on efficiency. But this does not mean that 
domestic banks did not feel competition. As mentioned earlier in this section, this 
implies that if foreign banks from industrialised countries focus on the wholesale 
segment markets in developing country, it is highly likely that they apply respective 
models and techniques to analyse wholesale credits.  
 
Two other impacts seem to be very low with almost no improvement over time: these 
are the involvement of foreign banks in the management of non-financial enterprises 
in which they have shareholdings, and their involvement in the management of non-
financial enterprises that are large debtors. This shows that close bank involvement in 
the non-financial sector enterprise management does not happen in SA.  
 
I stated previously that competition is the condition for demonstration effect to take 
place. And as competition occurred in the segment of wholesale banking (as just 
shown in this section), therefore this clearly implies that demonstration effects 
occurred. But demonstration effects are channels of spillover effects (as seen in 
chapter 2); in consequence I can conclude at this stage that the SA wholesale banking 
has experienced some knowledge spillovers (or spillover effects). The question now is 
to what extent have spillovers occurred into the entire SA banking sector and affected 
SMEs and retail banking.  
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4.6 What is the probability of future scenario in SA banking 
system?  
As far as the further consolidation of the banking system is concerned, table 4.8 
shows that almost all banks in the panel score 3 out of 3 on “remain independent” as 
their most likely option for the period after 2012. However, after 2012, “buy-out of 
domestic bank” scores 1.45. “Hostile offer for majority share” and “hostile offer for 
minority share” score each 1.26 and together 2.56, suggesting that beyond 2012 some 
acquisitions are likely to happen. Therefore, is there any future for SA domestic 
banks? There are currently four big banks in SA and one, ABSA is foreign-owned by 
Barclays since 2005 (not included in this study as a foreign bank). The ICBC, (a 
Chinese bank), has a minority shareholder (20%) in the Standard Bank. Nedbank has 
a strategic partnership with EcoBank, an African bank. First Rand is the only 
domestic big bank that has as yet no strategic or commercial partnership and no 
minority or majority foreign shareholding in its capital structure, but may seek 
partnership in order to establish activities in the Indian market and implement its 
technological platform there that has proved successful in the SA market (Interview 
5). Kraft (2002) suggests that after a consolidation process, there are market niches 
for smaller banks with exceptional knowledge of local conditions. This seems to be 
the case in SA with about 10 small domestic-owned banks left. Moreover, DeYoung, 
Goldberg and White (1999) provide evidence from the US that relationship lending 
with small business is generally most successfully practised by small and young 
banks arguing that a constant flow of new banks is needed, since older banks grow up 
to become larger and often lose their close relationship to their customers. 
 
Table 4.8: Probability of future scenario 
Scenario 
Through 2011-12 After 2012 
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Remain independent 3 7 54.52 3 7 54.52 
Merge with domestic bank 0.18 0 54.52 0.18 0 54.52 
Buy-out by domestic bank 0.18 0 54.52 0.18 0 54.52 
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Buy-out of domestic bank 0.66 1 54.52 1.45 3 54.52 
Merge with foreign bank 0.25 0 54.52 0.25 0 54.52 
Buy-out by foreign bank 0.30 1 54.52 0.30 0 54.52 
Buy-out of foreign bank 0.18 0 54.52 1.18 0 54.52 
Hostile offer for minority share 0.12 0 54.52 1.26 0 54.52 
Hostile offer for majority share 0.12 0 54.52 1.26 0 54.52 
Scale: 0-Not important, 1-less important, 2-important, 3-very important. 
Source: Questionnaire feedback (Annex 3.10). 
 
The emergence of Capitec bank, now a medium-sized bank, which has specialised in 
micro-lending is a perfect illustration. Chapter 4 provides more details about Capitec.  
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4.7 Conclusion  
The survey results analysed here in this chapter help us understand the strategy of the 
foreign banks and branches in SA and their potential for knowledge spillovers. It is 
clear that the main reason for entry of the foreign banks in SA market after regime 
change in SA was the search for new clients and businesses and this reason still 
remains valid today. However, the type of clients they were looking for at the time of 
entry was large domestic companies and blue chip companies. This remains the case 
today and for the future. This aspect of type of clients is very important as it reflects 
the particular market segment in which the foreign banks are operating. There is no 
doubt that foreign banks enjoys the most SA profitable market niches and the survey 
also confirms that they have no interest in operating in the larger segment of retail 
banking and domestic, small and medium enterprises or micro-enterprises and sole-
trader. The type of activities and products also confirm this particular segment in 
which they are operating. This aspect of market segment in which they operate might 
have huge implications as competition and knowledge spillovers might be localised in 
that particular market only.  
 
In terms of knowledge diffusion, this survey reveals the availability of new 
knowledge, skill and modern risk management system in the SA market due to the 
presence of foreign banks implying a technological gap in the wholesale segment. The 
problem was to identify any demonstration effect meaning whether or not the 
domestic banks adopted the new available knowledge management system. The 
survey identified the presence of competition occurring in the segment of wholesale 
banking; we argued that competition is a condition for demonstration effects to take 
place; as demonstration effects are a channel for spillover effects (as seen in chapter 
1) consequently, this survey provides some ground to argue the existenc of some 
knowledge spillovers in the SA wholesale banking sector.  
 
The next chapter extends the investigation of knowledge spillover through other 
routes and determinants using the techniques of case studies and empirical analyses.  
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Chapter 5 
 
5.  In search of knowledge transfer and 
spillovers effects: Evidence from case study 
The aim of this chapter is to address the relationship between efficiency and FDI. It 
investigates further the mechanisms and the impacts of knowledge spillovers and 
knowledge transfer in two of the SA four big banks. To achieve this, the performance 
and efficiency of ABSA and the Standard Bank are analysed.  Barclays Bank, a 
British bank, recently acquired ABSA, while ICBC, a Chinese bank took a significant 
foreign minority (20%) shareholding in the Standard Bank. Contrary to the previous 
chapter that dealt with foreign banks and branches that operate exclusively in the 
segment of investment banking, these banks are two of the four big SA-based banks, 
whose activities cover all segments of banking including wholesale and retail. 
Entering respectively into a FDI or a Greenfield investment represents two strategies 
that allow Barclays and ICBC banks to broaden their activities, in particular in the 
retail segment, to target new customers and perhaps to implement their strategy 
further in the rest of the African continent.  
 
This chapter addresses two questions: first whether or not ABSA and the Standard 
Bank performance have improved after their recent change of ownership, and second 
if their performance is better than those of their peers. Knowledge transfer could 
materialise through better performance or efficiency. But beyond these expected 
improvements, it is important to understand how this performance was achieved. Did 
the foreign bank pass on knowledge to the newly acquired domestic banks in areas 
such as management, system or products? The change in strategy is equally important 
to identify, as the new owner may want to concentrate on particular segments of the 
market, which implies a change of direction in terms of products and clients. But it is 
clear that any changes in performance could depend directly on the level of 
ownership. Another important issue is whether or not a change in performance of 
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these newly foreign-owned banks has influenced the competitors’ strategy. If this is 
the case that would suggest that more competition has occurred and implies some 
kind of spillover effects.  
 
The literature and practitioners argue that FDI in the banking sector and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) result in efficiency gains (Krabill, 1985; Meehan, 1989; 
McNamee, 1992). It is argued that FDI is one of the mechanisms by which firms gain 
access to new resources and that this redeployment of resources increases revenues 
and reduces cost. This impact of FDI and M&A is the result of intense competition, 
evolving technology, low interest rates, changing regulation in the financial market 
and many other factors. 
 
The potential economic benefits from FDI and M&A are changes that increase value, 
which would probably not be possible in the absence of a change in ownership. These 
changes in ownership are potentially most valuable when they lead to the re-
deployment of assets or restructuring, providing a new operating plan and business 
strategies. Otherwise, the changes in control could simply provide improvement in 
free cash flow. This is where the level of ownership can be decisive for future strategy 
and possible gains in efficiency and performance. For instance, Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm (1999) show that minority and majority FDI lead to spillovers. On the other 
hand, Demelis and Louri (2002) find majority ownership leads to spillovers when 
measured as labour productivity improvements and minority ownership is even more 
likely to produce knowledge spillovers. Javorcik (2004b) finds no evidence of 
spillovers and no statistical difference between minority and majority FDI. Jarvocik 
and Spartareaunu (2008) find spillovers from their studies. However, some analysts 
have expressed scepticism, as some studies show no efficiency gains (Azarchs, 1995; 
Srinivasan and Wall, 1992; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1993).  
 
The ownership structure is very important when mutinational banks take their 
advantages from intangible assets or technological leadership. This is also called 
ownership advantage meaning that the bank has some form of thechnological 
superiority or competitive advantage over its rivals in the domestic country that needs 
to be protected. However, sharing of ownership with domestic banks gives the 
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possibility to increase knowledge and technological spillovers. Mainwhile, it is worth 
noting that it is difficult to draft an agreement or a contract that exactly specifies all 
aspects of acquisition or minority participation and the right for using the intangible 
assets or thechnology (Muller and Schnitzer, 2003). But this particular issue of 
spillovers should be minimised when the multinational bank (firm) owns a substantial 
part of the domestic firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). 
Therefore, the two levels of owneship, whether it is wholly or partly owned, should 
have various implications for the transfer and diffusion of knowledge. Thus, this 
implies that in order to minimise any potential loss from spillovers a multinational 
may prefer full ownership of its subsidiary or branche. Another reason why the MNE 
may voluntary agree to share ownership is because of its lack of local experience. The 
literature categorises knowledge transfer and FDI spillovers as voluntary or 
involuntary spillovers, resulting from change in ownersip. While voluntary spillover 
is characracterised by technology transfer arrangements consequently to a change in 
ownership as just discussed in this paragraph, involuntary spillover is characterised by 
knowledge spillovers as a result of competition. Competition as we described in 
previous chapter 2 and 3 may force domestic banks to adopt new knowledge or 
technology through imitation. But for this to occur competitors may need to develop a 
minimum absorptive capacity (AC) so that involuntary information and knowledge 
spillovercmay increase at system level. There are also many other channels as 
discussed in chapter 2, such as reverse ingeneering that provides information about 
thechnology used, and mobility of labour, meaning that an employee from a foreign 
branch, who has the knowledge about the technology, can be hired by the competiting 
domestic. Because that knowledge is embodies in the employee, thus this allows the 
hiring firm to use it.  
 
Furthermore, the firm will decide which mode of entry is preferable in order to protect 
its ownership ownership advantage. Therefore where licensing is not safe because of 
issues of property right protection, firm may set up production faciities in foreign 
countires through FDI, as specific advantages in the host country make FDI preferable 
to exporting (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning 1979, 1988,1993). This is also 
called technology-exploitation motivation because such advantage is linked to the 
exploitation of the economy of scale. Work about ownership advantage in a given 
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location includes for instance Griffith (1999), Griffith and Simpson (2001) Oulton 
(2001) and Criscuolo and Martin (2004) and see also chapter 1.  
 
In addition to ownership advantage in a given location, location itself constitutes a 
key component of Dunning (1979) analysis of FDI, as it put it location advantage. As 
we already analised in chapter 2, location advantage is related to the factor of 
endowments of a particular country or region. These factors usually include costs 
differential, in particular unit labour cost differential that includes wages adjusted for 
productivity differences that constitute an important factor for FDI flows (Bajo-rubio 
and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Barrell and Pain, 1996; Love and Hidalgo, 2000; Love, 
2003). In their work and built on earlier findings, Driffield and Love (2005a, 2005b; 
2007) provide a model that identifies FDI and from high and low lobour cost 
locations. This model provides four alternatives’ motivations for FDI, based on 
technology differences (measured by R&D intensity differetials) and factor costs 
differences (measured in terms of unit labour costs). These alternatives includes 
(Driffield and Love, 2007): 
1. Technology-sourcing element and location advantage, where the host economy 
is more R&D intensive and lower unit labour cost than the source investor, 
meaning that inward investment can exploit the host’s location advantage,  
2. Pure technology-sourcing investment that attracts the host’s higher R&D 
intensity country despite its higher unit labour costs,   
3. Ownership advantage and efficiency seeking (defined in chapter 2) meaning 
that a lower unit labour cost advantage from the host country suggesting and 
efficiency seeking motivation (Dunning, 1998), 
4. Finally pure ownership advantage motivation, meaning that the source-country 
R&D intensity is greater than of the corresponding host sector and FDI are 
taking place in spite of the host country having higher labour costs.  
 
 
 
It is important to use this model carefully as costs may not be the only possible 
location advantage. In this study, for instance, it is hard to envisage ICBC investing in 
the Standard Bank for lobour costs reasons, as labour constitutes China competitive 
  98 
advantage. However, this model helps to capture the key FDI motivations between 
source and host countries provided by most empirical evidences from the litereature. 
And this is importance when addressing the nature or FDI spillovers and technology 
transfer.     
 
ABSA and the Standard Bank have been selected as case studies here; because of 
their size and their market share, they are thought to be the kind of acquisitions most 
likely to yield efficiency gains. The two deals occurred in 2005 between Barclays and 
ABSA and in 2007 between ICBC and the Standard Bank. A methodology of case 
studies rather than cross-section statistical models was used as the study focuses on 2 
banks only. Due to the non-random selection, it will not be possible to generalise 
from the findings to all similar foreign participation or acquisition cases. However, 
the findings may give indications as to which conditions surrounding FDI in the 
banking sector in a developing country are most likely to yield efficiency and 
performance gains and why efficiency and/or performance gains are or are not 
realised. In this chapter, section 5.1 provides a brief summary of spillover effects 
already studied in chapter 2, then section 5.2 presents and describes the research 
design while section 5.3 interprets the findings from the case studies, and the last 
section concludes.    
 
5.1. Direct, indirect and spillovers effects: Brief theory summary 
In figure 2.1 (from chapter 2), a mother bank, in this case Barclays, transfers its 
ownership-specific advantages such as management competencies, practices and 
procedures to ensure the competitiveness of its subsidiaries, and in this case ABSA 
(Uiboupin, 2005). Foreign banks may directly increase the quality, pricing and 
availability of financial services for domestic firms and individuals (Levine, 1996; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2004). 
 
Foreign banks may have indirect effects on the domestic banking sector if they 
succeed in changing the behaviour and the performance of the domestic banks as well 
as the industrial structure of the host economy as illustrated by figure 3.1. In this case 
it might be assumed that ABSA and the Standard Bank use outdated practices and 
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technology, low managerial skills and provide undifferentiated products and services. 
Therefore, they could both benefit from transfer of knowledge to adopt modern 
practices and technology. In performing better they could in turn increase the pressure 
on other competitors, such as Nedbank and First Rand to force them to increase 
efficiency that allows them to keep market share and profits. Spillover effects could 
be the result of this pressure that could force Nedbank and First Rand to adopt new 
skills, modern banking practices and technology, as competitive pressure from foreign 
banks may force domestic banks to improve the quality and quantity of financial 
services in order to reduce costs and enhance efficiency (Lensink and Hermes, 2004; 
Levine, 1996).  
 
Labour turnover from foreign to domestic banks is considered to be one of the most 
important mechanisms through which management and technical skills are transferred 
(McKendrick, 1994). Therefore, skilled employees and bank managers by entering the 
foreign subsidiary participate in the propagation of skills and knowledge, and the 
local labour force gets access to international know-how (Hemmer, 2002). This 
definition assumes that labour turnover flows from foreign branches to domestic 
banks. For this study I use this definition and apply it to the subsidiary bank ABSA as 
well as the Standard Bank (which is not a subsidiary) and both foreign banks Barclays 
and ICBC to detect if any knowledge was passed on. I monitor this labour indicator 
for the competitors. This is because the opposite also occurs, consisting of having 
local employees, who have better knowledge of the local economy, who are then 
employed by MNBs, which ensures that these local employees get training (Lehner 
and Schnitzer, 2008). Training is seen as important for competitiveness of a bank, for 
identifying and exploiting market opportunities and for being able to cope with 
geographic and technological changes in competitive markets (Bacom, 1998). 
Specific skills as well as human capital participate in the gathering of information 
about borrowers. Thus, the foreign bank contributes to the enhancement of the 
management of its subsidiary especially if the foreign bank team is directly involved 
in the domestic management team (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). Spillover effects 
could materialise when foreign employees or managers of foreign banks leave their 
employers for domestic banks. As they carry with them new skills and knowledge 
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about risk management techniques and better data processing routines, it is likely that 
they transfer this knowledge to the domestic banks (Lehner and Schnitzer, 2006).  
 
Although know-how can take the form of tacit knowledge that is not codified in 
procedures such as written plans on portfolio structure or pricing, implicit knowledge 
too requires direct contact amongst individuals (McKendrick, 1994). Inevitably, 
labour turnover may significantly increase the efficiency of domestic banks as 
implicit knowledge is transferred (Hamida, 2006). Finally, management know-how is 
mostly implicit and its adoption requires a sufficient level of personal contact between 
the sender and receiver of that know-how (Smeet and deVaal, 2005). Therefore as 
labour turnover catalyses the diffusion of management know-how and skills, then 
implicit knowledge is transferred (McKendrick, 1994).  
 
5.2. Research design 
To measure efficiency and performance, I use a set of different tools and 
methodologies. The notion of cost reduction and efficiency improvements can be 
misleading as many consider them as synonymous. Searching for efficiency and 
performance improvement is essential to identify any potential gains from new 
ownership. It is therefore important to distinguish between the two notions. 
Reductions in operations expenses may involve firing employees, shutting down 
branches, consolidating headquarters’ offices, and closing computer and back-office 
operations. However reduction in expenses does not automatically mean or translate 
into improvements in efficiency. For instance, as efficiency can be measured by the 
expenses ratio (expenses to assets or revenues), any decrease in expense could be 
followed by a reduction in assets and revenues. Consequently a reduction of this ratio 
could simply means shrinkage of the firm rather than improvement in efficiency.  
 
In this case study it is legitimate to analyse this aspect of performance and efficiency 
as Barclays branch had important investment banking operations in SA, which could 
have been overlapping with ABSA investment banking activities. Any change in 
investment banking activities after the ABSA acquisition may have resulted from 
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more competition on the SA market, which in return would have triggered a response 
from other banks.  
5.2.1. A case study approach  
As seen in the previous chapter, most studies on efficiency effects use cross-section 
analysis. This type of analysis typically includes a relatively large number of 
observations. The advantage of the cross-section approach is that it permits statistical 
tests that control for various other influences on performance and as a result 
statistically valid generalisations may be made. However, the cross-section 
methodology may not adequately capture industry-specific or firm-specific 
idiosyncrasies.  
 
The number of observations here is limited. Case studies will not permit statistical 
validation but they do provide insights into firm (industry) behaviour and 
performance that cannot be captured in a cross-section analysis. The case study may 
utilise a large set of data and institutional details from sources that are more likely to 
be unique to the firm or industry. The collected details and information may be useful 
for observed behaviour and performance and help identify situations to which cross-
section generalisations do not apply.  
5.2.2. Data 
I use data from the annual reports of the SA four main banks: ABSA, the Standard 
Bank, First Rand and Nedbank. To analyse expenses I considered the use of the ratio 
of total expenses to total assets. Taking only absolute expenses would not translate 
any gain of efficiency but would show purely a cost reduction. From some studies, it 
has been acknowledged that accounting data may not give a precise economic view; 
but some cost-related ratio even though imperfect is considered necessary to assess 
efficiency performance (Salomon Brothers, 1993). Similarly and as mentioned earlier, 
if assets were reduced in the same proportion, the ratio would not indicate any gain in 
efficiency. It would simply show a shrinking bank.  
 
It would be judicious for this study to use average assets over the year, as the asset 
level may change over the year. For instance it is not surprising to find the asset level 
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is more important at the end of year.  However, the level of assets of the SA banks 
does not vary dramatically over 12 months, at least not in the same proportion that 
expenses may do. But to keep consistency I use assets from end-year for all banks of 
the panel.  
 
Total expenses are important as they represent interest expenses as well as non-
interest expenses of the bank. The bank will adjust the interest expenses to the general 
market rates meaning that interest expenses could be affected by the way the bank 
chooses to get deposits. I analyse the expense ratio of the ABSA and the Standard 
Bank in relation to a control group. This should control for the effect of general 
interest rate movements on expenses. As an illustration, assuming that a firm wants to 
change from using core deposits (retail deposits) as a source of funds to using 
purchased money; this core deposits will involve possibly both relatively high non-
interest expenses involving costs of retail offices and personnel, and relatively low 
interest expenses (retail deposit accounts). On the other hand, getting purchased 
money will involve lower non-interest costs but higher interest expenses. The expense 
trade-off made by the bank is captured by total expenditure (Rhoades, 1998).  
 
I use the ratio of noninterest expenses (total operating costs / expenditure) to total 
assets. As mentioned above, this reflects expenses costs relative to personnel, and 
operations of back office and branches. A policy of cost saving decided by the new 
owner to improve performance and gain efficiency would be captured by this 
variable.  
 
Two additional variables were introduced: total expenses to total revenue and non-
interest expenses to adjusted operating revenue. This is to complement the analysis of 
total expenses to total assets ratios. The denominator, adjusted operating revenue, is 
defined by total interest income minus total interest expense plus non-interest income. 
But as total interest income minus total interest expense equals net interest income, 
then adjusted operating revenue simply becomes net interest incomes plus non-
interest income, which is easily identified from all annual reports. There are some 
advantages in using adjusted operating revenue as an alternative to ratios based assets. 
First the ratio total operating costs to total revenue is familiar to senior managers of 
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top banks (Salomon Brothers, 1993); second, using revenue as a denominator 
provides an indication about the ability of the firm to generate revenue from its 
expenditures as the definition (above) can show. Third, revenue gives an indication of 
rate changes, as assets don’t. And finally, for most banks, revenue indicates income 
earned off-balance sheet. It does not mean that the assets ratio base has to be ruled 
out, because, the advantage of assets, as suggested earlier, is that assets do not 
fluctuate from year to year as revenue does. However, expenses to asset ratio may be 
misleading especially in the case of banks that have significant off-balance sheet 
activities. Therefore, having these two types of ratios can provide good indications of 
efficiency.  
 
We add two additional variables for efficiency that are commonly used in the banking 
sector. Operating efficiency is defined as operating expenditure over operating 
income (operating revenue) and the efficiency index is defined as operating 
expenditure to net interest income.  
 
To measure performance, two variables were added for the analysis. First, the rate of 
return on assets (ROA) is defined by the ratio of net income to average total assets. 
But the definition can sometime differ due to taxes. Rhoades (1998) defines net 
income as net operating income minus applicable income taxes minus extraordinary 
items and other adjustments. For this study most of the banks’ ROA were directly 
collected from their annual reports.  
 
In most SA banks’ annual reports, net income is reported. Subtracting applicable 
taxes means that net income becomes profits and because ROAs for the Standard 
Bank were not available in their annual reports for the entire study period, it was 
decided to apply the simplest definition and use the net income as it is reported and 
divide it by the total end-year assets. The ROA is well appreciated by the profession 
and is regarded as the key measure of operating efficiency (King, 1993). ROA is a 
good indicator of profitability and a good overall indicator of a banking organisation’s 
performance. This ratio shows how well the bank is capable of generating profits 
from its own assets. However, some have suggested that it may be biased as some 
banks generate profits from off-balance sheet operations.  
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The second indicator of performance, given by net income to equity (ROE), is an 
alternative to ROA and measures the return to owners’ investment. Measuring the 
return of investment to owners can be a good indicator, but the fact that equity may 
fluctuate greatly across banks due to discretionary choices by management as to the 
mix between equity and debt capital as well as the total amount of capital held by the 
firm (Rhoades, 1998) may make it disadvantageous.   
 
5.2.3. Study framework and hypothesis 
 The objective as already mentioned is not only to compare the performance of the 
acquired banks before and after change of ownership structure occurred but also to 
compare these changes with a control panel of similar banks.   
 
The study framework is characterised by an econometric analysis that uses the T-
Statistic test to identify any significant changes in means for the selected variables 
defined above. The technique of interviews is used not only to refine the quantitative 
analysis but also to understand better how knowledge spillovers may have occurred.  
 
5.2.3.1  Interview guide and meetings activities 
I met with the three big banks and although ABSA (the fourth biggest bank) 
representative was not available for meeting, he provided succinct answers from the 
interview guide (Annexe 5.1) that was returned by email. I met the management 
consultants that operate in the banking and financial sector. Interviews with the 
regulators, competition institution and former Barclays lawyers that oversaw the 
acquisition, consumer financial institutions and other academics and practitioners, 
were informative and while they did not prove to be very significant in terms of 
findings, they did help understand the legislative and political context in which these 
foreign participations took place (See list of participants in Annex 5.2). I designed and 
submitted to them an interview guide (Annexe 5.1) to be used as a guideline for our 
discussion. The interview guide seemed to be useful as they could prepare their 
answers. The banks as well as the consultants were mostly cooperative. However, I 
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had some difficulties in meeting with Barclays and ICBC representatives. I invited the 
Banking Association to meet with me but they declined and the South African 
Reserve Bank did not cooperate except to provide me with guidance on how to use 
their website to collect data. The interviews were conducted from 2010 to 2012.  
 
What is striking is the high degree of consistency from interviewees across 
consultants and competitors about the lack of spillovers and benefits for ABSA and 
the change in strategy of ABSA and the Standard Bank, as they perceived it.  
 
When searching for efficiency and performance improvement following ownership 
changes, the literature and the banking professionals stipulate that (Rhoades, 1998): 
1. Half of the savings will occur during the first year and all savings will be 
achieved within three years;  
2. Most significant savings could be accomplished without changing ownership;  
3. Any cost saving or efficiency should be observable in public financial data such 
as annual reports.  
 
5.2.3.2. T-Statistics model to provide changes in variables 
The first step is to analyse all variables for three years preceding the change of 
ownership and three years after the change in ownership occurred. It is worth 
remembering in this particular case study that efficiency gains or performance 
improvements are partly indicators of spillovers. The specific strategy of the acquirers 
has to be taken into consideration, as efficiency gains might not be their primary 
objective, although the new owners may require a positive return on their investment.  
 
Finally a control group was set up, composed of the 2 other SA big banks: First Rand 
and Nedbank. These two banks are similar to ABSA and the Standard Bank in terms 
of size and location. The variables of the control group were examined as simple 
averages. They provide a base for comparing the efficiency and performance of the 
study group (ABSA and the Standard Bank). Setting up a control group is very 
important because it gives an indication of the nature of any observed changes in the 
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study group. The economic environment can influence the nature of changes or these 
changes can simply be unique to the study group itself.  
 
T-Statistics were used to provide comparison of average means first between both 
banks in the periods before and after the event of majority or minority shareholding 
participation, and second between the study group (ABSA and the Standard Bank) 
and the control group in the periods before and after the event of majority or minority 
shareholding participation. The selected indicators for each bank of the sample over a 
three-year period before (year T-3, T-2 and T-1) and after (year T+1, T+2 and T+3) 
the acquisition event are calculated and the mean from the sum of each bank indicator 
for years T-3, T-2 and T-1 is compared with the mean from years T+1, T+2 and T+3, 
respectively. The year (T=0), which corresponds to the year when the event of 
ownership change occurred, is purposely omitted. Usually a number of events, which 
influence the firms’ economic performance, are taking place during this particular 
year. The event includes acquisition transaction costs necessary for the deal (Healy et 
al., 1992). 
 
T-statistic methodology consist of applying the t-test equation for unequal variance 
that is given by the following:  
 

t 
X1  X2
S1
2
n1

S2
2
n2
     (5) 
 
 = Number of variables 
 = Mean of pre-foreign participation (majority or minority) variables  
 = Mean of post-foreign participation (majority or minority) variables 

S= Standard deviation 

1 = Group of pre-foreign (majority or minority) participation variables 

2 = Group of post-foreign (majority or minority) participation variables 
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5.2.3.3.  Hypothesis 
In order to evaluate the relative change with the variables defined above of the group 
study that had experienced a change in their ownership structure (minority or majority 
participation) the general form of the hypotheses that are examined for each variable 
separately is as follows: 
 
Ch5/H1: There is expected to be a relative change in the defined variables after the 
event of a change in ownership structure for both banks ABSA and the 
Standard Bank. 
Ch5/H2: There is expected to be a relative change with the defined variables after the 
event in ownership structure for the group study compared to the control 
group.   
 
Therefore, the crucial research question that is investigated in examining the different 
variables above is that performance of both ABSA after Barclays’ acquisition and 
Standard Bank after ICBC participation is greater than it is in the period pre-
acquisition and pre-foreign participation, regardless whether the performance is tested 
against itself or against the control group. In addition, the evidence from the 
interviews may explain the results from the t-statistics model.  
 
5.3. Interpretation of findings and further evidence 
The reported findings in table 5.1 below are related to efficiency and performance 
results of ABSA and the Standard Bank and Stata general procedures and commands 
for running this model are given in annex 5.3. The table presents the means of the 
indicators before and after the banks experienced a change in the structure of their 
shareholding.  
5.3.1 Main findings 
The analysis of the banks’ sample, whose results are shown in table 4.1, reveals 5 out 
of 6 indicators to be statistically significant and all six indicators’ means of efficiency 
are decreasing in value, which is equivalent to an increase in efficiency for ABSA. 
This result suggests that significant cost cutting objectives were achieved. In addition, 
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total expenses to total assets is statistically significant as well as total expenses to total 
revenues but just at 19% level. This result proves that the bank made significant cuts 
in non-interest expenses during the three-year period after being acquired. Non-
interest expenses involve personnel costs, operations costs at the branches and 
transaction systems. 
 
An ABSA representative reported for this study (interview 4) that “ABSA benefited 
from Barclays’ systems” meaning that Barclays’ system migrated to ABSA to be 
implemented and processes and procedures were upgraded. ABSA confirms 
(Interview 4) “it benefited from Barclays’ products, management skills, procurement 
scale and policies”. It can be inferred that ABSA reduced its interest expenses, which 
means that it attracted deposits in a cheaper way. It could be that the Barclays 
international exposure provided the opportunity of more sources of funding as 
“ABSA benefited from Barclays strong global investment bank” (Interview 4).  
 
The variable, non-interest expenses to total assets, confirms cuts in non-interest 
expenses, which is statistically significant.  
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Table: 5.1: T-Statistic (Two-tail) for the banks sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banks annual reports 
Note: (***) Statistically significant a 1% level, (**) Statistically significant at 5%, (*) Statistically significant at 20% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Pre 
Post 
ABSA The Standard Bank 
Mean T-Statistics 
(Two-Tail) 
P-Value Mean T-Statistics 
(Two-Tail) 
P-Value 
Total Expenses over Total Assets Pre 0.107 
2.597* 0.060 
0.077 
0.272 0.798  Post 0.089 0.075 
Total Expenses over Total Revenues Pre 0.826 
1.558* 0.194 
0.775 
0.536 0.620  Post 0.807 0.765 
Non-Interest Expenses over Total Assets Pre 0.035 
2.553* 0.063 
0.026 
1.841* 0.1394  Post 0.029 0.022 
Non-Interest Expenses over Adjusted Operating Revenues Pre 0.613 
0.855 0.440 
0.540 
1.312 0.259  Post 0.580 0.489 
Operating Efficiency Pre 1.165 
3.590** 0.022 
1.141 
2.459* 0.069  Post 1.000 0.898 
Index Efficiency Pre 0.734 
2.498* 0.066 
0.577 
-2.367* 0.077  Post 0.624 0.630 
ROA Pre 0.095 
-1.608* 0.183 
0.019 
20.554*** 0.077  Post 0.135 0.012 
ROE Pre 0.185 
-1.344 0.250 
0.323 
4.368** 0.012  Post 0.244 0.210 
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The variable, non-interest expenses to adjusted revenues, is not statistically significant 
but shows a decrease after the acquisition event. And finally general ratios of 
operating efficiency and index of efficiency are both highly statistically significant 
confirming the general idea that a cost cutting programme was achieved.  
 
Decreasing non-interest expenses is particularly critical for ABSA because from 
feedback with some professionals, keeping jobs at ABSA was one of the conditions of 
the acquisition. So decreasing non-interest expenses without cutting personnel was 
found to be challenging. This aspect of conditionality could not be verified from the 
ABSA/Barclays and the SA Treasury. In addition, feedback (interview 4) says that 
ABSA did not lay off any personnel or put in place any voluntary redundancy policy. 
However, the press (Mail & Guardian, 2012) revealed in early 2012 that in 2011, the 
new ABSA CEO, Maria Ramos had to make cuts in the bank’s costs. They reported 
that Ramos said “this organisation is going to have to become more efficient, and I 
have to keep a close eye on costs while serving our customers better”. Union 
representative, Sasbo added “retrenchments were inevitable”. The same newspaper 
also reported what an anonymous analyst said regarding job losses citing “it’s 
concerning that there’s been such a high turnover of the top people”. But this turnover 
is not only limited to the top management but also to the entire organisation as 
reported, “ Although Ramos is not talking about retrenchments but rather about 
restructuring, there has been a significant number of staff leaving the bank because of 
unhappiness over regional departments being moved to and integrated with 
Johannesburg city centre offices. These effects that people were talking about in early 
2012 suggest that deliberate policies regarding efficiency were put in place well 
before this date.  
 
In the ABSA case, there was a significant improvement in efficiency three years after 
the event of acquisition, confirming that a programme of cost reduction was achieved.  
 
The results for the Standard Bank contrast with that of ABSA as only two indicators 
show improvement in efficiency with statistical significance: non-interest expenses to 
total assets and operating efficiency. An example of cost reduction is illustrated by a 
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newspaper (Financial Times, 2010), which reported that Standard Bank cut 2100 
staff. This was written three years after the event of minority participation took place. 
This may be a coincidence as the global economic downturn occurred in 2008. The 
reason provided by the bank CEO to justify this redundancy policy was that the bank 
was losing in terms of revenues and ROE (as table 5.3 shows).  
 
In contrast, total expenses to total assets and total expenses to total revenue indicators 
are not statistically significant, and nor is the non-interest expenses to adjusted 
operating revenues. The difference between the non-interest expenses and total 
expenses, as explained in the ABSA case above, is that the variable, total expenses, 
takes into account both the non-interest and the interest expenses. But all four 
indicators that are not significant show a decrease after the minority participation 
event took place. This suggests that in comparison with ABSA, the Standard Bank put 
more emphasis on the non-interest expenses and not much on interest costs. The index 
efficiency indicator shows a small but significant decline in efficiency (5.3%). This 
signifies that Standard Bank had a clear objective to cut non-interest expenses after it 
experienced a change in ownership. It suggests that the Standard Bank may not have 
had the same capability as ABSA to reduce costs on interest expenses. The difference 
between Barclays and ICBC is that Barclays is internationally more exposed than 
ICBC, although ICBC remains one of the largest worldwide financial organisations. 
In fact Standard Bank offers an international exposure to ICBC through its more 
advanced investment banking (Interview 3). ABSA then may have found it easier to 
get deposits at lower costs on international markets thanks to Barclays. Furthermore, 
feedback (Interview 3) from Standard Bank provides limited evidence of knowledge 
transfer in terms of process, procedures and methods that could translate into 
significant gains in efficiency in its SA operations, although ICBC implemented an 
ICBC transaction card system in Standard Bank to optimise some banking operations. 
In the Standard Bank case there is a suggestion that improvement in efficiency was 
achieved three years after the event of foreign participation but on a small scale and 
mainly in the area of noninterest expenses.  
 
The findings from table 5.1 show the scale in percentage of the cost reduction but not 
in value. Table 5.2 below shows an interesting aspect of the cost reduction scheme for 
  112 
both banks that may explain the weak amplitude in decrease of the non-interest costs 
of Standard Bank. With an important decrease (from 81% in T-3 to 60% in T+2), the 
index of efficiency confirms ABSA’s commitment to cost cutting. On the other hand, 
the table does not suggest any significant shift for the Standard Bank strategy, as costs 
were already very low. This may be the explanation.  
 
Table 5.2: Value of Index efficiency for ABSA and the Standard Bank 
 
Source: Banks’ Annual reports, author calculation  
 
 
Before 2005 ABSA had a low level of efficiency around 70% on average whereas the 
Standard Bank had a much higher level of efficiency prior to 2007 at around 57% 
(and even 54.8% in T-1), which represents a very good score. The benchmark in the 
profession suggests that a score of 50% is generally regarded as the maximum optimal 
ratio. In the period pre-post 2005, ABSA reduced its index of efficiency from a 
maximum of 81% to a minimum of 60%. Clearly there had been room for 
improvement. This close look at the figures suggests that Standard Bank had already a 
culture of keeping costs down (at least the non-interest costs). From this point of 
view, it can be inferred that this culture of keeping costs down, helped Standard Bank 
to continue to lower its overall costs and gain some efficiency but not on the same 
scale as ABSA, which had ample room for further improvement and did so after 
Barclays took over in 2005.  
 
From table 5.1 it would be possible to conclude that the difference in ownership could 
influence the scale of the cost reduction and therefore the level of efficiency. This 
assumption could perhaps validate the case of ABSA and the question would be a 
counterfactual: what would have happened if no change had occurred. Similarly, one 
might assume that the weak decrease in the efficiency index in the case of the 
Bank 
Name 
Variable name Before change in 
ownership (%) 
T
=
0
 After change in 
ownership (%) 
  T-3 T-2 T-1  T+1 T+2 T+3 
ABSA Index Efficiency 81.80 71.00 67.55  64.45 60.84 62.00 
STD  59.10 59.20 54.80  60.50 62.50 66.3 
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Standard Bank is due to the limited participation of ICBC in the Standard Bank 
shareholding. But the value of the indicator suggests that with or without ICBC, 
Standard Bank would continue to keep its costs down. It can therefore be concluded 
here that only majority ownership (as is ABSA case) led to increased efficiency and 
knowledge transfer. This finding is in line with Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) and 
Demelis and Louri (2002). 
 
Before analysing performance, it is important to note that even when banks have 
similar revenues, different business models can generate different efficiency ratios. 
Assuming for instance that a bank puts more emphasis on customer service, this 
might lower its efficiency but improve its net profit. On the other hand a bank that 
focuses more on cost control may have a higher efficiency ratio but may have a lower 
profit margin. And this is the case for ROA and ROE indicators of ABSA and 
Standard Bank. The ABSA ROA is statistically significant at 18% level and shows 
some improvement after the period post acquisition (4.18% increase on average). 
Although ROA is highly statistically significant (at 1% level) for Standard Bank, it 
shows however a consistent decline after the ICBC minority participation (3.36% 
decrease on average). Here again it is important to have a look at the value of both 
ROA and ROE presented in table 5.3 below.  
 
Similarly to the index efficiency indicator, before the events of acquisition and 
minority participation took place, Standard Bank had on average a higher level of 
performance than ABSA. It can been seen that its performance after the event did not 
change dramatically, with an ROA average of 1.93% before and 1.28 after the event; 
compared with ABSA that had a 0.95% on average before the event and 1.35% after, 
ABSA came close to the Standard Bank level. It is also noticeable that by T+3 
Standard Bank ROA is higher than that for ABSA.  
 
This is equally observable for the ROE indicator. ABSA ROE is not statistically 
significant despite an improvement in the post-event period. At the same time there is 
a decline in the Standard Bank ROE. But before the events of acquisition and 
minority participation in shareholding, Standard Bank ROE on average was 1.75 time 
  114 
higher than the ABSA ROE. And both ROEs are almost at the same level after the 
events, despite a decline for Standard Bank. 
 
 Table 5.3: Value of performance indicator for ABSA and the Standard Bank 
 
 
Source: Banks’ Annual reports, author calculation 
 
Finally, on this aspect of performance it seems that both Standard Bank and ABSA 
put emphasis on controlling costs successfully but were less successful in keeping 
performance high.  
 
On both indicators of performance and efficiency it seems that the Standard Bank 
represented some kind of benchmark for ABSA as indicators reached similar levels 
after the events. 
 
The results show that after the events of change in ownership, both banks improved 
their efficiency. The medium cost cutting coupled with the culture of keeping costs 
down may illustrate the type of management or relationships between Standard Bank 
and the Chinese ICBC, which is described as smooth and translates into a mutual 
understanding. It does not seem that ICBC, unlike Barclays, which has a majority of 
ownership in ABSA, had a strong influence on Standard Bank strategy.  
 
The case of ABSA is different. ABSA was committed to preserve jobs as part of the 
deal when negotiating the acquisition deal with the Treasury, and confirmed that no 
plan for redundancy was implemented. In practice, ABSA did not cut any jobs but as 
some claimed, has been freezing recruitment, and many unhappy staff left. This has 
helped to keep the costs relative to staff under control. ABSA improved its 
performance and enhanced its efficiency after Barclays became its main owner. Both 
Bank 
Name 
Variable name Before change in 
ownership (%) T
=
0
 After change in 
ownership (%) 
  T-3 T-2 T-1  T+1 T+2 T+3 
ABSA ROA 0.50 1.20 1.17  1.42 1.47 1.17 
STD  1.96 1.89 1.95  1.23 1.31 1.29 
ABSA ROE 10.17 23.34 22.02  25.10 26.40 21.80 
STD  31.90 30.90 34.2  25.50 17.30 20.30 
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interest and non-interest expenses went down after 2005. These results suggest that 
knowledge has been passed on from the mother foreign bank Barclays to its domestic 
subsidiary ABSA. The feedback from the ABSA representative (interview 4) 
confirmed that new systems and procedures (explicit knowledge) were implemented 
at ABSA. To some extent, some very limited information systems were transferred 
from ICBC to Standard Bank, but that knowledge was not strategic enough to 
contribute to any form of efficiency improvement.  
 
5.3.2 Further evidence of competition and other factors 
The fundamental question however is whether or not the change in ownership is the 
only factor responsible for the efficiency gain. This increase in efficiency could well 
be a trend more specific to the SA market. Alternatively, some economic constraints 
may have contributed to force all competitors to become more efficient. It could be 
that competitors may have anticipated a more efficient ABSA after the announcement 
of the deal, and the market could have become more competitive. To preserve their 
margins, the banks had no choice but to reduce their running costs and efficiency 
gains became the norm.  
 
We saw above that Standard Bank had already this culture of keeping costs down 
even before the ICBC participation in its ownership. However, this change in 
ownership occurred in 2007, two years after Barclays bought ABSA. As indicators, 3 
years before and after the minority participation event, are compared, one could argue 
that ABSA/Barclays new entity influenced Standard Bank to become more efficient. 
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Figure 5.1: Staff growth in costs from 2002 to 2010 (%) 
Source: Banks’ Annual reports, author calculation 
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This assumption can be ruled out, as figure 5.1 above shows that Standard Bank from 
2002 to 2006 maintained personnel costs growth below 0.2% and even had negative 
growth from 2001-02; (note that personnel costs are one of the highest costs amongst 
all costs). Another argument could reside in the fact that some macro economic 
constraints or regulation may have occurred, which could therefore force the entire 
sector to become more competitive. This hypothesis should not be ruled out as some 
regulation in the financial sector occurred at the beginning of 2000. But was it enough 
to generate efficiency? Finally, it would be interesting to know if any specific event 
occurred in the SA market that encouraged all competitors to become more efficient. 
The answer could be yes, triggered by the emergence of a new domestic player.  
 
To provide some answers about competitors’ behaviour, I further the investigation by 
looking at the performance and the efficiency indicators of the two cases, ABSA and 
the Standard Bank in relation to their peers in table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4: T-Statistic (Two-tail) for the banks sample compared to their peers 
Variables ABSA The Standard Bank 
Mean T-Statistics 
(Two-Tail) 
P-Value Mean T-Statistics 
(Two-Tail) 
P-Value 
Total Expenses over Total Assets -0.004 -0.0610 0.951 0.006 0.824 0.417 
Total Expenses over Total Revenues 0.427 0.885 0.384 0.704 1.012 0.321 
Non-Interest Expenses over Total Assets 0.001 0.665 0.512 0.007 3.218 0.003*** 
Non-Interest Expenses over Adjusted Operating Revenues 0.013 0.451 0.655 0.110 3.093 0.004*** 
Operating Efficiency 0.223 2.234 0.034** 0.333 2.737 0.010*** 
Index Efficiency 0.055 1.274 0.214 0.076 1.359 0.186* 
ROA -0.025 -1.545 0.134* -0.002 -0.740 0.465 
ROE -0.042 -1.372 0.182* -0.037 -0.802 0.429 
Source: Banks annual reports, author calculation 
Note: (***) Statistically significant a 1% level, (**) Statistically significant at 5%, (*) Statistically significant at 18%. 
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Table 5.4 presents the difference in mean between ABSA and the control group and 
between Standard Bank and the same control group. For ABSA only one indicator of 
efficiency is statistically significant, the operating efficiency. Although 4 out of 5 are 
not statistically significant they show however a slight advantage for ABSA in terms 
of efficiency. The total expenses to total assets indicator is not statistically significant 
but shows that the peers are slightly more efficient than ABSA. Overall it can be 
concluded that ABSA is just slightly more efficient than its peers but the evidence is 
not strong enough to generalise or confirm this point. In this context, it is not 
surprising that competitors feel that nothing has changed since Barclays bought 
ABSA. They reported (Interview 5 and 6) that the deal was good for Barclays but not 
necessarily for ABSA. They feel that ABSA has not been performing better and that 
they never felt threatened by ABSA after the acquisition. This revelation is not what 
was expected but at the same time it is not a surprise. Firstly, this is because 
according to theory on FDI, the knowledge gained from Barclays should have helped 
ABSA to out-perform its peers and increase the competition, giving ABSA a 
competitive advantage. Others suggest that successful acquisition activities bring 
economic benefits from changes that increase business performance that would not 
have been generated without a change in control (Athianos et al, 2003; Mantzaris, 
2008; Pazarskis, 2008). However, suggestions from merger & acquisitions studies 
show that acquisitions don’t necessary increase efficiency (Azarchs, 1995; Srinivasan, 
and Wall, 1992; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1993); but this is not the case 
for ABSA, whose results show improved performance and efficiency gains after the 
acquisition event occurred. 
 
Competitors (Interviews 5 and 6) argued that ABSA became too efficiency-gain-
orientated and was losing out in terms of performance. This perception that ABSA 
has not been performing better can be partly confirmed by the results on ROA and 
ROE indicators. ROA and ROE indicators are statistically significant only at 13% and 
18% level respectively. And they increased by only 2.5% and 4.2% respectively 
compared to the control group. Therefore, it is not quite true that ABSA performed 
worse but its positive performance seems not to have been strong enough to be 
perceived as significant by competitors or to encourage any change in their strategy. 
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From this point of view it seems that the Barclays’ acquisition was not a factor that 
triggered competition in the retail-banking sector.  
 
On the other hand, the picture is clearer in the case of Standard Bank. Table 5.4 shows 
that on efficiency, four indicators out of six are statistically very significant. The 
results suggest better efficiency than the control group. The last two efficiency 
indicators are not statistically significant but present a slightly higher score. Similarly 
to ABSA, Standard Bank results (ROA & ROE) are slightly better than the 
competitors’ but unlike ABSA none are statistically significant. In other words, 
Standard Bank globally performed better than its competitors and this confirms 
previous results.  
 
But the same question remains whether or not this good performance was triggered by 
the ICBC minority participation (or whether ICBC became a minority owner 
because of Standard bank good performance? I did not access this question, as I 
could not meet with ICBC representatives). It is hard to say yes as I explained 
earlier, but it cannot be totally ruled out that ICBC does not influence Standard 
Bank’s strategy. Feedback (Interview 3) from Standard Bank confirms that ICBC 
does not put pressure on Standard Bank to produce better performance; the ICBC has 
only 20% of shareholding and only 2 seats on the Standard board. However, this level 
of shareholding represented $5.6 billion that ICBC paid. ICBC could legitimately 
influence some aspects of the strategy of Standard Bank citing for instance the 
simultaneity of some activities of costs reduction and divestment. As already 
mentioned earlier Standard Bank cut 2100 staff in 2010 (Financial Times, 2010) and 
the following year in 2011 it sold a 55% stake in the Standard Bank Argentina to 
ICBC, its significant minority shareholder, keeping a 20% holding and the right to 
board representation. The same year it divested in Russia and sold its 36.4% stake in 
Russia Troika Dialog. The following year in 2012 Standard Bank continued to divest 
by reducing its stake in Turkey’s Standard Unlu from 67% to 25%. These multiple 
divestments in assets abroad and staff cuts, whose objective was to refocus on 
operations on the Africa continent, fed the speculation that ICBC wanted a higher 
return on its investment in Africa. This was what many in the SA banking sector 
including competitors and consultants confirmed. Reinvesting in Africa would be 
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seen as a legitimate request from ICBC. After all, investing in Standard Bank was 
motivated by the fact that ICBC wanted a footprint on the African continent and this 
was part of its extension strategy. And with its presence in 18 African countries 
Standard Bank was therefore the best match to help support this expansion strategy 
(Interview3). I explicitly addressed this point with the Standard Bank representative 
(Interview 3) about the argument by which ICBC has influenced the Standard Bank 
by encouraging a refocus on Africa operations. The representative provided the 
following approach framed in three points:  
1. Standard Bank had no competitive advantage in these BRIC countries 
(countries include: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Some now include SA);  
2. Standard Bank was in a position to receive significant cash from local 
financial institutions for these assets; 
3. And there was potential growth in Africa due to economic and improved 
governance conditions. In addition, cash generated could increase Standard 
Bank’s ability to enhance its competitive advantage on the African continent 
where it already had an important presence (Standard Bank is active in 18 
African countries).  
Furthermore, the style of management of ICBC was not about imposing a strategy. 
Instead a harmonious relationship and mutual respect is established. Real effort is 
made for a post-deal cooperation to work at the operations level in establishing 
streams and workshops, and at the project level, where agreements are made with 
specific clients and projects. Ad hoc teams are built around these projects (Eidt, 
2012).    
 
When matching the indicator levels of ABSA and Standard Bank against those of the 
competitors, it could be suggested that competitors’ efficiency level may be close to 
the ABSA level. It could be assumed that the competitors too had or have been 
implementing a cost-cutting strategy during the same period from 2002 to 2010. 
Feedback from the competitors confirmed the existence of such an approach or 
strategy that took different shapes for Nedbank and First Rand. Already from 2003, 
Nedbank (Interview 6) implemented a programme called Barrett Survey that they 
speeded up in 2005 after Barclays’ acquisition (but did not change the content 
because of the FDI, as the programme was producing tangible results). This was not a 
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response to Barclays’ acquisition it was told but a process that was already in place. 
This plan had different components and the first one was based on personnel 
development, team effectiveness, coaching, flexible work and life balance. The 
second focused on market strategy. This market strategy consisted of cutting down 
their fees and targeting the higher segment of the market. Nedbank realised that the 
SA market landscape was changing as the population was getting wealthier and 
decided to focus on this particular segment as the traditional one was becoming 
saturated and competition too high. Nedbank too implemented its strategy to attract 
more customers in the retail bank
3
. It is worth saying that in the early 2000s, the 
regulator introduced Basel procedures and encouraged the banking sector to reduce its 
fees. This could be one of the motives of Nedbank in rethinking its strategy in 2003.  
 
For the second competitor First Rand (Interview 5) the constraint of reducing fees 
clearly was one of the motives that contributed to the reviewing of their strategy. In 
fact this rethink started in the late 90s following the re-entry of the foreign banks. As 
seen in chapters 2 and 3, the entry of foreign banks had some impacts on the domestic 
banks especially in investment banking and as a consequence domestic banks were 
forced to reduce their technological gap. To face these challenges First Rand started 
to invest massively in technology infrastructure
4
. The objective of putting in place 
new infrastructure platforms was to reduce running operations costs in branches and 
transfer many of these operations to electronic transactions. New infrastructure 
included telephone banking and Internet. It can be assumed that a direct consequence 
of this new strategy was a significant reduction of personnel costs, which translated 
into efficiency gains. This may be part of the explanation why ABSA did not out- 
perform the competitors as they had already embarked on cost-reduction programmes.  
 
However, both competitors (Interviews 5 and 6) conceded that they feared for their 
investment banking activities as it became clear that ABSA investment banking was 
performing well. In fact, Barclays and ABSA investment banking teams combined 
together. Barclays Capital, the investment banking of Barclays by working with the 
                                                        
3
 This is in line with findings from chapter 4 suggesting that competition forces domestic banks to look 
for new businesses to maintain or increase revenue. 
4
 Although cost indicators in chapter 4 don’t capture this but we did find evidence of competition via 
pre-tax profit indicator due to the re-entry of foreign banks. 
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ABSA team, became very competitive and created serious competition in this activity. 
Both Nedbank and FirstRand experienced an unusual turnover in their investment 
banking teams, and many of their employees attracted by the new ABSA/Barclays 
investment entity left. This was relatively serious and both banks implemented a staff 
retention scheme to keep or get their employees back. Furthermore, First Rand 
became anxious about Barclays products, in particular the Barclay card that was 
expected to be available on the SA market. However Barclays never introduced this 
product in SA. Therefore the Barclays/ABSA investment team was the only reported 
but limited threat that Barclays FDI created in the SA banking sector according to 
feedback from the competitors.  
 
Another factor that influenced competitors’ strategy to become more efficient was the 
emergence of a new domestic player. This new player is Capitec, a new bank created 
in 2002 and called by one of the competitors (Interview 5) a “disruptor”. As shown on 
figure 5.2, Capitec has experienced rapid and positive growth in terms of total assets. 
It has concentrated its offers on the lower segment and targeted low income-earners. 
Capitec is one of the main players in the SA microlending industry and provides 
small-unsecured loans. It has a good understanding of the microlending business and 
manages risks carefully. It has a prudent approach to liquidity and possesses a good 
information system and as a financial institution, it is supervised by the SARB.  
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Figure 5.2: Capitec annual growth from 2003 to 2010 (in %) 
Source: Banks’ Annual reports, author calculation 
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The main strength of Capitec is its technology-driven strategy. This is why it is 
regarded by First Rand as a major threat, which had also invested in technology 
infrastructures. Its technology-driven business model allows it to service the low-
income-earning population. Its infrastructure comprises strong front-end information 
technology, paperless and cashless branches. Its electronic cards can be used in its 
more than 200 ATMs, and distribution outlets of retailers with whom the banks have 
concluded business agreements. This ability to provide full banking products and 
services at the lowest costs gives the bank an edge over direct competitors.   
 
 
 
  126 
 
5.4.  Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter assesses both the relationship between efficiency and foreign investment 
in particular whether foreign direct investment in the SA banking sector contributed 
to knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers through the analysis of efficiency 
gains and improved performance from majority and minority acquisitions.  
 
The results show that three years after Barclays’ foreign acquisition, ABSA had made 
efficiency gains and better performance, but surprisingly did not out-perform by far 
the competitors on efficiency indicators nor on performance. The case of Standard 
Bank shows some significant efficiency gains but no performance improvements after 
three years of foreign direct participation from ICBC. However, and this is a surprise, 
Standard Bank globally outperformed its competitors in terms of efficiency gains 
especially on both indicators involving non-interest expenses. These two indicators, 
which translate the most gain in efficiency, were highly significant (1% level). The 
study finds and presents some elements that explain the overall gain in efficiency of 
the banking sector itself. These reasons can be attributed to external factors such as 
the entry of foreign banks in the mid-90s (as seen in chapter 2) and to internal factors 
such as regulation policy and the emergence of a new domestic player.  
 
This study confirms and concluded that there has been some evidence of knowledge 
transfer from Barclays, a British bank, to ABSA, a SA bank Barclays acquired from 
FDI channel.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature and provides similar findings in line 
with Blomstrom and Sjohalm (1999) and Demelis and Louri (2002) who find that 
majority shareholding leads to efficiency, more productivity and therefore knowledge 
spillovers. It seems that the nationality (or the country of origin) of parents can play a 
significant role in FDI spillovers. For instance, Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2007b) 
find on one hand that there are non-linear spillover effects from increased FDI in 
China comparing FDI from Hong-Kong, Macau and Taiwan countries with FDI from 
Western countries that does appear to generate positive linear spillover effects. The 
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difference in spillovers FDI between the two different types of ownership is that 
Western countries’ FDI carry more advanced technology. Our finding is in line with 
this.  
 
This research prefigures our analysis in chapters 6 and 7 that competition has 
occurred since the re-entry of the foreign banks in the wholesale segment. From the 
interviews, this study reveals that the big 4 domestic banks made significant 
investments to modernise their operations infrastructure and processes to become 
more efficient. This is a clear indication that the banks have reduced their 
technological gap. Reducing the banks’ technological gap was caused partly by 
external factors such as the re-entry of the banks as well as the pressure from the 
regulator, and by internal factors such as direct competition from the emergence of a 
new player such as Capitec. Finally, this study finds strong evidence of labour 
turnover, which was particularly acute in the wholesale segment after Barclays’ 
acquisition. Labour turnover movements (an aspect of voluntary knowledge 
spillovers) occurred from most of the SA domestic banks to Barclays/ABSA 
investment team and these movements were so intense that they forced all domestic 
players to take actions to limit their impact. This turnover impact coupled with the 
reduction in technological gap accords with the theory described in chapter 2, on the 
characteristics of spillover effects. In light of these new findings from this chapter, I 
can now conclude that spillover effects have been taking place in the entire SA 
banking sector including wholesale and retail banking, and these effects are more 
significant in the wholesale segment, in particular in the investment banking sector. 
Chapters 6 and 7 will confirm this result statistically.   
 
The choice of these two FDIs (acquisition and greenfield investment) was dictated by 
the fact that only two cases were available for the study. Nevertheless, they (the two 
FDIs) were very important, first in terms of value, as Barclays a British bank spent 
$5.5bn to get the majority (51%) of ownership in ABSA in 2005. This foreign 
acquisition was two years later followed by another major foreign minority 
participation in the Standard Bank. ICBC, a Chinese bank spent $5.5bn to acquire 
20% of the Standard Bank shareholding. Second, these FDIs took place in a context 
of globalisation in a developing country. There is an increasing interest from China, 
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which is looking for investments in Africa and tending to diversify its portfolio in 
sectors such as banking, services and telecommunication. In this context of 
internationalisation this case study resonates with even greater amplitude. And finally 
there is currently a growing interest for researchers and academics to assess South-
South political economy relationships. This case study could partly provide some 
embryonic elements of these relations.  
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Competition model results and spillover 
effects of   foreign banks entry on SA 
domestic banks  
This chapter provides the results of the empirical estimates measuring the effects of 
foreign bank re-entry on the performance of the SA domestic banks (income, costs 
and profitability) for the period 2000-10. While there were already foreign banks 
before the apartheid regime, during the apartheid regime and due to international 
pressure, many foreign banks were forced to sell their assets to SA shareholders and 
leave the country. Foreign banks started coming back in 1994-95, with the end of 
apartheid and the beginning of a new democratic government. The estimate 
methodology and data that were presented and explained in chapter 3 is briefly 
summarised as follow: 
1. Model 3.1 estimates foreign bank penetration in the SA banking market on SA 
domestic banks performance. It also captures the short time effects of the 
financial crisis in 2001 as well as the short-term effect on the performance of 
domestic banks, if any, after 2006 when Barclays bank decided to increase its 
shares in the market by buying the ABSA bank. The results are reported in 
tables 6.1 and 6.2.  
2. Model 3.3 estimates the interaction between the foreign banks entry and the SA 
banking market development and the results are reported in tables 6.3 and 6.4.  
3. And finally Model 3.4 should estimate the interaction between the foreign 
banks’ entry and banks’ market share, as banks having different market shares 
could react differently to foreign banks’ entry. But due to high correlation 
amongst variables the results were not reported.  
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6.1 Empirical results of foreign banks re-entry in SA  
To measure the presence of foreign banks two variables Forbk_Num, the number of 
foreign over the total banks and Forbk_Shr, the foreign banks’ share over the total 
assets of the banking market were used, alongside interactive terms with private 
credit to GDP (PCGDP) and bank market share (BKMKSHR). Four bank 
performance measures are used as dependent variables (NIIN, NOINTIN, BTXP, and 
TOEX). Just to remind that the total income is giving by the addtion of NIIN and 
NOINTIN. I use Stata 11 (for Mac) to compute the estimation and Stata general 
procedures and commands for running these models are given in annex 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
Time dummy variables were measured for all estimations but they appear to be 
significant only in one case confirming no significant changes over time across the 
banking industry. This explains why below are only reported the results with time 
dummy variables. Similarly, results from regressions that include BKMKSHR show 
no impact. In addition, strong correlations between BKMKSHR and Forbk_Num’s 
interaction term and between BKMKSHR and Forbk_Shr’s interaction term make it 
impossible to measure any interaction effects. Therefore model (6.4) is not reported. 
 
Contrary to Uiboupin (2005), who uses Arellano dynamic panel data and Bond 
GMM estimator but in common with Claessens et al. (2001), this study uses panel 
data fixed-effects estimator model, first developed by Nickell (1981).  
 
Table 6.1 shows the estimation results from equation (3.2) with Forbk_Num as the 
foreign banks’ entry variable. Forbk_Num is statistically significant and has a 
positive effect on the domestic SA banks’ interest margin (NIIN). However, this 
effect is statistically significant at 18% level only, suggesting a weak impact of 
foreign banks’ entry. As anticipated earlier this may result from: first the fact that the 
foreign banks in SA operate essentially in a specific segment of investment and 
corporate banking and second; that domestic banks have been generating extra 
revenues from retail banking where foreign banks have a lesser presence. For 
instance, the currency crisis may have helped some banks to be more profitable when 
they bought some lucrative assets from bankrupted banks.  
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The variables NIIN is used to analyse the effect on interest revenues. A positive 
relationship between the foreign banks’ entry and the interest revenue variable 
indicates that the foreign banks’ entry has not enhanced the level of competition on 
interest revenues or income activities. 
 
Table 6.1: Foreign bank entry (Forbk_Num) effect on SA domestic banks 
 NIIN NOINTIN TOEX BTXP 
Forbk_Num 0.338 
(0.248)* 
-0.121 
(0.149) 
-0.011 
(0.196) 
-0.136 
(0.071)* 
NINEA 0.342 
(0.092)*** 
-0.206 
(0.055)*** 
0.208 
(0.072)*** 
-0.011 
(0.026) 
EQTY 0.415 
(0.110)*** 
-0.011 
(0.066) 
0.222 
(0.087)** 
0.800 
(0.031)** 
SLTDPA -0.054 
(0.079) 
0.093 
(0.048)* 
-0.113 
(0.063)* 
-0.012 
(0.023) 
PCGDP -0.011 
(0.129) 
-0.051 
(0.077) 
-0.132 
(0.102) 
-0.016 
(0.037) 
GGDP 0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Income (log) 0.011 
(0.745) 
0.235 
(0.449) 
0.706 
(0.589) 
0.118 
(0.215) 
CPI -0.0006 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
-0.002 
(0.001)** 
Constant -0.231 
(7.510) 
-2.288 
(4.500) 
-7.021 
5.899 
-1.837 
(2,159) 
Number of Obs 86 86 86 86 
Source: Banks’ annual report and author calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(***) Significant at 1%, (**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 15% 
 
This result, unlike Uiboupin (2005), is in line with Hermes and Lensink (2004) 
findings, whose studies show a positive and significant relationship between foreign 
banks’ entry and net interest margin. However, the foreign banks’ entry in SA has a 
negative effect but is not statistically significant on the non-interest income activities 
(NOINTIN). A negative but non-significant effect on NOINTIN could mean that the 
SA domestic banks may have experienced a marginal increase in the level of 
competition in a particular segment of their activities such as investment and 
  132 
corporate banking. This probably translates the fact that, due to the competition in 
this segment, the domestic banks were forced to reduce their fees to keep some of 
their customers and make some provision to cover losses in a segment that does not 
represent their core activity. Claessen et al., (2001) and Zajc (2002) finds negative 
effects of the foreign banks’ entry on domestic banks non-interest income whereas 
Hermes and Lensink (2004) find opposite results on non-interest income and loan 
loss provision.  
 
The hypothesis 1 stipulates that the net interest margin of SA banks is either 
ambiguous or positively correlated with the foreign bank share in SA. Here the 
finding indicates that net interest income (NIIN) is significantly and positively 
correlated to the foreign banks’ entry in SA banking market 
 
There is a negative relationship between the non-interest incomes of the domestic 
banks and the foreign banks’ share in SA market, but this relationship is not 
statistically significant. Therefore the empirical result does not entirely support 
hypothesis 2 (the non-interest income of a domestic bank in SA is either positively or 
negatively correlated with the foreign banks’ share in SA).  
 
In light of these results it would be fair to deduce, statistically speaking, that the 
foreign banks entry has no effect on the SA domestic banks’ performance, especially 
on average loan interest rates. But the same results provide some particular and 
interesting economic insights. What is striking is that all variables confirm the 
expected relationship with the presence of the foreign banks, although, most of these 
variables are not statistically significant. First, NOINTIN shows a negative 
relationship suggesting that the domestic banks have probably lowered their fees on 
their non-interest activities to offset some losses or to keep some existing customers. 
This implies the existence of a direct but small effect resulting from weak 
competition due to the presence of the foreign banks. Second, the variables relative 
to the SA domestic banks’ revenue show a positive relationship, which is statistically 
significant in the case of NIIN. This tends to suggest that in the segment that the 
foreign banks are operating, either the SA domestic banks have a limited presence or 
this activity represents a small portion of their revenues. This could mean as table 6.5 
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suggests (with high level of NIIN from 2002 to 2009) that the SA domestic banks 
have succeeded in increasing their revenue in activities or segments, where foreign 
banks do not operate. And this could represent a strategy to avoid or offset the 
negative effects of competition. These empirical results, which measure the 
relationship between the presence of the foreign banks and the SA domestic banks’ 
performance, suggest a direct effect of competition in the SA banking market due to 
the re-entry of the foreign banks. But due to a lack of statistical significance of some 
variables, the competition effect could be considered as weak. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the competition, resulting from the presence of the foreign banks, has a 
limited effect on the SA domestic banks’ performance. 
 
Table 6.1 shows that banks’ total operating expenses (TOEX) have a negative 
relationship but not statistically significant with foreign bank presence. Economically 
speaking, a positive correlation may be explained by spillover effects between 
foreign and domestic banks because domestic banks may invest in new practices and 
technologies that lead to an increase in their costs in the short term. But this is not the 
case here. If data were collected from 1994 immediately after the re-entry of the 
foreign banks and used here, maybe a spillover effect could have been captured more 
significantly, because as mentioned, the re-entry of foreign banks contributed to the 
modernisation of the SA banking sector. The simultaneity of the currency crisis also 
makes it more difficult to measure the effect of foreign banks, accentuated by the 
small segment in which foreign banks operate in SA. Therefore, from this finding it 
can be inferred that hypothesis 3, (the overheads of a domestic bank in SA are 
positively correlated to the foreign banks’ share in SA), is not supported by the 
empirical findings.   
 
Table 6.1 reports that the SA domestic banks before tax profit (BTXP) is negatively 
associated with foreign banks’ presence, as Forbk_Num is used as an explanatory 
variable. In addition, the relation is very significant at 6.2% level. Before-tax profits 
are the net revenue before tax generated by SA domestic banks, which takes into 
account the interest and non-interest income as well as overhead costs and loan loss 
provisions. For instance, if the share of total foreign banks goes up by about 1%, the 
before tax profit is affected by about 13% decrease. This finding gives support to 
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Hypothesis 4 that stipulates that the ratio of pre-tax profit to the total assets of a 
domestic bank in SA is negatively correlated to the foreign banks’ share in SA. This 
indicates the effects of foreign banks on both revenue and costs of SA domestic 
banks, confirming the effects of foreign banks on SA domestic banks in both areas of 
competition and spillovers.  
 
This finding that strongly supports Hypothesis 4 is very important as it confirms 
previous economic analysis consisting of first the existence of a competition effect 
resulting from the one hand a positive impact of NIIN, and on the other hand from a 
negative relationship with both variables NOINTIN. The results specifically support 
the evidence of decreasing NOINTIN and confirm the existence of a competition 
effect in non-interest activities, such as corporate and investment banking where 
foreign banks are mostly operating.   
 
For robustness checks and comparison, this model was estimated with Panel data 
random-effects GLS (Generalised Least Squares) estimator (see result in annex 6.6). 
There are minor differences between fixed and random effects and both yield to very 
close results, which means that for this study parameter estimates are generally 
robust regardless of estimation methodologies.  
 
When looking at table 6.2 below, which reports results from equation (3.2) with 
Forbk_Shr that reflects the relative size of foreign banks compared to the size of 
domestic banks, Forbk_Shr has no statistically significant effect on any of banks’ 
performance variables. However, the presence of the banking market has different 
effects on SA domestic banks’ performance. Forbk_Shr has a negative effect on 
interest incomes (NIIN). Uiboupin (2005) and Zajc (2002) find a negative 
relationship between the size of the foreign banks in the domestic market and the net 
interest margin while Hermes and Lensinz (2004) find the opposite result. This 
indicates the presence of a competition effect.  
 
In more general terms, Forbk_Shr, is negatively associated with three indicators of 
performance: net interest income (NIIN), non-interest incomes (NOINTIN) and 
profits (BTXP), and one indicator of cost: total operating expenses (TOEX). A 
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positive correlation with the three indicators of performance coupled with a positive 
relationship with the indicator of costs could mean an increase in profits despite 
increasing costs, which in turn would suggest an attempt to achieve some economies 
of scale from the big banks. 
Table 6.2: Foreign bank entry (Forbk_Shr) effect on SA domestic banks 
 NIIN NOINTIN TOEX BTXP 
Forbk_Shr -0.0140 
(0.199) 
-0.028 
(0.119) 
-0.064 
(0.155) 
-0.012 
(0.058) 
NINEA 0.344 
(0.093)*** 
-0.206 
(0.055)*** 
0.210 
(0.072)*** 
-0.011 
(0.027) 
EQTY 0.399 
(0.111)*** 
-0.007 
(0.066) 
0.221 
(0.086)* 
0.086 
(0.032)** 
SLTDPA -0.077 
(0.079) 
0.010 
(0.047)** 
-0.113 
(0.061)* 
-0.003 
(0.023) 
PCGDP -0.141 
(0.123) 
0.010 
(0.047) 
-0.098 
(0.096) 
0.039 
(0.036) 
GGDP -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.0007 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001)** 
Income (log) 0.862 
(0.447)* 
-0.106 
(0.267) 
0.607 
(0.349)* 
-0.162 
(0.131) 
CPI -0.005 
(0.003)* 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.002)** 
-0.0006 
(0.0008) 
Constant -7.714 
(7.496)* 
1.113 
(2.68) 
-6.044 
(3.506)* 
1.659 
(1,318) 
Number of Obs 86 86 86 86 
Source: Author calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(***) Significant at 1%, (**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
 
But there is a decrease in the four indicators of performance and costs, which leads to 
the conclusion that the domestic banks tried to reduce their costs after decreasing 
profits. This suggests that the domestic banks did not try to achieve any economies of 
scale, but instead they reacted to the competitive pressure exerted by the re-entry of 
the foreign banks. However, this remains inconclusive, as results are not statistically 
significant.  
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The estimation results from equation (3.3) with the interactive terms Inter_Num 
between foreign ownership Forbk_Num and the banking sector PCGDP are given in 
the below table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Foreign bank entry Forbk_Num interacting with PCGDP 
 NIIN NOINTIN TOEX BTXP 
Forbk_Num 0.484 
(0.960) 
0.127 
(0.578) 
0.436 
(0.757) 
-0.045 
(0.275)* 
Inter_Num -0.149 
(0.950) 
-0.255 
(0.572) 
-0.459 
(0.749) 
0.325 
(0.272) 
NINEA 0.341 
(0.093)*** 
-0.203 
(0.056)*** 
0.213 
(0.0734)*** 
-0.014 
(0.026) 
EQTY 0.414 
(0.110)*** 
-0.013 
(0.066) 
0.220 
(0.087)** 
0.081 
(0.031)** 
SLTDPA -0.054 
(0.080) 
0.092 
(0.048)* 
-0.114 
(0.063)* 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
PCGDP 0.423 
(0.366) 
0.040 
(0.221) 
0.033 
(0.289) 
-0.133 
(0.105) 
GGDP 0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Income (log) 0.0483 
(0.785) 
0.297 
(0.47) 
0.819 
(0.620) 
0.109 
(0.225)* 
CPI -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.003)* 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Constant -0.659 
(7.985) 
-3.018 
(4.814) 
-8.336 
(6.302) 
-0.905 
(2.288) 
Number of Obs 86 86 86 86 
Source: Author calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 (***) Significant at 1%, (**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 10% 
 
They show that the interaction term has no statistically significant effect in relation to 
any of the independent variables. It is not possible to conclude whether or not the 
entry of foreign banks reduces the profitability or increases costs of the domestic 
banks. Uiboupin (2005) finds that the development of the banking sector has some 
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negative effects on short-term foreign banks’ entry effects in developing markets, but 
he emphasises that the estimations with the interactive term Inter_Num gives a 
smaller drop in interest revenues in more developed banking markets, because 
interest rates have already converged more in developed markets. 
 
This study has long advocated the particular case of SA being a developing country 
(World Bank Data, 2013; IMF, 2012) with a very strong and developed banking 
market and findings might reflect this SA aspect. However, tables 6.4 reporting 
results from equation (5.3), shows estimation of the interactive term between the 
relative size of the foreign banks, Forbk_Shr, and the domestic private credit to GDP, 
PCGDP. There is a significant effect at 12.8% level of the interaction term on the 
before-tax profits of the domestic banks. This statistical significance appears only 
when two time dummy variables for years 2001 and 2005 are included. The two 
events that occurred in years 2001 and 2005 correspond respectively to the SA 
currency crisis and the acquisition of ABSA by Barclays. However, the time dummy 
variable is not statistically significant for 2005 but it is for 2001 at 18% level. Given 
that results are not statistically significant without the dummy variables, it would be 
tempting to conclude that the effect was attributable more to the currency crisis 
rather than the entry of the foreign banks. To verify this point, a robustness check 
was conducted by running the same regression with panel data random-effect GLS 
estimator (see results in annex 6.1). The results show no significance without dummy 
variables, but in the presence of time dummies the significance of the interactive 
term is confirmed at 15% level. However there is not statistical significance for any 
of the time dummies.  
 
In light of these conflicting statistical results what can be concluded? With dummy 
variables, both regressions confirm the significance of the interaction term, and I can 
conclude that Inter_Num, the interactive term between foreign ownership 
Forbk_Num and the banking sector PCGDP, has a negative impact on the SA 
domestic banks. It could suggest that there was shrinkage of the private credit market 
due to the foreign banks’ entry or other events. Since the regression results show the 
significant effect of the interactive term only in the presence of time dummies, it 
suggests that only events at these times are responsible for this effect.  
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Table 6.4: Foreign bank entry Forbk_Shrinteracting with PCGDP  
 NIIN NOINTIN TOEX BTXP BTXP 
Forbk_Shr 0.276 
(1.229) 
-0.260 
(0.734) 
0.704 
(0.954) 
0.240 
(0.229) 
0.824 
(0.557)* 
Inter_Shr -0.188 
(0.785) 
0.150 
(0.469) 
-0.498 
(0.609) 
-0.156 
(0.229) 
-0.533 
(0.346)* 
NINEA 0.343 
(0.094)*** 
-0.205 
(0.056)* 
0.206 
0.073)*** 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
EQTY 0.401 
(0.112)*** 
-0.008 
(0.067) 
0.227 
(0.087)** 
0.087 
(0.031)*** 
0.082 
(0.032)** 
SLTDPA -0.077 
(0.079) 
0.101 
(0.047)** 
-0.112 
(0.061)* 
-0.003 
(0.023) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
PCGDP -0.107 
(0.189) 
-0.16 
(0.113) 
-0.007 
(0.147) 
0.068 
(0.055) 
0.193 
(0.100)* 
GGDP -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001)* 
0.003 
(0.001)** 
Income (log) 0.883 
(0.467)* 
-0.082 
(0.279) 
0.529 
(0.362)* 
-0.186 
(0.136) 
-0.522 
(0.272)* 
CPI -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.0007 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Constant -8.45  
(4.655)* 
0.906 
(2.783) 
-5.360 
(3.613)* 
1.873 
(1.360) 
5.188 
(2,703)* 
Time dummy     Yes 
Number of Obs 86 86 86 86 86 
Source: Author calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 (***) Significant at 1%, (**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 15%. 
 
Although results from panel data with fixed effects show a relative significance at 
18% level for year 2001, panel data with a random-effect GLS estimator shows no 
significance for either of the two years. However I will favour the results from panel 
data with fixed-effects, which captures changes within the banking sector over time.  
The currency crisis occurring in year 2001 saw a fall in the number of domestic 
banks. Only the remaining domestic banks were allowed to buy lucrative assets of 
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those disappearing ones. This asset buy-out may have increased the assets level of 
the domestic banks left. Therefore a drop in the number of domestic banks could 
have been offset by a better performance of the assets of the remaining domestic 
banks after the crisis, which could explain a milder negative effect of the interaction 
term and a small significance of the dummy variable for year 2001. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that the finding provides evidence of the negative effect of the 
interactive term, but due to the SA financial crisis and not to the entry of the foreign 
banks, thus there is no support for Hypothesis 6 stating that the effect of foreign 
banks’ entry depends on the banking market development in SA. On the other hand, 
this finding could suggest implicitly that the SA banking market is more developed 
than the typical banking market in developing countries and that SA interest rates 
had already converged with developed market rates. 
 
No results are reported here for the interaction term FS_SGLKB_Ass, which 
represents the interaction term between the presence of the foreign banks and the 
value of their market share relative to the total SA banking market. The reasons for 
this are that the regressions suffer from severe problems of correlation amongst 
variables and a lack of statistical significance.  
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6.2 Discussion and conclusion 
This is the first study to my knowledge that investigates empirically the effect of 
foreign banks entry in SA during the post-Apartheid period. The main finding is that 
the foreign banks’ entries are associated with both higher net interest income (NIIN) 
and lower before-tax profit (BTXP) of SA domestic banks. But evidence from NIIN 
proved to be weak being statistically significant at only the 18% level. However, 
evidence from BTXP is statistically stronger with a 6% level and decrease of 14%. 
And higher NIIN confirms the presence of competition faced by SA domestic banks 
in the segment of investment banking that forced them to improve their presence in 
activities where foreign banks do not compete. A decrease of both NOINTIN and 
BTXP combined with statistical significance of BTXP suggest strong competition 
effects on non-interest activities such as fees, where foreign banks are present. 
 
When Ch2/H5 (impact of the foreign banks share associated to PGDP) was tested I 
found an unexpected result. The interaction term (Forbk_Shr) between the foreign 
banks share relative to domestic banks share and the private credit over GDP 
(PCGDP) was found to be statistically significant, suggesting an effect on domestic 
banks’ profits (BTXP). In fact, it appears that this effect was the result of the 
financial crisis that occurred in 2001. This confirms the concern noted earlier, 
regarding the difficulty to detect any spillovers during the period 2000-04 when 
TOEX in table 3.2 increased sharply. 
 
Finally, Ch2/H1 consisting of the net interest margin of SA banks is either 
ambiguous or positively correlated with the foreign bank share in SA and Ch2/H4 
stipulating that the ratio of pre-tax profit to the total assets of a domestic bank in SA 
is negatively correlated to the foreign banks’ share in SA, are fully supported by the 
study, as NIIN and BTXP were respectively positively and negatively correlated with 
the presence of foreign banks and both statistically significant. On the other hand 
support for H6 stating that the effect of foreign banks entry depends on the banking 
market development in SA is either unclear or not supported because of the 
ambiguity of the impact of the interactive term Forbk_Shr on the variable BTXP. 
Ch2/H2, the non-interest income of a domestic bank in SA is either positively or 
negatively correlated with the foreign banks’ share in SA, is not supported 
empirically supported because the variable NOINTIN is not statistically significant. 
  141 
But NONINTIN is negatively correlated with the presence of foreign banks, which 
adds up for more support to a competition effect. The Ch2/H3 that indicates the 
presence of spillover effects, which says that the overhead of a domestic bank in SA 
is positively correlated to the foreign banks’ share in SA, is not supported by this 
study. Nevertheless these results are in line with previous studies provided in table 
6.5 with some exceptions, which indicates that the SA economy remains a specific 
case in terms of foreign banks’ entry.  
 
The findings from this chapter not only support but also generalise the existence of a 
significant degree of competition effects on non-interest activities in SA banking 
market, suggesting strong competition in investment banking where most of the 
foreign banks are present. Both the survey in chapter 4 and the case study in chapter 
5 anticipate this result about competition effect and now in this chapter the results 
from the empirical model confirm competition effects as domestic banks were forced 
to increase their performance (profits) in activities where foreign banks are less 
present. Although the economic analysis of indicators NIIN, NOINTIN, TOEX and 
BTXP suggests that the SA banks did not achieve any economy of scale, however, 
this evidence is not strong enough to statistically justify that foreign banks forced the 
domestic banks to operate more efficiently and /or to realise any economies of scale 
or scope.  
 
Both survey and case study results from chapter 4 and 5 show the existence of 
technological gap in high segment of SA banking sector and the avalaibility of new 
technology, knowledge and know-how. The case study also confirms that knowledge 
spillover took place in the all SA banking sector. As competition is a condition for 
knowledge to spillover when there exists some technological gap therefore, this 
empirical result from this chapter provides further evidence that knowledge spillover 
occurred in the entire SA banking sector.  
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Table 6.5: Summary of studies of foreign banks effects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Claessens et al (2001), Hermes and Lensink (2004 a,b) Zajc (2002) 
Note: (+) significant positive correlation, (-) significant negative correlation, (NS) not statistically significant 
 
 NIIN NOINTIN BTXP TOEX 
Forbk_Num Claessens (NS) 
Uiboupin (-) 
Zajc (NS) 
Pietrus (+) 
Claessens (-) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Zajc (-) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Claessens (-) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Zajc (-) 
Pietrus (-) 
Claessens (-) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Zajc (+) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Forbk_Shr Claessens (NS) 
Uiboupin (-) 
Zajc (-)  
Pietrus (NS) 
Claessens (NS) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Zajc (-)  
Pietrus (NS) 
Claessens (NS) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Zajc (-)  
Pietrus (NS) 
Claessens (NS) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Zajc (+) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Forbk_Num / Forbk_Num*PCGDP Hermes (2003a) (+) / (-) 
Hermes (2003b) (+) / (-) 
Uiboupin (-) /(+) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Hermes (2003a) (+) / (-) 
Hermes (2003b) (+) / (-) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Hermes (2003a) (-) / (+) 
Hermes (2003b) (-) / (+) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Pietrus (-) / (NS) 
Hermes (2003a) (+) / (-) 
Hermes (2003b) (+) / (-) 
Uiboupin (+) /(-) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Forbk_Shr / Forbk_Shr*PCGDP Hermes (2003b) (+) / (-) 
Uiboupin (+) /(-) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Hermes (2003b) (-) / (NS) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Hermes (2003b) (+) / (-) 
Uiboupin (-) /(+) 
Pietrus (+) / (-) 
Hermes (2003b) (+) / (NS) 
Uiboupin (NS) 
Pietrus (NS) 
Forbk_Num / Forbk_Num*SGLBK_Ass Uiboupin (NS) Uiboupin (-) Uiboupin (NS) Uiboupin (NS) 
Forbk_Num / Forbk_Shr*SGLBK_Ass Uiboupin (NS) Uiboupin (NS) Uiboupin (NS) Uiboupin (NS) 
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Chapter 7 
 
7. Efficiency model results for foreign and 
domestic banks in SA  
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the results from the empirical model 
of efficiency and generalise the finding from the case study in chapter 5 about the 
relationship between efficiency and FDI. The theoretical analysis framework, 
described in chapter 2 clearly shows how efficiency is a transmission channel for 
benefits fro FDI in the financial sector to the whole economy. This benefits starts at 
the micro level when the domestic banks achieve some efficiency from economies of 
scale and scope thanks to technology and knowledge transfer. Then efficiency 
spillovers may occur as a direct effect of competition. Therefore financial sector 
efficiency may in turn translate into an increase of GDP.  
 
The interview outcomes from the case study clearly confirm that the entire banking 
sector in fact undertook the modernisation of its infrastructure, processes and 
regulation to better comply with international standards, just after the re-entry of the 
foreign banks (competition) from the 1990s to early 2000s. The SA regulators from 
2002, tried to address the issue of competition and costs of services and products 
provided by the SA banking sector by sponsoring a series of studies
5
 and has 
encouraged the banks to reduce their fees. And findings from the survey in chapter 4 
and the competition model in chapter 6 confirm the existence of competition effects 
accentuated in the activities of investment banking.  
 
This chapter analyse the efficiency for a long period just after 2000 to 2010. It is 
therefore important to assess whether foreign banks outperform domestic banks from 
                                                        
5 Competition in SA banking: task group report for the National Treasury and SARB, 2004; Hawkins, 
2001, 2004 
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the angle of efficiency because despite the importance of this question and the 
relatively strong SA financial sector, only a few studies
6
 on SSA are available. 
 
Issues of efficiency have been examined in developing and transition countries such 
as the Eastern-European economies that are now part of the EU and in many South 
American emerging markets (Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) thanks to economic 
liberalisation. Today, only two big domestic-owned banks, namely the First Rand and 
Nedbank, are left with no significant foreign shareholders in their ownership 
structure. It could be the case in the future that the SA banking sector could be 
dominated by a majority of foreign-owned equity, as is the case in Swaziland. 
However, whether this growing market share of foreign-owned banks has been 
improving the performance of the banking sector is an issue that needs further 
investigation.  
 
To answer the first question whether foreign banks are more efficient than SA 
domestic banks the model (3.6) presented and described in chapter 3 is used. Its 
results are reported and analysed in the next section. They will provide an average 
efficiency score of both banks for the period 2000 to 2010.  
 
Apart from ownership, other factors could influence the level of better efficiency of 
the foreign banks. The model (3.8) presented and described in chapter 3 is used. Its 
results are also reported in the next section of this chapter.  
 
7.1 Results for SA banks efficiency scores 
The main descriptive statistics for cost efficiency scores, results of x-efficiency model 
(3.6) are presented in the table 7.1 and the Stata general procedure and command for 
running this model is given in annex 3.7. The score denotes the ratio of the bank’s 
actual costs to the computed minimum possible cost (cost frontier). Therefore, a lower 
score means greater efficiency. On average, with a score of 56.11, foreign-owned 
banks are more efficient than domestic banks, whose score is 84.78. The dispersion 
                                                        
6 Haddad and Harrison (1993); Okeahalam 1999, 2004a, 2006 
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score does not show a very significant difference between the two types of banks: 
standard deviation of 10.37 for the domestic-owned and 6.71 for the foreign-owned 
banks.  
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for efficiency scores 
Sample Num Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Domestic-owned banks 94 84.78 10.37 59.46 96.17 
Foreign-owned banks 37 56.11 6.71 41.82 68.18 
All banks 131 76.69 16.04 41.28 96.17 
Source: SA Banks’ annual reports. 
Notes: all scores are in percentage 
 
This study shows that in SA, foreign-owned banks outperform domestic-owned banks 
by more than 28%. This finding is in line with the literature according to which 
foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing countries as 
previously discussed. But even more importantly it confirms and amplifies the 
previous empirical finding from chapter 5 that shows foreign-owned banks perform 
slightly better than domestic-owned banks in term of before-tax profit. In that chapter 
I concluded in favour of significant competition but limited to the wholesale segment 
and no spillover effects as the foreign banks’ entry had positive and negative effects 
on domestic banks’ performance with small statistical significance and negative 
effects on costs indicators with no statistical significance. The confirmation that 
foreign-owned banks have been consistently more efficient over a long period of time 
(at least ten years figure 6.1) adds to the conclusion from the previous chapters that 
competition really took place. It indicates a possibility that there were efficiency 
spillovers to the whole financial sector. This backs up the theoretical section 
illustrated in figure 2.3, and in figure 7.1 showing from 2000 to 2010 a more than 
10% increase in efficiency for both domestic and foreign-owned banks. But this 
finding does not clarify how spillover effects took place and which channels or areas 
were used for their diffusion.  
 
Figure 7.1 below shows the scores’ trend for both domestic and the foreign-owned 
banks from 2000 to 2010. By considering the sub-period 2001-06, and for domestic-
owned banks it can be observed a very small increase
7
 of the efficiency scores from 
                                                        
7
 Note that a lower percentage of efficiency score denotes a higher efficiency.  
  146 
2001 (88.8%) to 2003 (88.4%) then in 2004 there is a bigger increase of 2.4%. The 
foreign-owned banks too experienced the same trend, with small increase scores of 
61.6% and 60.3 in 2001 and 2002 and bigger increase of 58.8% in 2003 as well as 
57.3% in 2004 (almost a 4 percentage points increase for the period). This increase in 
efficiency for both categories of banks, may well be the result of regulatory 
encouragement to the banks in SA to lower their product prices and fees to customers. 
It was at this time that Basel processes were implemented to better monitor analysis 
on banking risks. 
 
On the other hands, in 2005 there is a very small decrease of half a percentage point 
in efficiency (from 57.3 in 2004 to 57.9 in 2005) followed by a 1.5 percentage point 
increase in 2006 for the foreign banks while the domestic banks show a slow-down in 
the trend of increase in 2005 with scores of 86.0% and 85.4% in 2004 and 2005 and a 
higher increase in 2006 with a score of 84.0%. The year 2005 corresponds to the 
Barclays acquisition. Perhaps to anticipate possible competition triggered by this 
acquisition, foreign and domestic banks made some investments in 2005 allowing 
them to get better knowledge, technology and risk management tools, processes and 
procedures, which possibly translated into a short term increase of their overhead 
costs. This could suggest that ABSA, the Barclays acquisition triggered competition 
in the segment of investment banking, where the majority of foreign banks and 
branches operate, forcing them (as well as domestic banks’ investment banking 
activities) to pre-emptively respond. This argument was verified and reported in the 
case study in chapter 4. From the feedback I received from the different actors of the 
banking sector, the Barclays branch called Barclays Capital was regarded as the 
benchmark. There were fears that Barclays taking over ABSA could represent a 
serious threat. Therefore, this provides another piece of evidence for a technological 
gap and demonstration effect that took place meaning de facto knowledge spillovers. 
 
The analysis of differences in efficiency between the domestic and foreign-owned 
banks cannot be complete if some banks’ characteristics, which are exogenous to the 
banks managers’ decisions, are not taken into account. This is the reason why the 
level of equity was included in the estimation of efficiency scores, to ensure that the 
influence of risk preferences was taken into account. However, other factors that seem 
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to be beyond managers’ control could have some impact on the efficiency scores. 
Therefore, to extend the analysis additional explanatory variables that may influence 
differences in efficiency such as size and structure were included in the study. Better 
management is also a factor that accounts for increasing efficiency and managers 
have also some responsibility for the decisions over production of the banks.   
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Figure 7.1: Score efficiency level for 2000-10 
Source: SA Banks’ annual reports 
Author calculation 
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7.2 Results for other factors that influence SA banks efficiency 
scores 
Table 7.2 below provides the results of the regression model (3.8) showing that there 
is a negative and very significant effect between the efficiency score and all 
explanatory variables. The negative effect is due to the nature of the efficiency score 
and should be translated as a positive effect because a lower value of efficiency score, 
means a higher efficiency cost.   
Table 7.2: Other factors estimation 
Variables Equation using Tobit estimate Equation using GLS estimate 
For -0.3188 (0.2169)*** -0.1453 (0.0395)*** 
For*Assets 6.05e-07 (7.58e-08)*** 2.17e-07 (7.26e-08)*** 
Assets 6.52e-08 (3.99e-08)* -5.79e-08 (2.48e-08)** 
CustomDep 0.2050 (0.0385)*** -0.0503 (0.0206)** 
Linvass -0.0023 (0.0023) -0.0065 (0.0017)***  
Constant 0.7151 (0.02148)*** 0.8958 (0.02927)*** 
Source: Banks’ annual report and author calculations  
Notes: Dependent variable is the cost efficiency score in percentage. Coefficient beta is reported and 
standard error is in parentheses.  
(***) Significant at 1%, (**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 15%.  
N:14 banks 
 
The main lesson from the results is that the coefficient for foreign ownership For is 
highly significant and positive at 1% level in both regressions, suggesting that in the 
SA market foreign-owned banks have a significant advantage in cost efficiency 
relative to domestic-owned banks. In addition, as the regressions control for the 
influence of size and structure of activities (variables Assets and Linvass) and for risk 
preferences of managers (Equity) included in the estimation of efficiency scores, 
results confirm that foreign-owned banks benefit from better management.  
 
Secondly, the interaction variable For*Assets, which is highly significant at 1% level 
in both regressions, proves that the efficiency gap between domestic and foreign-
owned banks is a result of the banks’ size. It shows that the correlation between the 
variables For and Assets, which is the result of a larger size for domestic-owned 
banks, influences the relationship between For and the efficiency score. This means 
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that the link between foreign ownership and cost efficiency is the direct result of the 
smaller size of the foreign-owned bank.  
 
In addition this advantage for foreign banks could be explained by both better control 
by the foreign shareholder and a comparative advantage in banking know-how, which 
is provided by their mother companies. The latter explanation is even more plausible 
as all the foreign banks in the sample operate in the small segment of investment 
banking that requires particular knowledge and techniques. However, the foreign-
owned banks’ management, who have greater managerial experience in a market 
economy than domestic-owned banks’ in developing countries, may suffer from 
poorer information about the domestic market and have less information on the 
quality of borrowers. In addition, foreign-owned banks’ management may be less 
familiar with moral hazard problems
8
 in emerging or developing economies, where 
the market is less committed to western standards of contract rules (unreliable 
accounting information and consequently equity and collateral values that are not 
properly assessed). The results show that this is not the case here. The foreign-owned 
banks do not have weaker knowledge of domestic customers and this is confirmed by 
the fact that from at least 1994 when the foreign banks returned to the SA market, 
they have had time to adjust and understand the local market. It is helpful to 
remember that some foreign-owned banks have never left the SA market after the 
establishment of the Apartheid regime (for instance in the case of the Bank of 
Athens).  
 
The coefficient of CustumDep is significant in both regressions suggesting that 
deposits may imply lower costs than other financing sources. But with opposite signs 
for each coefficient from both regressions, it is difficult to provide a clear explanation.   
However, it is important to remember that the big names of foreign investment banks 
that have easier access to cheaper international financing sources are not represented 
in the panel as they operate as foreign branches, whose data from financial reports are 
                                                        
8
 Banks collect deposits and invest these funds in risky assets (loans). To safeguard against insolvency, 
banks hold capital buffers against adverse outcomes in their investments in risky assets (loan default). 
But the bank’s private solvency target may not take into account the interests of depositors, nor of 
society as a whole. As a result, banks may engage in excessive risk-taking (Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
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not accessible. On the other hand, Linvass is significant in only one regression making 
it even harder to conclude.  
 
The coefficient of size (Assets) is significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively in 
Tobit and GLS estimates. This confirms that there is a linear relationship between size 
and cost efficiency for SA banks as mentioned earlier. This particular observation 
could be linked to the issue of economies of scale suggesting that potential economies 
of scale may be achieved in the SA banking sector; but this is beyond the scope of this 
study and will not be developed further.  
 
This section shows that in the SA banking sector, foreign ownership is strongly 
associated with higher cost efficiency. A higher level of cost efficiency remains, even 
when adding variables such as size and structure of activities into the regressions. 
This represents another piece of new evidence about a developing economy that can 
be added to the existing literature; Claessens et al. (1998), Micco et al (2004), Berger 
et al. (2005) find that in developing countries foreign banks tend to have higher 
profits, better performance and lower costs than domestic and state-owned banks. The 
same literature concludes that domestic-owned banks have better knowledge of the 
local market. However, this study shows not only that foreign banks perform better 
but also that they possess as good quality information about the local market as 
domestic-owned banks and better know-how.  
 
This study could suffer from some particular limitations such as the small segment in 
which the foreign-owned banks operate, their size in term of assets and their number 
in the sample (5 foreign-owned banks for 9 domestic-owned banks: almost a ratio of 
1:2). Unfortunately, it was not possible to include in the panel the data from the 
foreign branches’ annual reports, as these data were not accessible. And this the 
reason why the survey on foreign banks where designed and presented in chapter 2.  
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7.3 Discussion and conclusion on efficiency results 
I have analysed empirically the impacts of ownership on the cost efficiency of banks 
in SA and the channels by which knowledge have spilled over. I have found evidence 
of impacts of foreign ownership on cost efficiency. The foreign-owned banks have a 
higher efficiency score resulting from differences in risk preferences between 
categories of banks. The regressions of cost efficiency on control variables for size 
and structure of activities shows significant influences of foreign ownership that can 
be explained by better corporate governance, smaller size and transfer of knowledge 
and know-how from their mother company. In addition, it can be observed that there 
is a link between the first big acquisition of a domestic bank by a British bank in 2005 
and foreign banks’ efficiency scores. One year before the acquisition deal, the 
efficiency score of foreign banks decreased slightly to increase again one year after 
the deal. This suggests some competition effects. From 2000 to 2010 both categories 
of banks increased their cost efficiency scores slowly but steadily. But there is still a 
big efficiency gap (28 percentage points) on average between domestic and foreign-
owned banks. Although it is not easy to use and replicate processes and systems used 
by foreign banks that operate in investment banking, but with a score of about 80%, 
the domestic banks have plenty of room for efficiency improvement and clearly this 
should be a concern for policy makers, especially as efficiency implies economies of 
scale and scope, which in turn can provide better and cheaper banking products and 
services. One way is to allow more competition in retail banking by letting more 
foreign banks operate in this segment. This is what possibly the SA government had 
in mind when it authorised the acquisition of ABSA by Barclays bank. But 5 years 
later and despite the acquisition of 20% shares of the ICBC in the Standard Bank, this 
result show and confirm (finding from case study) that resulting competition did not 
occur. It is generally considered that foreign banks increase competition and access to 
financial services, enhance financial and economic performance of their borrowers 
and bring greater financial stability (Clarke, Cill, Martinez Peria and Sanchez, 2003; 
Claessens, 2006, Chopra, 2007, and Cull and Martinez Peria, 2011). But with two big 
independent banks out of four left (Nedbank and First Bank), the SA government may 
feel reluctant to allow more acquisitions, as it may fear for SA financial and economic 
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stability. And indeed, there is reason to be fearful. An important concern over foreign 
banks’ presence is the tendency for foreign banks to leave foreign markets in times of 
economic downturn and political crisis, also called a hit and run strategy. A 
consequence of this strategy is the possibility of triggering risks for financial stability 
as well as a decrease of private sector credits. But many examples show that the hit 
and run strategy is not systematic. For instance in the case of Argentina and Mexico, 
Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000), who look at the rate of growth in lending during 
and after the Tequila Crisis of 1995 show that foreign banks expand lending even 
when domestic GDP is stagnating or falling. They conclude that foreign banks’ 
lending provides a counter-cyclical support to the economy. Other fears of policy 
makers are the tendency of foreign banks to cherry-pick, meaning that foreign banks 
are more interested in large and less risky customers, neglecting the credit-lending to 
smaller borrowers. In the policy-makers view, this leaves domestic banks with more 
potentially risky customers, leading to more bankruptcies and credit constraints on the 
private sector (Hermes and Lesink, 2002; World Bank, 2002). However, as the survey 
from chapter 4 shows, this is already the case as most of the foreign banks operate in 
the wholesale segment (excluding ABSA bought in 2005 by Barclays) and no 
negative aspects have so far been reported as the retail segment seems to be 
dominated by the four big SA banks. Therefore, given the huge potential to increase 
efficiency, the domestic banks should take more opportunity to gain economies of 
scale and scope. One solution is perhaps to introduce more competition and allow 
even more acquisition of domestic banks. Since foreign banks are usually large, 
market-lending banks, they operate at larger scale than domestic banks. There is 
reason to believe that foreign banks will be able to take advantage of economies of 
scope because generally they are universal banks and/or members of financial 
conglomerates that offer a wide range of products and services.  
 
Advocating more competition in the retail-banking sector is important for spillover 
effects and/or transfer of knowledge. The survey in this study shows that despite the 
availability of some technologies, knowledge and skills, efficiency as well as spillover 
effects occurred but were limited to the segment in which the foreign banks operate. 
This result corroborates the finding on efficiency from this chapter and confirms the 
result of the empirical model in chapter 6 that finds no evidence of spillovers effects 
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but limited competition effects. This also confirms the fact that if the foreign banks 
are only interested in limited market segments then the effect on overall competition 
will be small. But inversely, it can be assumed that if they are interested in the 
broader market, their effect on competition may be large (Kraft, 2002)”.  
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8. Conclusion  
This thesis investigates FDI knowledge spillovers, a literature that recognises the 
ambiguity of the empirical evidence of the existence of such spillovers. More 
specifically the dissertation has focused on the search for such knowledge spillovers 
in the banking sector and in an atypical developing country, South Africa (SA). The 
thesis has adopted an approach to this problem in the preceding chapters by i) looking 
at in detail the relationship between competition and knowledge spillovers in the SA 
banking sector and how the existence of both competition and FDI spillovers depends 
very much on distinct markets (chapters 2&4); ii) presenting two major empirical 
models and their data, one that measures the effect of foreign banks re-entry after the 
Apartheid regime in SA for the considered period of 2000-10, and the other that 
measures the score efficiency of foreign and domestic banks in SA for the same 
period (chapter 3); iii) addressing and analysing the relationship between efficiency 
and FDI (chapter 5); iv) and presenting the results of the two empirical models 
(chapters 6 and 7).  
 
The objective of chapter 1 is to present a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on knowledge spillovers in FDI. It intends to show the complexity, the 
different shapes and the multi-channels that FDI knowledge spillovers can use. It 
shows the many theories that are available for the manufacturing sector. However, 
section 1.2 stresses the specificity of the banking sector, which is driven more by 
information technology (IT) by which its products are defined, and characterised: 
specific knowledge of its markets, its best practices and its know-how. It also 
highlights the fact that knowledge spillover is made possible depending very much on 
the market segment in which foreign banks operate. By using some aspects of MNE 
theory taken from manufacturing and the internalisation theory, the literature review 
shows the emergence of the field of study of spillover effects, which still merits more 
attention as banks are operating in a more global environment.  
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Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of FDI in the banking sector used by 
this study. On the one hand, analogies are made with the manufacturing sector and 
concepts, such as demonstration effect, labour turnover, technological gap (figure 2.1) 
and absorptive capacity are borrowed, distinguishing between direct and indirect 
effects. On the other hand, concepts that measure performance and determinants of 
MNBs are also used. As a result, a distinctive two-stage framework emerges. First, 
this framework contributes to analyse the impacts of the presence of foreign banks on 
domestic banks and competition effects in the SA market. Second, the framework 
measures the efficiency gap between the foreign and domestic banks that operate in 
SA. In addition, the efficiency measure is also used to analyse the performance of 
domestic banks that were recently subject to FDI. Chapter 2 also identifies the main 
hypotheses for each stage. For stage one, five hypotheses are set. Ch2/H1, the first 
hypothesis is about the non-interest incomes of SA domestic banks that can be 
ambiguous or negatively correlated with the foreign banks’ share. Ch2/H2, the 
second, states that the non-interest income of a SA domestic bank can be either 
positively or negatively correlated with the foreign banks’ share in SA. The third one, 
Ch2/H3 is concerned with the overheads of the SA domestic banks that can be 
positively correlated to the foreign banks’ share. Ch2/H4 stipulates that the ratio of 
pre-tax profit to the total assets of a domestic bank in SA is negatively correlated to 
the foreign banks’ share in SA. For stage two, there is one hypothesis Ch2/H6, which 
states that foreighn-owned banks in SA are more efficient than domestic banks.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the research methods, procedures and data. It includes a survey 
(Annex 3.10) and two empirical models.  
The survey includes eight questions (table 8.1): Question 1 (Ch3/H1) identifies the 
reasons for entry. Questions 2 and 3 (Ch3/H2) are directed to foreign banks’ strategy 
in the SA market and their comparative advantage at the time of entry. Questions 4 to 
6 (Ch3/H3 and Ch4/H4) relate to products, innovation and technology transfer 
identifying the presence of potential spillovers. Questions 7 and 8, (Ch3/H5 and 
Ch3/H6), focus on the future of the SA banking sector. 
The two empirical models cover 9 SA domestic banks and 5 foreign banks for the 
period from 2000 to 2010. The first model (3.1) aims to measure the competition and 
spillovers effects from the re-entry of the foreign banks in SA and distinguishes 
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between direct, indirect and spillover effects (the results are discussed in chapter 6). 
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that if domestic banks are able to compete 
with foreign-owned banks then the efficiency of the domestic banks may also 
improve (Claessens et al., 2001). The reason for this is that domestic banks may 
imitate and adopt foreign banks’ modern skills and competencies (Lensink and 
Hermes, 2004) and therefore improve their efficiency. From this hypothesis, the 
objective of the second model (3.8) is to generalise the relationship between 
efficiency and FDI by measuring the efficiency scores of both foreign and domestic 
banks. In order to do so I use an extended model of x-efficiency and present the 
results in chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the survey covering the period that includes before 
2010, from 2000 to 2012 and after 2012. A summary of the findings is presented in 
section 4.7. The survey findings highlight:  
i) foreign banks contribute to the introduction of new products, techniques and 
technologies, practice and know-how (Ch3/H2 to Ch3/H4); 
ii) foreign banks operate in the limited scope of the wholesale segment (Ch3/H1, 
Ch3/H2 and Ch3/H3); 
iii) demonstration effects took place (Ch3/H4 and Ch3/H5);  
iv) although foreign banks wish to remain independent, they may, in the future, 
have to enter in some FDI that could trigger a reconfiguration of the SA banking 
market (Ch3/H6).  
Chapter 2 had highlighted how spillover effects depend on the market segment in 
which foreign banks operate; our results in chapter 4 confirm this observation. 
Combining the findings from hypotheses and questions, from Ch2/1-4 to Ch3/1-6, 
leads to the conclusion that, at this stage, competition and spillover effects occured in 
the wholesale segment of the SA banking sector. These results are in line with 
Lensink and Hermes (2004) that find that domestic banks imitate and adopt foreign 
banks’ new skills and techniques 
 
Chapter 5 establishes the relationship between efficiency and FDI by analysing 
whether foreign acquisition and minority participation improves efficiency. It also 
investigates whether these changes in ownership contribute to knowledge transfer and 
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spillover effect. This chapter introduces also the difference between voluntary and 
involuntary spillovers, and shows how FDI spillovers could depend not only on the 
country of origin (or nationality of parent) but also on the objectives of the foreign 
participation (technology sourcing, ownership advantage or efficiency seeking).  
To this purpose, two cases were examined: ABSA, one of the SA big four controlled 
by Barclays bank, and Standard Bank another SA big four banks, of which ICBC, a 
Chinese bank, holds a minority (but significant) shareholding. These two cases were 
scrutinized through two hypotheses: Ch5/H1 and Ch5/H2 (see table 8.1). Ch5/H1 
stipulates that ABSA and the Standard Bank should perform better in terms of 
efficiency and performance after a change in their ownership structure; Ch5/H2 
specifies that a change in the ownership structure of ABSA and the Standard Bank 
should trigger an increase in competition in SA market. My conclusion is that ABSA 
has benefited significantly from transfer of know-how, managerial practices, systems 
and technology, which translate into significant efficiency gains. This contrasts with 
Standard Bank that did not benefit from significant knowledge transfer from ICBC. 
But I also find a paradox: although ABSA outperforms slightly the competitors in 
term of efficiency gains, it does not outperform Standard Bank. The reason is that 
Standard Bank has developed a culture of keeping costs down during the period of 
foreign banks re-entry. The second finding is that the competitors are unimpressed 
with ABSA performance, and these two FDIs have not contributed to changing their 
strategy. In other words, this does not provide strong evidence for knowledge to spill 
over in general and into all segments of the banking sector. However, and this is the 
third finding, all ABSA competitors recognise that the new investment team formed 
by Barclays/ABSA triggered competition in the wholesale segment and important 
labour turnover occurred. This backs the conclusion from hypotheses’ results Ch3/1-6 
in chapter 4 that strong competition and spillover effects occurred in the SA 
investment-banking sector. But from the interviews’ feedback with the big four, I 
acknowledge that different programmes were implemented (training, infrastructure 
modernisation, etc) suggesting that there were spillover effects beyond the wholesale 
segment to the entire SA banking sector. And finally, this chapter reveals another 
finding: the emergence of a new competitor in the segment of retail banking: Capitec 
Bank, which poses a serious threat to Standard Bank as they possess a similar 
technology-driven strategy.  
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These aspects of ownership advantages are highlighted by To and Tripe (2002) who 
find that parent-bank specific ownership advantages are dominant in their 
subsidiaries’ performance, and clearly this is the case for Barclays-ABSA, which is in 
line with hypothesis Ch5/H1 for ABSA. In manufacturing there are more references 
in favour of the ownership argument such as Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) who 
find foreign ownership leads to spillovers. Demelis and Louris (2002) find that only 
majority ownership leads to more labour productivity. Abrahanm, Konings and 
Sloomaekers (2007) suggest that minority ownership effects are larger than majority, 
whereas Javorcik (2004b) argues that majority ownership does not create spillovers 
but only firms owned by both foreign and domestic firms generate spillovers. 
Nationality of parent is a factor in spillover creation. Buckley, Clegg and Wang 
(2007b) find that Western FDI generates more spillovers because firms from the West 
are more technologically advanced. This finding is supported by the results from the 
hypothesis in Ch5/H1 for ABSA and the Standard Bank and by Buckley, Clegg and 
Wang (2007a) showing that Western FDI generates more spillovers in technology-
intensive industries but Asian firms generate more spillovers in labour-intensive 
industries. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the empirical estimates measuring the effects of 
foreign bank re-entry on the performance of the SA domestic banks (income, costs 
and profitability) for the period 2000-10 (model 3.1). The model (3.1) on effects of 
the foreign banks on SA domestic banks’ performance is derived using time dummy 
variables. The results include: i) the re-entry of the foreign banks had a direct and 
significant competition effect on the performance of the domestic banks, which 
support hypotheses Ch2/H1 and Ch2/H4 but not Ch2/H3; ii) but had no spillover 
effect, which does not support hypothesis Ch2/H4; iii) the SA currency crisis in 2001 
had an indirect effect on the SA domestic banks’ performance when testing 
hypothesis Ch2/H5, although Ch2/H5 is not supported by the result. In addition, 
spillover effects are unlikely to occur if foreign firms operate in isolated market 
segments, and if technologies and products are very different from those of domestic 
firms (Kokko, 1994). As the majority of the foreign banks in SA operated exclusively 
in the wholesale segment, the conclusion was that the competition effect was 
essentially acute in that wholesale segment, and as this segment is small compared to 
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the retail segment it could be assumed that overall spillover effects were unlikely to 
have occurred, or if they did they would have been localised and limited. The finding 
is in line with those of several authors who find similar results such as Berger et al., 
(2005); Claessens and al., (2001); Mico et al., (2004); Uiboupin (2005), who find that 
in developing countries, foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks, and 
an increase of foreign banks reduces the level of profitability and margins of domestic 
banks, in line with results from Ch2/H4. But the literature also suggests that at a 
higher level of economic development, foreign banks entry has a less significant 
effect on domestic banks’ profitability (Hermes and Lensink, 2004).  
 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the empirical estimates of the x-efficiency regression 
model (model 3.5), testing hypothesis Ch2/H6. The results confirm a net efficiency 
margin for the foreign banks of more than 28% on average over the period 2000-10. I 
also find that since 2000 there is a clear trend of increasing efficiency for both 
categories of banks: slightly less than 10% for the domestic banks and more than 10% 
for the foreign-owned banks, suggesting a spread of efficiency to the entire banking 
system. 
 
The literature on the effects of FDI in the banking sector is divided between the study 
of the determinants of MNB growth or presence and the profitability of MNBs in 
foreign markets. Studies on MNB growth or presence include works by Fieleke 
(1977), Terrell (1979), Golberg and Saunders (1980), Ball and Tschoegl (1982), Cho 
(1985), Sabi (1986), Ngh et al. (1986), Hultman and McGee (1989), William (1996) 
Yamori (1998) and William (1998). Studies on the profitability of MNBs in foreign 
markets concentrates primarily on the MNBs’ performance (or profitability) in 
foreign markets and include De Young and Nolle (1996), William (1996, 1998), 
Molyneux and Seth (1998) and Peek et al. (1999). But while the literature on effects 
of FDI in the manufacturing sector is well developed, it is not the case for the banking 
sector where most empirical investigations of FDI in banking focus on multinational 
banks (MNBs) operating in the US market or on US MNBs operating abroad. Due to 
a lack of data, only a few studies have been carried out in Canada, Europe, Japan or 
Australia.  
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This dissertation offers an extensive literature review that underpins FDI knowledge 
spillovers theory in both manufacturing and banking sectors. The literature review 
represents an important synthesis of work in recollecting in detail the many aspects, 
and shapes of impacts of FDI that are later linked to the theory of internationalisation 
of the multinational banks.  
This dissertation provides empirical ground and validates the main argument that in 
developing countries, foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks and an 
increase in the number of foreign banks reduces the level of profitability and margins 
of domestic banks in a specific market (Claessens et al, 2001). The results also 
confirm that in developing countries, foreign ownership is positively correlated with 
banks’ efficiency and performance Mico et al (2004). Such results from empirical 
evidence are rare and this study contributes to enriching the discipline of FDI 
spillovers.  
This dissertation innovates in terms of methodology by combining a case study 
approach and a survey method to evaluate the specific case of SA banking sector and 
to argue for the existence of knowledge spillovers and competition. The inclusion of 
empirical models allows the generalisation of the findings, re-enforcing the validity of 
the empirical argument while the use of the survey methodology was a means to 
compensate for lack of data from the foreign bank branches. In short the contributions 
of this dissertation to the literature are three:  
i) it contributes to the theoretical debate on the existence and mechanisms 
whereby FDI brings spillovers to host country firms. The existing theory has 
focused on manufacturing FDI; this thesis extends this to FDI in banking and 
examines the different mechanisms whereby spillovers occur in banking. The 
thesis finds that spillovers, where they occur, are related to copying and transfer 
of managerial practices and organizational structures related to the IT services 
that are being brought over by the acquiring firm. They extend only to those 
segments that the acquiring firm is targeting and do not affect firm practices 
more widely. This alters theoretically the way in which FDI spillovers should be 
considered: the issue needs to be considered in the light of the specific sector 
affected and the strategy of the acquiring and investing firm.  
ii) the effects of FDI are investigated in the SA, a region poorly studied and where 
data are difficult to obtain. 
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iii) it contributes to the ongoing debate over the growing geopolitical role of China. 
The SA is an emerging economy, part of the BRICS, and China has started a 
new phase of diversification in investing in banking and services into SA.  
 
This study, however, suffers from two main limitations. The first is the lack of data at 
two different levels. Firstly the impossibility to collect data from the domestic banks 
straight after 1994, despite the fact that they exist and the efforts made to obtain them 
at the SARB. Secondly, the same data obtained from the domestic banks could not be 
collected from the foreign banks. This would have helped for instance to apply some 
more predictable or powerful models such as Arellano-Bond linear model, a dynamic 
panel data estimation that enables the use of a lagged term for the dependent variable 
as an exogenous variable, to get more consistent and refined estimates, as used in 
Uiboupin (2005).  Another limitation is the level of response from the foreign banks 
for the survey; although I had a 50% feedback, I initially expected an 80% response 
rate. Some banks promised to send back their responses but pulled out at the last 
minute. On reflection, the number of responses may have increased if I had thought to 
show the banks a sample of the output that the feedback could have produced.  
 
In light of this dissertation’s findings, what should the policy makers do to maximise 
the benefit of MNBs for the SA economy? Chapter 4 shows that the foreign banks are 
interested only in wholesale activities, and not in SMEs nor in retail banking. Chapter 
5 demonstrates that the strategy of the two main foreign owners who entered the SA 
market by FDIs (by acquisition and greenfield), was focused on SA as a hub, due to 
its developed banking infrastructure, to serve the African continent. The SA 
government has three specific pressing issues: first making sure that the 
internationalisation of its domestic banks does not bring any systemic risks from other 
African countries; second, that the MNBs contribute to more SA job creation (rather 
than job destruction); and third to ensure that the banking system becomes affordable 
for everyone and serves the SMEs in particular, as they are the main source of new 
jobs. To address these issues, the first area of intervention is perhaps to create 
conditions for more competition in particular in retail banking and to end the situation 
of the oligopolistic position of the SA big four. There is no easy way to do this; the 
examples of Barclays and ICBC two MNBs are more interested in extending their 
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strategy to the African continent. I argue that SA, for a developing country has a well-
developed and sophisticated formal financial sector and SA commercial banks’ assets 
constitute around 87% of GDP (Demirguc and Ross, 1996). Furthermore, the SARB, 
estimated in 1996 that 60% of the SA population remains unbanked (Wiese, 1996). 
This demonstrates that there is space for further markets: more banking for the SA 
population and SMEs. Findings in Chapters 4 and 7 suggest that economies of scale 
were not achieved by the larger SA banks, in particular the SA big four, despite the 
availability of best practice in the SA market. As the SA banking sector is 
concentrated, consequently, the lack of competition hampers efficiency. Despite great 
efforts from Barclays to increase ABSA performance, the two new entrants Barclays 
and ICBC were not able to improve performance in such a way that would force the 
competitors to react. This means that internationalisation alone is not sufficient to 
improve performance or there is not enough gain in performance just by allowing 
foreign entry. Thus policy makers should find some incentives to promote more 
competition, ensuring that new entrants are not monopolists seeking rents and their 
teams are able to transfer technology and skills and not only benefits through scale. In 
the short run this technology transfer and skills may destroy a significant number of 
jobs but by ensuring more capacity building and training may help increase absorptive 
capacity and create more employment in the long run. A direct consequence would 
possibly be cheaper banking products for all. And this is exactly what Capitec has 
done as shown in Chapter 5. As a technology-driven company, it provides unsecured 
loans for the poorer that require greater knowledge of the business process and cost 
structures and cheaper banking services; in doing so it represents a direct threat to 
some of the SA big 4 banks. Capitec has had a spectacular growth rate since it started 
to operate and continues to thrive. It is therefore important for policy makers to look 
at these conditions when authorising new banking FDI because in failing to do so, 
efficiency and spillover effects will not be achieved, as our case study has shown and 
as other studies support. For instance, Pehlivan and Kirkpatrick (2001), Yeyati and 
Micco (2004) and Bonin et al. (2005), from their findings support the argument that 
foreign banks are not more efficient than domestic banks and foreign entry does not 
necessarily make the market more competitive, particularly when the market is 
already concentrated, as is the case in SA.  
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Table 8.1: Summary findings 
 
Hypotheses / Questions Contributions / Findings 
Ch2/H1: The net interest margin of SA banks is either 
ambiguous or positively correlated with foreign 
banks’ share in SA. 
The foreign banks’ entries are associated with higher net interest 
income (NIIN) of SA domestic banks.  
Ch2/H2: The non-interest income of a domestic bank in SA is 
either positively or negatively correlated with the 
foreign banks’ share in SA. 
The non-interest income of a domestic bank in SA is negatively 
correlated with the presence of foreign banks. But this relationship is 
not statistically significant.  
Ch2/H3: The overheads of a domestic bank in SA are positively 
correlated to the foreign banks’ share in SA. 
The overhead of a domestic bank in SA is not positively correlated 
with the presence of foreign banks. 
Ch2/H4: The ratio of pre-tax profit to the total assets of a 
domestic bank in SA is negatively correlated to the 
foreign banks’ share in SA. 
The foreign banks’ entries are associated with lower before-tax profit 
of SA domestic banks.  
Ch2/H5: The effect of foreign banks entry depends on banking 
market development in SA. 
The positive and statisticaly effect found, was not the result of the 
banking market development in SA, but the result of the financial 
crisis that occurred in 2001. 
Findings from Ch2/H1 to Ch2/H6 suggest there has been a limited increase in competition confined to wholesale banking. Not in retail 
banking. There have been no spillover effects that could be statistically significant. 
 
Ch2/H6: Foreign-owned banks in South Africa are more 
efficient than domestic-owned banks. 
Ch2/H6 is supported by this study, as foreign banks in SA are more 
efficient than domestic banks. In addition, foreign banks’ higher 
efficiency is explained by: risk preference, better corporate 
governance, smaller size and transfer of knowledge and know-how 
from their mother company. 
 
Ch3/H1: What are the reasons for entry of the foreign banks in 
SA market? 
The foreign banks entered (and are still) in the SA market for the 
search of new clients. 
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Ch3/H2: In which type of clients foreign banks are interested, in 
SA market? 
The forieng banks have been interested in the limited scope of the 
SA wholesale segment and not in the retail-banking segment. 
Ch3/H3: What products and service innovation do foreign banks 
contribute to bring into the SA market? 
The foreign banks have been contributing to the introduction of new 
products, techniques and technologies in SA market. 
Ch3/H4: What knowledge do foreign banks contribute to bring 
into SA market? 
The foreign banks have been contributing to the introduction of new 
practices and know-how in SA market. 
Ch3/H5: What is the impact of foreign banks on competition, 
quality and efficiency in SA market? 
Demonstration effects took place, implying that competition and 
spillovers effects have occurred in the SA banking sector due to the 
presence of the foreign banks.  
Ch3/H6: What is the probability of future scenario in SA 
banking system? 
A majority of foreign banks want to be independent, however, a 
reconfiguration of the SA banking sector may happen in the future 
through new FDI in SA market. 
 
Ch5/H1: There is expected to be a relative change in the defined 
variables (performance and efficiency) after the event 
of a change in ownership structure for both banks 
ABSA and the Standard Bank. 
 
There is a positive change in the variables of performance and 
efficiency for ABSA. This leads to the conclusion that the British 
FDI has contributed to pass on new knowledge and increased both 
performance and efficiency of its new acquisition ABSA. 
 
There is no significant change in variables of performance and 
efficiency for the Standard Bank. This leads to the conclusion that 
the Chinese FDI has not improved performance or efficiency of its 
new SA Greenfield investment, the Standard Bank. However, 
interviews with representatives of the Standard Bank confirm that 
the Chinese FDI has contributed to pass on limited new knowledge 
to the Standard Bank.  
Ch5/H2: There is expected to be a relative change with the 
defined variables (performance and efficiency) after 
the event in ownership structure for the group study 
compared to the control group. 
There is no significant change in variables of performance and 
efficiency for both the Standard bank and ABSA compared to there 
competitors (control group). This leads to the conclusion that the 
new FDI have not contributed to raise significant competition in SA 
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banking sector. And this is also backed by the interview results from 
the competitors.  
However, the same interview results suggest that competion has 
occurred in the wholesale segment and knowledge has spilled over in 
both retail and wholesale segments since 2000 well before the two 
FDI due to SA government pressure and the re-entry of the foreign 
banks from 1994 after the Apartheid regime.  
 
The study has also found that the emergence of a recent SA bank, 
Capitec (a domestic competitor) has raised competition in the entire 
SA banking sector. 
 
Conclusion on the FDI knowledge spillovers in SA: The combinaison of survey, case study and empirical (statistic) models leads to 
the conclusion that there are some competition and spillover effects due to the re-entry of foreign banks in SA. But this competition and 
spillover effects are localised in the segment of wholesale and investment banking. 
Policy implication: How to learn from FDI flows and extend their positive impact and restrict their negative effects can be achieved by 
opening up the SA banking market further. FDI are positive but too restricted in impact to one segment (wholesale banking). 
Theoretical contribution for FDI spillovers in banking in developing country in South-South context: to extend FDI theory that applies 
to manufacturing to refocus on nature of spillovers in banking services and role of FDI in transferring knowledge and practices. 
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Annexes  
 
 
 
Annex 3.1: List of banks operating in SA and banks panel 
 
 
Banks operating in SA 
Locally controlled Foreign controlled Branches of foreign banks 
African Bank Ltd Absa Bank Ltd (a 
member of Barclays 
Bank Group) 
ABN AMRO Bank N Bank of 
Baroda.V. 
Bidvest Bank Ltd Albaraka Bank Limited Bank of China, Johannesburg 
Branch 
Capitec Bank Ltd Habib Overseas Bank 
Limited 
Bank of Taiwan, SA Branch 
FirstRand Bank Ltd Islamic Bank Limited (in 
liquidation) 
Calyon Corporate and Investment 
Bank SA 
HBZ Bank Ltd Mercantile Bank Limited China Construction Bank, 
Johannesburg Branch 
Imperial Bank Ltd South African Bank of 
Athens Limited, The 
Citibank N.A. 
Investec Bank Ltd  Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 
Marriott Merchant Bank Ltd  Deutsche Bank AG 
Nedbank Ltd  HSBC Bank plc, Johannesburg 
Branch 
People Bank Ltd  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
Johannesburg Branch 
Regal Treasury Private Bank 
Ltd (in liquidation) 
 Société Générale, Johannesburg 
Branch 
Rennies Bank Ltd (now a 
division of Bidvest Bank) 
 Standard Chartered Bank, 
Johannesburg Branch 
Sasfin Bank Ltd  State Bank of India 
 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd, 
The 
  
TEBA Bank Ltd   
Source: South Africa Reserve Bank and other sources 
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SA Banks Panel  
Source: South Africa Reserve bank (SARB) 
 
Banks Ownership Foreign Panel 
Local Foreign Branches  
African Bank Ltd     
Bidvest Bank Ltd     
Capitec Bank Ltd     
FirstRand Bank Ltd     
Imperial Bank Ltd     
Investec Bank Ltd     
Marriott Merchant Bank Ltd     
Nedbank Ltd     
People Bank Ltd     
Regal Treasury Private Bank Ltd (in liquidation)     
Rennies Bank Ltd (now a division of Bidvest Bank)     
Sasfin Bank Ltd     
Standard Bank of SA Ltd, The     
TEBA Bank Ltd     
Absa Bank Ltd (a member of Barclays Bank Group)     
Albaraka Bank Limited     
Habib Overseas Bank Limited     
HBZ Bank Ltd     
Islamic Bank Limited (in liquidation)     
Mercantile Bank Limited     
South African Bank of Athens Limited, The     
Bank of China, Johannesburg Branch     
Bank of Taiwan, SA Branch     
Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank SA     
China Construction Bank, Johannesburg Branch     
Citibank N.A.     
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft     
HSBC Bank plc, Johannesburg Branch     
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Johannesburg Branch     
RBS     
Société Générale, Johannesburg Branch     
Standard Chartered Bank, Johannesburg Branch     
State Bank of India     
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Annex 3.2: Bankscope data definitions  
 
This link below provides all data definitions from Bankscope: 
https://bankscope2.bvdep.com/version-201387/Search.QuickSearch.serv?cont 
 
Here is just an extraction to illustrate what the definitions look like: 
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Annex 3.3: SA Private Credit to GDP from IMF source  
Source: IMF 
 
Procedure for Private Credit extraction from IMF database by IMF team  
 
On 3 Apr 2012, at 22:52, StatisticsQuery wrote: 
 
Dear Alex, 
 
You may want to contact the author of the report to ask which exact IFS series code 
he used for private credit but for our "claims on private sector" series in IFS, 
generally speaking: 
 
Claims on the private sector are comprised of claims on other nonfinancial 
corporations and other resident sectors.  Other nonfinancial corporations are privately 
held businesses.  They are called "other" to distinguish them from publically owned 
nonfinancial companies (state owned enterprises) whose claims are captured in lines 
12c/22c/32c/42c/52c.  They are called  "nonfinancial" because their primary business 
is not financial intermediation. Thus, the other nonfinancial corporations sector will 
exclude things likeinsurance companies and pension funds, financial auxiliaries, 
exchange houses, etc (whose claims are captured in lines 12g/22g/32g). 
Other resident sectors comprise of households and nonprofit enterprises serving 
households (any nonprofits, religious organizations, etc.).  Often, if a sole 
proprietorship's books are entangled with those of the household, sole proprietorships 
will be included here and not in other nonfinancial corporations.  We recommend, 
however, that sole proprietorships be classified as other nonfinancial corporations if 
they can be identified distinctly from the household. 
 
Line 12D will be the central bank's claims on the private sector. Mostly, this may 
refer to loans given to central bank staff, but there are also instances where the central 
bank has invested directly in private sector securities (like the US Fed's investment in 
mortgage backed securities) or shares. 
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Line 22D will be the other depository corporations claims on the private sector. 
 
Line 32D is the sum of lines 12D and 22D.  This represents the depository 
corporation's claims on the private sector. 
 
Line 42D will be the other financial corporations claims on the private sector. 
 
Line 52D is the sum of lines 32D and 42D and represents the entire financial system's 
claims on the private sector. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Data Dissemination and Client Services Team 
Statistical Information Management Division 
Statistics Department 
International Monetary Fund 
 
5 April 2012 16:04:41 GMT+01:00 
Dear Alex, 
 
Thank you for your email. 
 
1.  The codes that you see in the Query within a Dataset are not IFS codes but our 
Catalog of Time Series Codes so you will not find 12d, 22d, 32d, 42d, 52d here! 
 
2.  If you read the introduction to IFS pages, section 5 (from our earlier reply to you), 
you will note that there are now two presentations of monetary statistics in IFS. Some 
countries are still reporting monetary statistics based on the old presentation while 
others are reporting data based on the new presentation.  For South Africa, they are 
now reporting data on the new presentation (based on SRF reporting method).  Any 
country that reports on the new presentation basis will have data only from 2001 
forward.  Hence, we will not have data prior to 2001A (or 2001Q4 or 2011M12) for 
those reporting in the new presentation.  Having said that, data based on the old 
presentation for South Africa is still available in IFS if you want to review. 
 
3.  If you want to retrieve data for 12d, 22d, 32d, 42d, 52d based on the new 
presentation on eLibrary Data site, there is a Help link on the top right.  Click on it 
and then click on the "Find Concepts for Codes" link in the text under the "Find Data 
Using IMFStatistics.org Codes" section.  Click on the "IFS" sheet and in the first 
column look for 12D..ZK, 22D..ZK, 32D..ZK, 42D..ZK 52D..ZK.  The "ZK" 
indicates the series is based on the new presentation.  For old presentation codes, look 
for same codes but with "ZF" in the code, eg. 12D..ZF, 22D..ZF, 32D..ZF, 42D..ZF 
52D..ZF.  Once you find these in column A, go to Column D and you will see the 
path you need to follow in the Concept section of the Query builder.  Also note that 
Column C now gives you the code that is in the Query builder. 
 
Hope this is helpful. 
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Sincerely, 
 
Data Dissemination and Client Services Team 
Statistical Information Management Division 
Statistics Department 
International Monetary Fund 
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Annex 3.4: Procedure and Command Stata to perform panel data fixed effect 
regression 
1. Create a dataset: The dasetset contains all “Studied Variables”.  
2. Insheet using dataset.txt: specifies to Stata the dataset to be used.  
3. The following Stata command xtset bank years declares bank data to be 
panel data and years identifies the times within panels.  
4. Then the commande: xtreg (Studied Variable1) (Studied Variable2). . . ., fe is 
executed 
a) xtreg: estimates the panel data variables   
b) : fe, indicates Stata to use panel data fixed effect estimator. 
5. The command is run separately for the six different independent variables.  
 
 
Annex 3.5: Procedure and Command Stata to perform panel data random effect 
GLS regression 
6. Create a dataset: The dasetset contains all “Studied Variables”.  
7. Insheet using dataset.txt: specifies to Stata the dataset to be used.  
8. The following Stata command xtset bank years declares bank data to be 
panel data and years identifies the times within panels.  
9. Then the commande: xtreg (Studied Variable1) (Studied Variable2). . . ., re is 
executed 
c) xtreg: estimates the panel data variables   
d) : re, indicates Stata to use panel data random-effect Generalized Lease Square 
GLS estimator. 
10. The command is run separately for the six different independent variables.  
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Annex 3.6: Definition of investment assets 
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Annex 3.7: Procedure and Command Stata to perform X-efficiency scores 
1. Create a dataset: The dasetset contains all “Studied Variables”. Fourteen banks 
compose the dataset and are identified by a number contained in the variable 
“Bank”.  The variable “Ownership” that takes value 0 or 1 corresponding 
respectively to domestic-owned or foreign-owned, and finally, variable “year” that 
identifies the year of the observation. 
2. Insheet using dataset.txt: specifies to Stata the dataset to be used.  
3. The following Stata command xtset bank years declares bank data to be 
panel data and years identifies the times within panels.  
4. Then the command xtfrontier ln(Studied Variable1) ln(Studied Variable2). . 
. ., tvd is executed 
a) Xtfrontier: estimates the technical efficiency.  
b) Tvd: specifies that the parameters of the time-varying decay technical 
inefficiency model be estimated. 
5. Then the command predict efficiency, te: allows Stata to get the time-varying 
technical efficiency scores. 
6. And list efficiency: displays the efficiency scores. 
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Annex 3.8: Procedure and Command Stata to perform Tobit regression 
1. Create a dataset: The dasetset contains all “Studied Variables”.  
2. Insheet using dataset.txt: specifies to Stata the dataset to be used.  
3. Then the commande: tobit (Studied Variable1) (Studied Variable2). . . ., ul() is 
executed 
e) Tobit: estimate the different parameters or variables   
f) Ul(): indicate the value at which the right censoring begins. 
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Annex 3.9: QMUL – Ethic approval 
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Annex 3.10: Survey Questionnaire  
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Annex 3.11: Survey Information letter 
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Annex 3.12: Survey consent form  
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Annex 5.1: Template of bank interview guide 
 
 
Interview guide for ABSA  
(Impacts of the Barclays majority ownership in ABSA) 
 
Question concerning the informant 
 Name 
 Position 
 Education background and experience 
 How long have you been employed in CCBC 
 Nationality 
 
Question concerning activities and reasons for investment 
 Why your Barclays choose to invest in SA: 
o Labour costs 
o Business/investment incentives 
o Africa will be the Chinese future financial hub in Africa, taking 
advantage of the JSE? 
o To use SA as an export base for African investment market 
o To get better knowledge in finance/competition . . .  
 Why did you accept to partner with Barclays and not another European 
bank such as HSBC. . .  
 Why did you accept an acquisition and not an Greenfield investment 
 Which type of investment did you agree with Barclays to finance this 
shareholding acquisition: 
o Absorption 
o Consolidation 
o Acquisition of stocks (voting stock for cash, share of stocks, or 
other securities) or assets 
 What was the method of payment: 
o Cash payment 
o Stock for stock exchange (including ordinary shares, preference 
shares, etc…) 
o Cash and stock exchange (which is a combination of the cash 
payment and stock for stock) 
o Other (loan stock, convertible loan stock, etc. . . ) 
 
Questions concerning the strategy and governance of the new entity 
 What is the relationship between Barclays and ABSA  
 What is the degree of autonomy in decision-making in ABSA?  
 Which type of decision are made at headquarter level (London) and 
which at the branch (ABSA SA) 
 Does the branch have any influence on investment projects?  
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 What level (financially) or which types of investment are considered as 
strategic for ABSA 
 What are the strategy of the ABSA concerning development: 
o Africa and South Continents (Asia, Brazil, India)  
o Local by introducing new products and/or attracting new 
customers 
o Both. . .  
 What procedure do you follow when you have to introduce a new product 
or penetrate new markets 
 
Questions concerning relationship between ABSA bank and Barclays 
 Did Barclays replace a significant number of ABSA top and middle 
managers with Barclays ones? If yes why 
 Did ABSA lay off any personnel, or put in place any voluntary redundancy 
policy 
 Did the Barclays investment team merged with ABSA one? 
 Did Barclays assist or help ABSA in anyway in upgrading their 
management skills, system and operation quality. In what way?  
o Assisted improving product/customer quality: quality control  
o Gave operational guidance  
o Assisted ABSA with operational knowledge and methods 
o Helped upgrading customer satisfaction / delivery system 
o Carried out training and education of employees (which group of 
personnel? How many, about what?) 
o Training at management level: Planning, marketing, finance, 
administration of technology 
o Transferred system, technology or other equipment 
o In what form? Licensing arrangement? 
o Helped employees in handling new system 
o Assisted in designing improvements 
o Helped test products 
o Provided information (product development, customers) 
 In what way was assistance provided? 
o By whom? Barclays engineers, technician or marketing managers, 
foreign experts or external consultants 
o Via written or electronic manuals or personal visiting ABSA 
 Does Barclays have any joint-project product or investments projects 
with other SA banks than ABSA? 
 Does Barclays normally communicate with ABSA 
o Through fax, mail, telephone, personal, face-to-face contact 
 Do ABSA people and Barclays’ often meet? Do they meet for other 
purposes than business? Social events . . .  
 Would you say mutual trust exists between the two banks?  
 
 What is your future plan for this co-operation? 
o Increase the number of investment projects in SA 
o Merge African Barclays’ operations with ABSA and give ABSA the 
lead in Africa?  
o Increase the Barclays ownership in ABSA? 
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 Would a possible EU-Africa partnership influence Barclays strategy in SA 
via ABSA 
 
Question concerning the SA context and political regulation 
 Does the government offer you any assistance or encouragement or 
incentives or financial support to invest in SASB 
 Is any effort made by the government to link you up with Barclays 
 Is SA the main regional base for project financing or other financial 
projects 
 In your opinion does SA has a future as the financial hub of Africa 
 How the EU-SA and other regional agreements (SACU, SADC) influenced 
the strategy of your firm 
 
Question concerning the crisis in 2008 
 Has the Barclays and SASB made any changes in strategies or future plans 
because of the recent crisis in 2008, 
 Have you suffered and recovered from the crisis? 
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Annex 5.2: Interviews participants  
 
1. Emilio Pera, Director at Ernst & Young Consultant 
2. Roger Vester, Director at Deloitte Consultant 
3. Alan Bedford-Shaw, Head of Corporate Development, Standard Bank 
4. Alan Hartdegen, Head of Investor Relation, ABSA 
5. Sam Moss, Head of Investor Relationship, First Rand 
6. Alfred Visagie, Head of Investor Relationship, Nedbank  
7. Tralac 
8. Simon Robert, Competition Commission 
9. Steward Bobo, SA National Treasury 
10. Linda Motsumi, South Africa Reserve Bank 
11. South Africa Ombudsman 
12. Frontier Advisory 
13. Feasibility 
14. Financial Service Board Regulator 
15. Ex-lawyer for the competition commission ex-Barclay Lawyer 
16. The Edge Institute Stephen Gelb 
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Annex 5.3: Procedure and Command Stata to perform T-Statistics  
T-statistic to compare indicators of the two banks of the panel: 
1. Create a dataset: The dasetset contains all “Studied Variables” in addition to 
variable “numbank” that that takes value 1 for ABSA and value 2 for Standard 
Bank and another variable “year” that identifies the year of the observation.  
2. The following Stata command is then executed: ttest “Studied Variable”, by 
(numbank). The ttest command tests the hypothesis of no difference in the two 
banks means assuming equal variances. It provides a test statistic and a p 
value assuming the population variances are equal. By numbank allows Stata 
to distinguish the Studied Variable of ABSA from Standard Bank.  
3. And this command is repeated for each Study Variable.   
 
T-statistics to compare indicators of the two banks of the panel with their peers: 
1. Create a dataset: The dasetset contains all “Studied Variables”, the variable 
“numbank” that that takes value 1, 2, 3 and for ABSA, First Rand, Nedbank and 
Standard Bank respectively, the variable “Ownership” that takes value 0 or 2 
corresponding respectively to foreign-owned or domestic-owned, and finally, 
variable “year” that identifies the year of the observation. 
2. The following Stata command is then executed: ttest “Studied Variable” 
if(year>=2004|year<=2010) & numbank!=4, by(ownership2).  
c) In this case the ttest command tests the hypothesis of no difference in one 
foreign-owned bank (here ABSA) and the two domestic banks (peers’ banks) 
means assuming equal variances. It provides a test statistic and a p value 
assuming the population variances are equal.  
d) Numbank!=4 instructs stata to exclude the other domestic bank from the panel 
(here Standard Bank).   
e) by(ownership2) allows Stata to distinguish the Studied Variable of ABSA 
from the peers’ Bank. 
f) if(year>=2004|year<=2010 indicates stata the time period before and after 
the event of acquisition or greenfield.  
3. And this command is repeated for each Study Variable. And the procedure is 
executed again for the second bank.   
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Annex 6.1: Regression results of Foreign bank entry effect on SA domestic banks 
Before-Tax Profit (BTXP)  
 
 Equation (3.2) Equation (3.3) 
Forbk_Num -0.142 (0.0870)*              _ 
Forbk_Shr                 _ 0.960 (0.6793)* 
Interact_Shr                 _ -0.606 (0.4225)* 
NINEA -0.0004 (0.022)  -0.001 (0.0235) 
EQTY 0.168 (0.0285)*** 0.173 (0.029)*** 
SLTDPA 0.0002 (0.0195) -0.002 (0.0198) 
PCGDP -0.175 (0.0453) 0.194 (0.1233)* 
GGDP 0.001 (0.0013) -0.002 (0.001) 
Income (log) 0.2459 (0.2601) -0.447 (0.332) 
CPI -0.002 (0.0015)* -0.001 (0.020) 
Constant -2.452 (2.6031) 4.383 (3.294) 
Time Dummy            Yes 
Number of Obs              86            86 
Source: Author calculations. 
Notes: Dependent variable is BTXP. Robust standard error is in parentheses.  
(***) Significant at 1%, (**) Significant at 5%, (*) Significant at 15%. 
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